

# Financial System Stability Review 2020



# **PUBLISHER:** Central Bank of Sri Lanka 30, Janadhipathi Mawatha Colombo 1 Sri Lanka The Financial System Stability Review – 2020 mainly focuses on nine months data ending September 2020. However, selected developments up to date of publication are also reported. Data may include calculations made specially for this publication based on information obtained from various sources. Download a PDF version of the report from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka website: www.cbsl.gov.lk For inquiries, comments and feedback please contact:

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### **Abbreviations**

Authorised Dealers	GOSL	Government of Sri La ka
Anti-Money La ndering/Countering	GWP	Gross Written Premium
•	IFC	Internationa Fina ce Corporation
	IIAs	Inwa d Investment Accounts
Averg e Weighted Cb   Money Rate	IIS	Interest in Suspense
Averg e Weighted Repo Rate	ILF	Intra-Day Liquidity Facility
Business Continuity Plan	ILO	International Labor Organization
Business Foreign Currency Accounts	IMF	International Monetaly Fund
Ba k for Internationa Settlements	IPOs	Initial Public Offerings
Business Sentiment Index	LBs	Licensed B <b>a</b> ks
Cp ith Adeque y Ratio	LCBs	Licensed Commercia Ba ks
Common ATM Switch	LCPL	Lanka Clear Pvt. Ltd
Credit to Deposit and Debenture	LCR	Liquidity Coverg e Ratio
Common Electronic Fund Transfer Switch	LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies'
Computer Emergency Response Tean	LFCs	Licensed Fina ce Compa ies
Colombo Stock Excha ge	LFPR	Labor Force Participation Rate
Domestic-Systemically Important Licensed Fina ce Compa ies	LPOPP	LankaPay Online Payment Platform
	LSB	Licensed Specialized Bank
Ea nings Before Interest a d Tax	ISBs	International Sovereign Bonds
Europea Centra Bank	LSF	Liquidity Support Fa ility
Emerging Market and Developing Economies	LTV	Loa to Vaue
	MI	Member Institutions
Europay Ma ter Visa	MLA	Moneta y Law Act
Fina cia Action Ta k Force	ML	Money La ndering
Foreign Currency	MSMEs	Micro, Smb I a d Medium Enterprises
Foreign Exch <b>a</b> ge Act	NBFIs	Non-Ba k Fina cia Institutions
Fina cia Institutions	NFIS	Nationa Fina cia Inclusion Strategy
Fina cia Intelligence Unit	NII	Net Interest Income
Fina cia Ma ket Stb ility Indicator	NIM	Net Interest Ma gin
Gross Domestic Product	NPC	National Payment Councils
	Anti-Money La ndering/Countering Fina cing of Terrorism  All Share Price Index  Averg e Weighted Cb I Money Rate  Averg e Weighted Repo Rate  Business Continuity Plan  Business Foreign Currency Accounts  Ba k for Internationb Settlements  Business Sentiment Index  Cp ith Adequa y Ratio  Common ATM Switch  Credit to Deposit and Debenture  Common Electronic Fund Transfer  Switch  Computer Emergency Response Tean  Colombo Stock Excha ge  Domestic-Systemically Important  Licensed Fina ce Compa ies  Ea nings Before Interest a d Tax  Europea Centra Bank  Emerging Market and Developing Economies  Emerging Ma ket Economies  Europay Ma ter Visa  Fina cia Action Ta k Force  Foreign Currency  Foreign Excha ge Act  Fina cia Institutions  Fina cia Intelligence Unit  Fina cia Ma ket Stb ility Indicator	Anti-Money La ndering/Countering Fina cing of Terrorism IFC All Share Price Index Averg e Weighted Ch I Money Rate IIS Averg e Weighted Repo Rate Business Continuity Plan Business Foreign Currency Accounts Ba k for Internationh Settlements IPOs Business Sentiment Index LBs Cp ith Adequa y Ratio Common ATM Switch Credit to Deposit and Debenture Common Electronic Fund Transfer Switch Computer Emergency Response Tean Colombo Stock Excha ge Domestic-Systemically Important Licensed Fina ce Compa ies Ea nings Before Interest a d Tax Europea Centrh Bank Europea Centrh Bank Emerging Market and Developing Economies Emerging Ma ket Economies Emerging Ma ket Economies Europay Ma ter Visa Fina cih Action Ta k Force Foreign Currency Foreign Excha ge Act Fina cih Institutions Fina cih Institutions Fina cih Intelligence Unit NII Fina cih Ma ket Sth ility Indicator NIM

NPLs	Non-performing Loans	RTGS	Reb Time Gross Settlement
NSFR	Net St <b>b</b> le Funding Ratio	RWA	Risk Weighted Assets
ОМО	Open Ma ket Operations	SDAs	Special Deposit Accounts
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries	SDFR	Standing Deposit Facility Rate
		SLCs	Specib ised Lea ing Compa ies
PBV	Price to Book Value	SLDB	Sri Lanka Development Bond
PCIDSS	Payment Card Industry Data Security Sta da d	SLDILSS	Sri Lanka Deposit Insurance and Liquidity Supports Scheme
PDCs	Primary Dealer Companies		. ,
PER	Price Earnings Ratio	SLFR	Sta ding Lending Fa ility Rate
PFCAs	Personal Foreign Currency Accounts	SLIPS	Sri Lanka Inter Bank Payment System
PIs	Participating Institutions	SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
PMI	Purchasing Managers' Index	SPDs	Standalone Primary Dealers
QR	Quick Response	SRR	Statutory Reserve Ratio
REITs	Reb Estate Investment Trusts	USA	United States of America
ROA	Return on Assets	USD	US Dollars
ROE	Return on Equity	WEO	World Economic Outlook

## Governor's Foreword

The Financial System Stability Review (FSSR) is an assessment of the financial system stability of Sri Lanka, carried out by the Central Bank, encompassing developments in the financial system and a comprehensive analysis of factors that may affect the stability and resilience of the financial system. The present issue of the FSSR highlights contemporary issues pertaining to risks in the financial system and the policy measures taken by the government and the Central Bank to contain such risks during the nine months ending September 2020.

Identifying and gauging risks and vulnerabilities in the financial system and taking remedial action to mitigate them in order to maintain the financial system stability were challenging during the period under review because of the uncertainties and adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the financial sector and the economy. The global economy encountered one of its deepest recessions due to COVID- 19 pandemic. These negative developments in the global economy have transmitted to the domestic economy, bringing in unprecedented socio-economic problems. Despite spillovers of these unfavorable conditions, the financial system stability of Sri Lanka was maintained during this period, through timely and proactive policy measures. Accommodative monetary policy measures brought out a reduction in policy rates and the statutory reserve ratio. The consequent availability of liquidity in abundance and reduced market interest rates have the potential to stimulate economic activities. The introduction of concessionary credit schemes by the Central Bank encouraged banks to grant credit to COVID-19 affected businesses and individuals. Further, regulatory forbearances on capital and liquidity are further measures that were taken to reduce the stress on the financial system. Macroprudential measures such as holding capital conservation buffers by regulated financial institutions which were released in response to the crisis, helped those institutions to steer through the turbulent period. Further, microprudential regulation and supervision carried out by the Central Bank and other financial sector regulators ensured that adequate risk management techniques were employed by regulated financial institutions. Nevertheless, financial institutions continued to face concerns regarding depleting credit quality due

to income losses lowering the repayment capacity of borrowers. In addition, some Licensed Finance Companies (LFCs) which were under-capitalized even prior to the crisis, faced challenges in continuing their business operations. As such, a Master Plan is being implemented by the Central Bank to improve capital levels and establish a strong and resilient LFCs sector in the medium term. Meanwhile, the performance of financial markets weakened with high volatility during the COVID-affectedQ2 2020, followed by a recovery phase due to improved investor sentiments, political stability and favourable policy stimuli. In the meantime, financial infrastructure proved adequate for the smooth functioning of the payment and settlement systems, with considerable improvements in the legal infrastructure. Given the rising eagerness for digital payments due to effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, payment and settlement systems, supported by timely issuance of regulatory guidelines, demonstrated their resilience in the face of heightened cyber security threats.

Going forward, the Central Bank will continue to monitor and be vigilant on risks and vulnerabilities affecting individual participants of the financial system as well as the emergence of systemic risks, to safeguard the financial system stability, which is one of the Central Bank's main objectives. In conclusion, I believe that this FSSR will provide comprehensive reference material to all stakeholders of the financial sector. Its detailed analysis of risks and vulnerabilities faced by the financial system and the summary it provides about risk mitigation measures implemented by relevant authorities are bound to be extremely useful for them as well as many others examining conditions of the economy.

Deshamanya Prof. W D Lakshman

Deshurs

Governor

## **Executive Summary**

The outbreak of COVID-19 and its implications on economies extend fa beyond the heathrelated concerns, testing the resilience of globa fina cia sectors. The Sri La ka fina cia sector is no exception a it wa a so confronted with a a ray of unprecedented challenges. Nevertheless, country ma g ed to preserve the stb ility of the fina cia system during the nine months ending in September 2020 through multifa eted mea ures an idst strong ma roeconomic head winds. In built strengths and cp a ities of the fina cib system a d prompt a tions the en by the Government a d the Centra ba k ea ed the pressure triggered by the pa demic to a greater extent. The effica y of the pa demic containment mea ures especially during Q2 2020, continued accommodative monetary policy mea ures to exert downwa d d justments to ma ket interest rates, fa ilitating d equate liquidity a d credit in domestic ma kets, introduction of concessiona credit schemes a d offering debt moratoria to businesses a d individua s affected by the pandemic a d regulatory forbea a ces to the fina cia sector, positively contributed towa ds the resilience of the fina cib system a d restoring market confidence in Q3 2020. However, the resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic in October 2020 could exert further stress on the fina cia sector, if not ma g ed effectively.

Immediately after the Presidential elections, a fiscal stimulus package was unveiled in late 2019 ta geting the corporate sector of Sri La ka with a view to enha cing production a d economic growth. However, due to the negative effects stemming from the COVID- 19 pandemic, the economy contra ted by 1.6 per cent during the first qua ter of 2020 a d 16.3 per cent in second qua ter 2020, negating the impa t of the fisch stimulus. Further, the global economic downturn tra smitted to the domestic economy through declining tourism ea nings a d export ea nings while recording foreign ca houtflows from fina cia Pandemic containment measures, including mobility restrictions, relentlessly affected the performa ce of the corporate sector a d household incomes. As such, the economy could not rep the benefits of the ma sive tax reliefs a d positive policy stimuli provided towa ds the end of 2019. However, as a result of re-opening the country and positive policy stimuli a GDP growth of 1.5 per cent was recorded in third qua ter of 2020. Fina cib intermediation which is mea ured by the credit to deposit ratio decreased during the period under review which wa a result of increa ing deposits. A modest increa e in credit to the private sector wa observed, while credit to the state sector expa ded rapidly an idst increased reliance of the government on domestic fina cing an idst limited a cess to foreign sources a d increa ed borrowing requirements of the government. Mea while, the sovereign rating of Sri La ka wa downgrd ed by three rating g encies, heightening the challenges to service the country's external debt. Challenges to external debt sustainal ility are looming with the declining externa dema d for exports a d mobility restrictions affecting tourism a d other inflows, weighing heavily on foreign currency inflows an idst limited reserve a sets to defend pla sible risks. However, the fisch policy strategy of the Budget for 2021 is expected to strengthen the medium term fisch consolidation path through tax policy reforms, while further rationalization of recurrent expenditure and prioritizing public investment to stimulate the economy a enunciated in the national policy framework, "Vistas of Prosperity a d Splendour".

COVID-19 pandemic brought in unprecedented volatility into national financial market. Despite short lived unprecedented volatilities observed a ross & I fina cib ma ket segments a the pa demic befell, fina cib ma kets remaned resilient during the ten months ending in October 2020. The prices of risky a sets plummeted while investors sought refuge in safe haven a sets, in globa fina cial ma kets. The Sri La ka fina cib ma kets were no exception a d witnessed investors opting for more liquid and less risky assets. Despite proa tive policy mea ures the en by the regulators that have been effective up to now, in stabilizing ma kets, the loca fina cib ma kets reman volatile to COVID-19 pandemic related developments.

The Colombo Stock Excha ge can e under severe stress at the onset of the pa demic, exhibiting excessive volatility which triggered indexedba ed circuit brea ers ha ting trad e in ma ket. Nevertheless, the bourse has been recovering since mid-May 2020 as domestic investors' preference shifted towa ds equity investments in a low interest rate regime an idst foreign outflows, becoming one of the fa test recovered ma kets from the pa demic in the region. The government securities maket expa ded rapidly during the ten months ending October 2020 an idst foreign outflows, a the former benefited from excess rupee liquidity in the ba king sector resulting from moderated private sector credit dema d a d enha ced investor preferences towa ds safer a sets during the challenging business conditions. The government securities maket remained a tive to fina ce the fisch operations intensified by the pandemic. Yields on government securities were impa ted by the moneta y policy ea ing, strategic issuance a ra gements of government securities, the a nouncement of maximum yield rates prior to a ction a d prima y ma ket purcha e of government securities by the Centra Ba k. Consequently, historically low yield rates were observed a ross all maturities during the period, shifting the secondary ma ket yield curve downwards. Primary market activities of the corporate bond ma ket were a versely affected by the pandemic but rebounded towards Q3 2020, with mea ures being the en to contain the spred of the disea e.

The money maket waresilient reporting excess liquidity during ten months' period ending October 2020. Unprecedented monetary policy earing, refinace failities disbursed under special loas schemes for those affected by the pademic, provision of long-term liquidity as sistace to commerciabaks ad extending the Liquidity Support Faility for stada one primay dealers positively contributed towads earing the pressure in the money maket. In response, money maket interest rates significatly declined during the period.

The domestic foreign excha ge market can e under severe stress at the outset of the pa demic a substa tib outflows were witnessed from fina cib ma kets, simila to other emerging ma ket economies. The pressure ha been gradually ea ing since May 2020, owing to the policy mea ures introduced, such a the imposition of tempora y restrictions on non-essentib imports

a d selected outwa d remitta ces, modest foreign excha ge interventions by the Centra Bakad favorable developments in workers' remittances. Consequently, the Sri Laka rupee recorded only a slight depreciation of 1.4 per cent g is not the US dolla during the ten-month period ending in October 2020.

The ba king sector wa well poised in terms of cp ith a d liquidity at the onset of the pa demic. As the pa demic unfolded, the ba king sector exhibited a deterioration in credit quality during the nine months ending September 2020, despite the moratorium being in effect. The credit growth in 2020 wa la gely driven by credit to the government and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The ba king sector exhibited a higher resilience g a nst liquidity risk reflecting the unprecedented ea ing of moneta y policy, regulatory forbea a ces a d low dema d for loans. Rupee deposits recorded a not**b** le growth during the nine months ending September 2020 a d continued to be the ma or source of funding for the ba king sector. The cumulative maturity gp a a percentg e of the cumulative lib ilities of the ba king sector for maturity buckets up to six months ma ginally widened. The ba king sector profits were impa ted due to downwa d d justment in NIM a d increa e in loa loss provisioning. Nevertheless, an increa e in non-interest income a d decrea e in noninterest expenses a d taxes positively contributed towa ds profits. All ba ks had complied with the minimum Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR) while the ba king sector CAR rema ned well b ove the regulatory minimum. Despite the marginal decline in the leverge e ratio, it remained well be over the requirement.

2020 turned out to be a challenging year for the Licensed Finance Companies (LFCs) and Specialised Leasing Companies (SLCs) sector. The sector, which was vulnerable even before 2019, became more vulnerable as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The centra baka sisted LFC ad SLC sector in ma g ing a d reducing these volatilities with their extro rdina y policy mea ures. The loa book of the LFC a d SLC sector contra ted during the nine months ending September 2020 a d depicted increa e in non- performing loa s despite the debt moratorium offered. The introduction of import restrictions to curtal non-essentia imports, especially motor vehicles, affected the LFC and SLC sector significantly. Profits of the LFCs a d SLCs sector declined manly due to high loan loss provisioning and drop in NIM. Despite severa compa ies faling to mantan a equate cp ith levels, the LFC a d SLC sector collectively ma nta ned cp ith a d liquidity buffers well b ove the regulatory minimum levels. The Centra Ba k announced a Master Plan of consolidation aimed at strengthening the LFC a d SLC sector, by fa ilitating the merger of distressed fina ce compa ies with stronger entities in the medium term, coupled with a prompt corrective a tion fran ework to ensure al LFCs a d SLCs comply with al the prudentia requirements. Mea while, the insura ce sector exhibited mixed performa ces with satisfa tory cp ith a d liquidity levels during the period under consideration. The insura ce sector weathered socio-economic cha lenges encountered in 2020, safegua ding policyholders with clam payments while affording relief on payment of insura ce premiums.

The corporate a d household sector leverg e wa heavily impa ted by the pa demic- induced economic contra tion which outweighed the slow growth in credit to the private sector. The moderation of credit is evident in the household sector. The institutional sector which encompa ses the corporate sector, government a d State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) reported a credit growth la gely due to the increa e in credit to government a d SOEs. Nevertheless, the delinquency levels of household a dinstitution b sectors have been rising, resulting in increa ed non-performing loa ratios in these sectors. Moneta y policy ea ing since ea ly 2019 and tax stimulus unveiled in late 2019 had a favor**b** le impact on corporate sector performa ce prior to the pa demic. However, a the effect of the pa demic heightened, the non-fina cia corporate sector reported a dismb performa ce in the first ha f of 2020. Subdued developments in the corporate sector may eventually be tra smitted to the fina cib sector eroding its performa ce while hindering internal capital generation. However, it is p pa ent that the debt moratorium, concessiona y interest rates a d a commodative moneta y policy mea ures would provide a consider le comfort to corporates. Effective pa demic ma g ement enb ling the economy to return to its growth path is a critich for to boost investor confidence a d to revive the household a d corporate sector performa ce in 2021, while mitigating risks to the fina cia sector.

The COVID-19 pandemic heightened the need for an efficient **a** d reli**b** le fin**a** cib system infra tructure in the economy with a phenomena increa e

in digita tra sa tions in the digita la dscp e. The domestic fina cib system infra tructure demonstrated its resilience a it functioned sean lessly during the nine months ending September 2020. The yea 2020 wa decla ed a "The Year of Digital Transactions" with the view of promoting the usg e of secured a d efficient digital payment mecha isms. Regulatory a d supervisory fran eworks were strengthened with p propriate reforms to stream line the fina cib sector and to mantana efficient a d stable fina cib system.

Fina cib inclusion a d litera y have a considera le scope a d a role in reshap ing the future of the fina cib sector of Sri La ka fetching new growth prospects to households a d Micro-smal, Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Further, enhanced financial inclusion a d litera y positively contribute towa ds the fina cib sector by d dressing issues such a over -indebtedness while inculcating hea thy fina cib hab its an ong households a d MSMEs. Nevertheless, fina cib inclusion would bring new risks to the formab fina cib sector prompting policy setters to take pre-emptive meas ures to mitigate the pla sible impa t on fina cib system stab ility.

The pa demic ha brought unprecedented challenges to the global economies and fina cial systems. The long-term resilience of the globa fina cib system hinges upon the availb ility of vaccine for COVID-19 and the recovery of global economies. Sri La ka needs to re-emerge from the preva ent economic contra tion a d return to a susta na le high growth path. Economic reviva a d containment of the spred of the virus a e required for a la ting fina cib system stability. Stb ility of the fina cib system as contributes towa ds improving ma roeconomic fundan entas through moneta y tra smission a d fina cia intermediation which is a prerequisite for growth. La ge-sch e policy support provided by the Centra Ba k a d the government is expected to fa ilitate fa t recovery of economic a tivities in the nea term, while growth-oriented policies of the government a e expected to sustain the recovery over the medium term. Ta ling off policy stimuli granted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic needs to be made prudently to minimize adverse implications while emphasizing the importance of policy consistency and coherence.



## **Chapter 1**

#### **Macrofinancial Conditions**

#### 1.1 Overview

Me roeconomic hed winds stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic affected the global and domestic economy which spilled over to the fina cib sector of Sri La ka during the nine months ending September 2020. The COVID-19 pa demic has created a heath crisis which ha exerted a significat m ount of stress on the global economy a d the fina cib sector, which ha a greater output loss that the global fina cib crisis. Further, the inherent uncertainty, which is unique to this crisis, continues to create further economic turmoil in both d va ced economies, a d Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs). Drop in demand due to mobility restrictions a d decline in production due to interruptions in the globa supply chains resulted in falling commodity prices during this period. Further, investors shifting to less risky a sets due to uncerta nties created by the pa demic wa observed in increa ing investments in safe haven a sets such a gold. Mea while, centra baks ad governments implemented unprecedented moneta y a d fisca policies to revive the economies from the impa t of the COVID-19 pandemic. These policies were aimed at stimulating the economies, boosting liquidity a d rega ning of business confidence in globa fina cia ma kets, preventing the creation of ma ro fina cia feedba k loops. However, a ma y frontier a d developing economies, Sri La ka too experienced a dry down of liquidity in its international cp ital ma kets fa ing challenges to a cess funding a investors become increa ingly risk averse.

Domestic macro-economic developments also exerted pressure on the fina cib system. Fina cib intermediation of Sri La ka reflected through the credit to deposit ratio decrea ed during the period under review a a result of increa ing deposits. Nevertheless, a increa e of credit wa b so reported during this period due to enha ced liquidity, concessiona y loa schemes, low interest rates a d a increa ing dema d for credit by

the government. The credit dema d from the government sector increa ed significatly for funding the fisch deficit a d to meet the d ditionh expenses related to combating the COVID-19 pandemic. Depleting credit quality despite the debt moratorium, a a result of decreaing repayment cap a ity of corporates a d individuals stemming from the economic downturn is a major risk faled by the finacih sector.

In this be kground, unprecedented moneta y a d fisch policy mea ures were the en by the Centra Ba k a d the government, despite limited fisca spa e ava la le. Such policies resulted in consider**b** ly lowering ma ket interest rates hed ing towa ds a negative rea interest rate scena io for deposits. As such, a shift in investments towa ds ventures other tha deposits wa a ticipated, creating a undue price increa e in such ventures. Nevertheless, so fa, such a increa e in prices ha not become evident in the real estate maket. However, a improved enthusia m in domestic investors was observed in the stock market. Yet, the stock ma ket performa ce a so wa disma, with continuous foreign outflows during the period a d the disruptions to income flows of households a d corporates.

Sri La ka encounter externa may sector vulnerabilities a decrea ing export a d tourism ea nings with foreign ca h outflows weigh heavily on foreign ca h inflows an idst limited reserve a sets to cushion pla sible risks. Mea while, the requirement of fina cing the growing fisca deficit, which wa resulta t from moderating government revenue a d expa ding expenses incurred on combating the COVID-19 pandemic has been challenging. Nevertheless, it is a ticipated that the fisch consolidation a d tax reforms included in the Budget 2021 will improve the fisch position of Sri Despite all challenges, the financial sector has so far been resilient owing to positive policy stimuli **a** d the ava l**b** ility of buffers created through timely **a** d **d** v**a** ced regulatory and ma roprudential mea ures. However, going forwa d, revival of the global **a** d domestic economy **a** d sustaining ma roeconomic performace are essential to mantaining final cial system stability in Sri Lanka


## 1.2 International Economic Environment and Financial Condition

The global economy stepped in to the yea 2020 with a mixed performa ce, a ticipating improved growth, but was stunned by the COVID-19 pandemic from the beginning of the yea. Towa ds the end of 2019, geopolitical and trade tensions amongst USA a d its trade pa tners intensified, emerging ma kets such a India wa under stress situations with concerns on the stb ility of its non-ba k fina cia sector a d natural cata trophes fa ed by USA, Europe, Austra ia Ea tern a d Southern Africa However, the a commodative moneta y policy a d fisch ea ing ca ried out by countries like USA, China a d South Korea gave a positive outlook for growth prospects for 2020. Considering a consolidated effect from a I such fa tors in Janua y 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that the global economy will grow by 3.3 per cent in 2020.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic, which started in China in November 2019 spread to many parts of the world during Q1 of 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic hit the world in three forms of crises: health crisis, economic crisis a d fina cib crisis stemming from a globa lockdown coupled with a ma sive increa e in hea thea e expenses. The IMF predicts that the world will fa e a recession greater tha the Great Depression and surpass the impact of the Global Fina cia Crisis due to the inherent uncerta nty of this crisis. Supporting this, the world uncertainty index a d the world pa demic uncertainty index have rea hed extro rding y levels a a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, surpassing the uncertainty levels created by a y other pa demic or crises fe ed by the world in the pa t. High uncertanty a sociated with this pa demic is ca sed by the exponential possibility of the spread of COVID-19 which is likely to rema n until a cure is identified or a va cine rollout is completed.

Chart 1.1


## World Uncertainty and World Pandemic Uncertainty Indices




Source: Ahir, H, N Bloom, and D Furceri (2018), "World Uncertainty Index", Sta ford mimeo

As per the IMF, the output loss in this situation is much higher tha during the Globa Fina cia Crisis, a d mea ures to improve g gregate dema d in a environment of economic lockdown with mobility restrictions a e more challenging tha in a y other crises, mk ing the reviva of the economy difficult. This is p pa ent from the IMF predicting in April 2020, that the world GDP growth will contract by 3 per cent in 2020, which is a drop of over 6 per cent from the predictions md e before the globa outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic has a higher impact on the services sector due to mobility restrictions which is a other prominent va ia ce from previous crises. During Q1 2020, most countries were under total or pa tib lockdowns which interrupted industries requiring physica lb our. Impa red huma cp ita a d reduced productivity affected global production and disrupted supply chains, creating a significant drop in the global supply. Due to broad based reduction in private investments and consumption, firms were reluctant to increase investments during these times of uncertainty, further depressing improvements in the supply side.

In the mea time, it wa evident that dema d patterns have a so cha ged va tly from pre-crisis behavior. This wa visible with people avoiding mas s gatherings, shopping mals, public trasport a d leisure activities. Demand for sectors which need social interation such a travel, entertanment a d tourism wa more severely affected a la ound the world. Low income levels due to lay-offs or sa y deductions may have a so contributed to the sluggish dema d. As a result, there wa a





High-income countries

Source: International Labour Organization

notice**b** le reluct**a** ce in consumers to spend on luxury **a** d non-essenti**b** products **a** d services. The la k of confidence in future ea nings have **b** so led consumers to follow more ca tious spending hab its.

Unemployment ha increa ed sha ply during the crisis period despite va ious mea ures ta en by governments a med at retaining employees. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that the working hour losses compa ed to Q4 of 2019 (pre-crisis baseline) is 12.1 per cent in Q3, 2020 which is equivalent to a loss of 345 million full time workers. Further, it wa observed that lower-middle-income countries have reported the highest working hour losses a well a the highest loss of lb our income during this period. This may be due to lower infra tructure fa ilities a d technologica d va cements in such countries a d a so ma ority of the workforce being employed in work requiring ma ub lb our which is less an enable to work from home nature. Persons employed in the informal sector a e more severely affected with lesser or no government support in this time of crisis. The ILO ha estimated that 60.0 per cent of globa workers a e employed in the informal sector. Such disruptions in the la our ma ket ca significa tly affect the globa supply a d dema d conditions.

The sharp drop in the Global Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) during April 2020 coincides with this decrea ing global dema d and supply due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Global PMI which was gral ually declining since 2017, improved slightly towards the end of 2019 owing to pessimistic




Source: Bloomberg


business sentiment. The Global PMI was slumped drastically with the COVID-19 pandemic indicating the low sentiment in Q1 and Q2 2020. However, it showed signs of significant recovery in Q3 of 2020 ma nly driven by the confidence boost from policy measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pa demic.

In Q2 of 2020, most countries re-opened from the stringent lockdown conditions imposed in Q1 2020. However, the g gregate dema d continued to decline as a result of job and income losses in Q1 2020, while supply disruptions a so continued. Even after the re-opening of countries a d commencing of work, the productivity loss ha been inevitable. The high cost a d time incurred for mantaning heath guidelines issued to mitigate the spred of COVID-19 have significantly contributed to the decline in productivity. Therefore, in June 2020, the IMF predicted that the reduction in GDP will be steeper tha predicted in April 2020.

In October 2020, the IMF predicted that globb growth will contrated by 4.4 per cent compared to the 4.9 per cent projection released in June 2020. The recovery of growth in economies has been better that expected and economic activity, globble trate and retails here have picked up during Q3 of 2020. Success in several vaccine trials and people and pring their lives to the new normal conditions contributed to this recovery. However, a rapid resurgence of COVID-19 was witnessed all over the world again during Q3 of 2020, urging some countries to re-impose stringent lockdowns similate to those imposed during the first wave of







Source: International Monetary Fund

the pa demic, which may slowdown the economic reviva worldwide a 2020 ends.

Ma y economies have the en multi-pronged mea ures to combat all forms of crises created from COVID-19 pandemic. Government spending on improving heath services, increa ing ra dom testing for COVID-19 virus, medicating and isolating infected people, a d funding resea ch a d development for a va cine a e some measures taken to withstand the health crisis. Providing low cost credit facilities subsidized by the government, cushioning income losses, debt moratoria for industries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, credit guara tee schemes, a d price restrictions to decrea e the cost of living were some mea ures taken to relieve the economy during this turbulent period. Mea ures such a easing moneta y policy, a set repurchases enb led to increa e the liquidity in the economy to stimulate economic a tivity in a period of economic downturn.

Mea while, introducing regulatory forbea a ces especially in terms of cp ith a d liquidity requirements of fina cib institutions a d providing liquidity a sista ce a e some ma roprudentib measures taken to stabilize the financial sector during this period. May countries have issued guidelines to relea e the countercyclica cp ith buffer a d the liquidity coverage ratio which a e buffers created during favourb le times a d meat to be used in times of crisis situations. Further, limiting discretionary payments such a dividends a d profit repatriation was a so the enas a measure to improve the building up of cp ith of fina cib institutions. Through such measures, liquidity was

freed up to fa ilitate the continuation of lending done by fina cib institutions. Thereby, economic a tivities could be ca ried on without disruptions from la k of funding.

Fisch policy mea ures the en by economies, have been in the forms of "Above-the-line" and "Below-the-line" nature. Above-the-line policies a e policies which have a direct impat on the fisch budget in the short term, such a didition spending a dtax cuts. Additional expenses on the heath sector are a so included under such policies. On the contray, below-the-line policies a e policies which do not have a direct impat on the fisch budget but will have a impat on increasing debt or a ditional borrowings. It is observed that a vaced economies have spent a substatially higher an ount for both types of policy measures, which could be due to the high impact of COVID-19 health related issues a well a their bility to afford such spending.

Such unprecedented moneta y a d fisca stimuli have undoubtedly supported in building investor confidence a d diluting the effects of the shocks to the economy. Furthermore, such policies have contributed to avoid d verse ma ro-fina cia feedba k loops.

The positive impa t of the timely implementation of all equate and effective policy measures is reflected in the improving final cib conditions in the Final cib. Conditions Index of USA and the Europeas Union from May 2020 onwards. A noteworthy decline in final cib. conditions was observed in March and April 2020, during which time the COVID-19




pa demic wa at its pea a d the world wa beginning to realize its magnitude and impact of this crisis. It is evident that the uncertainty has severely affected business sentiment.

Global inflation was muted in Q4 of 2019 as a result of the decrea ing prices of meth a d energy stemming from low dema d which wa attributable to the emerging COVID-19 situation in China which led to a closedown of severb fa tories. The low g gregate dema d during the first two qua ters of 2020 created a downwa d pressure on prices, driving the globa inflation low. It was noted that the downwa d pressure on prices surpa sed possible upwa d cost push pressure stemming from disruptions to the supply side. Inflation has slightly picked up for d va ced economies during

Q3 of 2020. However, countries like Japan continue to fa e deflationa y pressure with the downturn in dema d.

Shift in the fina cib sentiments led ing to moving portfolios towa ds safe a sets, such a gold, was observed during the COVID-19 crisis in the commodity ma ket. The flood of liquidity from centra ba ks, combined with record-low interest rates, lifted gold prices from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic which showed corrections in April a d August 2020. This trend wa further strengthened with the declining dema d for the US dolla with politica uncertanties arising from the November 2020 Presidential elections in the USA. Further, towa ds October 2020 the increa ing number of COVID-19 infected people in the USA




and the resurgence of COVID-19 in other advanced countries have led investors to move g ain town ds investing in gold which ha increa ed its price.

The demand for commodities like oil a d heavy meta declined considera ly due to significa tly low commuting done by the world a d the drop in production a d industry usg e of such materia. Further, due to the crisis situation, the OPEC+ cobition could not come into a g reement on prices, resulting in a plunge in oil prices in Ma ch 2020. However, in April 2020 the OPEC+ coalition resumed discussions a d a a result energy prices have improved from May 2020 onwards. Yet, these prices reman below the pre-crisis levels. As such, currencies of commodity exporting economies have fa ed considerb le depreciation. Further, economies which depend on exporting commodities a e experiencing difficulties due to the uncertain cain flows from exports.

#### 1.2.1 Global Financial Markets


In the beginning of yea 2020, international fina cia ma kets indicated a downturn with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic which created consider**b** le liquidity constra nts. However, from Q2 of 2020, a disconnection between financial ma kets a d the rea economy wa observed with substa tia ea ing of fina cia conditions with improving liquidity in the ma kets due to unprecedented moneta y policy mea ures ta en by centra ba ks. Such mea ures have boosted investor sentiment, a d a a result fina cia markets have sta ted to improve, independent of the downwa d moving economy. Pertaining to monetary policy ea ing mea ures, policy rates were cut in severa instances in advanced economies and EMDEs. The Federa Reserve Ba k, sla hed interest rates twice in 2020 to near zero levels, cutting interest rates from 1.75 per cent to 0.25 per cent. At the san e time, the Ba k of Engla d reduced the rate by 65 ba is points to 0.10 per cent. In such a scena io, rea yields of bonds issued by a va ced economies a e moving towa ds negative territory due to decrea ing bond yields a d inflation increa ing to pre-pa demic levels. Mea while, the Ba k of Jp a ha kept policy rates uncha ged a they a e a red y at a level below zero. Further, some large EMDEs like Brazil, India, Indonesia, Ma aysia Mexico a d South Africa have a so cut policy rates in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.



Source: Bank for International Settlements

In this be kground of globa liquidity, the ea e of fina cing in globa fina cia ma kets ha improved in Q2 or 2020 facilitating foreign currency credit flows to non-ba k borrowers a per the Globa Liquidity Indicators compiled by the Ba k for International Settlements (BIS). The annual growth of US dolla credit to non-bank borrowers outside the USA increa ed to 6.5 per cent at end June 2020 compa ed to 4.2 per cent reported a at end June 2019. Out of this, credit to Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) has improved to 7.4 per cent at end June 2020 a g ainst 2.0 per cent reported at end June 2019. The annual growth rate of US dolla credit to developing Asia and the Pacific ha increa ed phenomenally to 8.7 per cent at end June 2020 when compa ed to negative 0.6 per cent recorded at end June 2019. This increase wa manly due to the la ge borrowings done by Indonesia India a d China Mea while, foreign currency credit denominated in Euros a d Ja a ese yen increased at a slower pace at 3.9 per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively, compa ed to US dolla denominated credit. Overa I improvement of globa liquidity ca be attributed to the favorb le policy responses to the COVID-19 outbreak by advanced economies and EMDEs during Q1 and Q2 of 2020.

With rega d to the bond ma ket, it wa noted that yields and flow of portfolios to the EMDEs have increased towards end of 2019 due to a shift in investor sentiment toward EMDEs from the d va ced economies caused by the lightening



Source: Bank for International Settlements

of trd e tension between US a d China a d the expectation of not pursuing a no-deb Brexit. However, during the surge of the pandemic in Q1 2020, the US denominated bond yields dropped drastically and increased in Q2 2020 and thereafter the bond ma ket yield ha been consistent up to now.


With the surge of the COVID-19 pandemic, EMDEs' US dolla denominated debt spred declined with retra ting bond yields. From end Ma ch 2020, the bond spred moderately declined with bond flows reporting outflows for EMDEs. It was anticipated that rate reductions in d va ced economies will trigger investors to move their investments from advanced economies to EMDEs. However, this did


not materialize owing to various reasons, such as excha ge rate volatility, concerns on economic stb ility a d politica uncertanty in emerging economies. Further, the stronger presence of China in the aftermath of the pa demic recovery could be a potency for the emerging economies in the Asia region a the outlook for most of the d va ced countries p pea to be extremely gloomy.

Further, it wa observed that credit ma ket spred s on corporate bonds significatly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic accounting for the risk of defalt during a economic downturn. Corporates faled serious revenue losses despite having to incur fixed costs, debt repayments and shalies. Therefore, corporates ale under significat liquidity constraints and some have faled backruptcy due to this crisis. However, a narrow down on credit market spreads was observed from Q2 of 2020 despite the deteriorating credit quality and a result of the disconnection between finacia makets and the real economy. The declining corporate bond yield has been led by the decrease in risk-free rates which has been imposed through policy measures.


Further, it was observed that credit market spreads on corporate bonds significantly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic accounting for the risk of default during an economic downturn. Corporates faced serious revenue losses despite having to incur fixed costs, debt repayments and salaries. Therefore, corporates are under significant liquidity constraints and some have faced bankruptcy due to this crisis. However, a narrow







Source: Bank for International Settlements





Equity Market Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic

120
110
100
90
80
70
United States — AEs excl US
— China — EMEs excl CN

Source: Bank for International Settlements

down on credit market spreads was observed from Q2 of 2020 despite the deteriorating credit quality as a result of the disconnection between financial markets and the real economy. The declining corporate bond yield has been led by the decrease in risk-free rates which has been imposed through policy measures.

Equity ma kets have been rp idly repricing throughout 2020 due to the uncertan a d continuous disturba ces to the globa economy during this period. From mid-Februa y, the COVID-19 outbreak fears resulted in a rapid drop in equity prices with the sha pest drop seen in Ma ch 2020. However, thereafter equity ma kets

ma g ed to report sted y gans. Nevertheless, such gans were not equally distributed an ongst makets or sectors a advaced economies, especially China ad US reported notable gans compaed to other economies. Other alvaced economies rebounded during Q3 of 2020 with a compatively lesser increae. Considerable cpithoutflows from EMDEs were evident due to the deteriorating market sentiment during Q1 of 2020. However, from Q2 of 2020, investor sentiment has moderately improved on EMDEs as well.

A discrepancy in equity valuations was observed within sectors of equity. Equity in sectors which



Performance as per Sectors in Global Equity Markets

140

120

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 About 120

100

100

80

60

40


20

0 Current P/E ratio\* (RHS)

\*Current P/E ratio compared with long term historical distribution – 1973 to current

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bank for International Settlements



are in a better position from structural changes created by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as stocks on technology and health, reported the highest valuation. The rising valuation of technology-related stocks has been a primary reason behind increasing prices in US and China equity markets where most of the technology-related stocks are listed. Meanwhile, financial services and energy stocks reported lower valuations. Due to the depleting credit quality, valuation of financial services was low and the lack of demand for energy has resulted in low valuation for energy related stocks.

The volatility of the stock ma kets a observed through volatility indices was a so high during the surge of the COVID-19 pandemic. The volatility of the stock markets dropped during Q2 of 2020 and is increasing g in due to the resurgence of second waves in many advanced economies and EMDEs. The VIX index which indicates the expected price fluctuation of the S&P 500 index, the VSTOXX index which indicates the implied volatility of Eurozone Stocks, and the NKY volatility index which indicates the expected volatility of the Tokyo Stock Excha ge b I moved in b most identical paths throughout 2020.

With such developments in the global financial markets, noteworthy movements in currencies were also observed. The US dollar index erased more than one year of gains in a matter of three weeks as falling equities, and US bond-yields are weighing heavily on the US dollar. However,

the strength of the US dollar depended on a few key factors, namely; the ability to maintain the safe haven demand momentum, the pace of the expected economic recovery in the USA, the way in which the new political regimes would react to the prevailing socio-economic crisis, and the pace at which other markets would recover from the ongoing crisis. At the same time, the Euro weakened drastically with the outbreak of the pandemic across the region in different magnitudes and in different frequencies. However, with the European Central Bank (ECB) adopting very quick measures to avoid the possibility of a virus-induced debt crisis, the Euro has recovered from its lower levels reported in March 2020 with an optimism for economic recovery in the post pandemic period. Similarly, the fundamental outlook for the GBP remains negative with price action skewed downside with the severe economic downturn and the uncertainty caused by Brexit negotiations which still remain in a deadlock status and has not produced any positive headlines. On the contrary, the Japanese Yen has been on a continuously appreciating trend in the recent past mainly supported by the safe haven demand.

#### 1.2.2 Financial Institutions

Up to now, regulated financial institutions were not as deprived as they were during the Global Financial Crisis, despite the higher severity of this crisis. High regulatory requirement of capital and liquidity levels of regulated financial institutions

which were imposed after the Global Financial Crisis and macroprudential measures adopted have safeguarded regulated financial institutions so far from the pandemic induced vulnerabilities. Further, such liquidity and capital levels are stress tested in accordance with Basel principles in order to ensure higher absorbency of losses and funding pressures. Due to the building up of buffers, regulated financial institutions are less vulnerable to procyclical corrections in the face of external shocks. Timely policy measures taken by regulators around the world to ease the pressure on financial institutions may also have contributed towards the stability of financial institutions. Even so, through debt moratoria and other concessionary measures the realization of losses has been delayed at the moment. In addition, the declining credit quality, which may be aggravated if the economic downturn continues, poses a threat to financial institutions through rising unemployment levels and bankruptcies of corporates. Loans taken by individuals whose employment is threatened or income is depleted are prone to be defaulted. Further, cash flow constraints of corporates may lead them to default credit taken from financial institutions. As a result, financial institutions may show some reluctance to lend. Such decline in credit will in turn lead to worsening of the economic downturn creating a macrofinancial feedback loop between the real economy and the financial sector. In addition, prolonged stress in financial markets may also exacerbate as a shock to financial institutions as funding sources are affected. Thereby, the possibility of a credit crunch similar to the global financial crisis which may affect non-financial corporates, individuals and the global economy cannot be ruled out in the future.


The economic turmoil created by the COVID-19 pandemic has affected advanced economies and EMDEs in a myriad of ways. The future outlook of the economy and the financial sector is widely uncertain given the impossibility of predicting when COVID-19 will be eradicated from the world. At the moment, financial markets have rebounded to almost normalcy and financial institutions have remained resilient. However, a disconnection between the financial markets and the real economy is observed in the bond markets as well as the equity markets. It is apparent that investors are expecting a quick "V" shape recovery of the economy. At the moment, this scenario appears to keep the financial markets and the

financial system on a positive outlook. However, if the economy does not recover as expected or policy stimulus becomes unaffordable for some economies, a correction in the financial markets will be unavoidable. Prolonged contagion, failure of vaccine trials, re-emergence of trade tensions, social unrest stemming from increasing inequality may lead to a possible price correction. Whether financial markets are able to withstand such a correction and whether it will trigger a shock to the entire financial system remain a major challenge faced by the global financial system. Financial institutions have not yet reflected the impact of COVID-19 on depleting credit quality due to the moratoria and other policy measures taken by regulators. Further, financial institutions are utilizing the buffers created during favorable times and expect to be rescued by the regulators in case of severe liquidity constraints.

It is **p** pa ent that **d** va ced economies have been **b** le to provide higher relief **a** d direct spending to withsta d the drop in g gregate dema d compa ed to other economies with lesser fisch spe e. However, if the pa demic continues a d a va cine rollout to the whole world the es a prolonged period of time, ba kruptcies, low income levels a d job losses will continue in a l economies which will affect the fina cia system a well. Thereby, d va ced economies may not be b le to continue lending or to provide fina cia support to other vulnerb le countries. Therefore, susta nb ility of policy responses is a importat fe tor for both advanced economies and EMDEs in withstanding unforeseen risks which maybe fa ed by the world in the future, especially risks a sociated with a prolonged COVID-19 pandemic.

## 1.3 Domestic Macrofinancial Conditions

Unfavorable domestic macroeconomic developments intensified as the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic exerted pressure on the financial sector during the nine months ending September 2020. In the latter part of 2019, subsequent to the presidential elections, the newly appointed government introduced massive fiscal stimuli mainly targeting the corporate sector of Sri Lanka, with a view to enhancing production and stimulating economic growth. Yet, GDP contracted by 1.6 per cent in Q1 2020 and 16.3 per cent in Q2 2020. Though the impact of the



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


fiscal stimuli was expected to be witnessed with some time lag, the COVID-19 pandemic affecting the global economy and the pandemic emerging in Sri Lanka since March 2020 negatively affected the economic performance of Sri Lanka. The global economic downturn transmitted to the Sri Lankan economy through lowering tourism earnings, export earnings and migrant worker remittances while recording cash outflows from financial markets. Measures taken to curtail the spread of COVID-19 virus, such as lockdown of the country for over two months, mobility restrictions and social distancing adversely affected the production

and productivity. This in turn, relentlessly affected the performance of the corporate sector and household incomes. As such, the economy could not reap the benefits of the massive tax reliefs and positive policy stimuli provided towards the end of 2019. However, as a result of re-opening the country and positive policy stimuli, a GDP growth of 1.5 per cent was reported in Q3 2020. Further, numerous tax policy reforms and other policy measures announced by the Government Budget for 2021, may stimulate the economy to enter into a sustainable high growth path in the medium term.


The Business Outlook Survey conducted by the Centrb Bank be so indicates the deterioration of business conditions resulting from measures the ento combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Business conditions have been in a negative territory, reporting the barace of opinion below 100 for 14 consecutive quarters with an increase in Q4 of 2019. However, with the impact of the COVID-19 particle, the barace of opinion has dratically reduced recording its worse in Q2 of 2020. The barace of opinion on both sales and demand was significantly below the neutrb level during this quarter, when compared to Q2 of 2019. However, it was projected that the barace of opinion will recover in Q3 of 2020.

Chart 1.21

#### Number of COVID-19 Patients and Key Incidents related to COVID-19 outbreak in Sri Lanka



Source: Health Promotion Bureau




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Such downturns in the globb **a** d domestic economy **a** d business conditions spilled over to the financib sector of Sri La ka manly through depleting credit qubity due to the drop in the repayment cp a ity of corporates a d individub s.

Fina cib intermediation a reflected by the credit to deposit ratio of ba ks ha decrea ed during the nine months ending September 2020. This wa attributable to the rapid increase of deposits with a compatively low level of credit growth reported during the period under review. Mobility restrictions ad the lack of spending avenues manly resulted in increasing deposits during this period even with low interest rates. Further, as a result of policy measures on increasing liquidity in the economy, decreasing interest rates ad the implementation of special concessionary loass at the implementation of special conce

Due to the high borrowing requirement of the government **a** d low demand for credit by the corporate **a** d household sector<sup>2</sup>, credit to the public sector exp**a** ded not**b** ly during the nine months ending September 2020. Net credit to the government increased significa tly by



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


Rs. 1,294.9 billion during the nine months ending September 2020, compa ed to the increa e of Rs. 285.0 billion in the corresponding period of 2019. This was mainly due to the increased reliance of the government on domestic fina cing an idst limited foreign fina cia flows a d the shortfal in government revenue collection. Credit to public corporations has a so increased prominently by Rs. 200.3 billion during the nine months ending September 2020 compa ed to the contra tion of Rs. 48.4 million in the corresponding period of 2019, reflecting the weak financial positions of most public corporations which have been further g gravated by the pa demic. In tota, credit to government a d public corporations had increa ed by 39.3 per cent at end September 2020.

Furthermore, due to lowering of credit dema d from the private sector a d ba ks following more ca tious lending pra tices, excess funds were invested mostly in Government securities<sup>3</sup> and the Standing Deposit Facility of the Central Bank. Relaxing regulations on liquidity requirements have a so increa ed the ava la ility of funds for ba ks. At end September 2020, the growth of banks' investments in trea ury bills, trea ury bonds a d SLDBs were reported at 28.5 per cent compared to 12.8 per cent reported at end September 2019. Hence, investments in government securities a d credit to the government **a** d public corporations from licensed ba ks have increa ed, which enha ced the exposure of the ba king sector towa ds government a d public corporations.

<sup>1</sup> Following the provisions of the Monetary Law Act, No. 58 of 1949 (MLA), the Central Bank facilitated special credit schemes to provide finance to the needy sectors of the economy, particularly to SMEs, at a concession

<sup>2</sup> Credit to the public sector is credit given by LCBs, LSBs a d LFCs to the Government and Public Corporations as per the Financial Survey.


<sup>3</sup> Only investments male by licensed backs are included.





During the nine months ending September 2020, credit to the private sector4 increa ed by 3.4 per cent a g is nst 1.8 per cent growth reported during the nine months ending September 2019. However, it is still a consider **b** le drop from 11.2 per cent credit to private sector growth reported during the nine months ending September 2018. Further, private sector credit declined during the period from May to July but showed a significa t improvement in August. Private sector credit reported a growth of 5.6 per cent in September 2020. Furthermore, it is observed that private sector credit to GDP ha slightly increa ed b ove the long-term trend in September 2020, despite the downwa d trend in credit to private sector. It was evident that the contra tion of the economy had a greater impa t on the private sector credit to nominal GDP ratio which outweighed the declining trend of private sector credit growth. As such, the gp between private sector credit and GDP which was negative from April 2019 with few exemptions in March and April 2020, turned positive in September 2020.

As per the credit survey conducted by the Centra Ba k, the overal willingness to lend a d dema d for loas has been high for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) during Q2 of 2020 due to their high borrowing requirements. On the contray, the dema d for loas by other sectors has been negative due to low economic a tivity, despite favourable interest rates prevailed during Q2. Nevertheless, it is expected that the willingness a d demand for loans during Q3 of 2020 will improve



Source: Centra Ba k of Sri La ka


corresponding to the positive policy stimuli the en in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. The lowest willingness to lend he been to the corporate sector a baks have perceived profit declines a diminishing repayment cap a ity of corporates in the current economic scena io. However, the lowest dema d for credit has a so been reported from the corporate sector. It is a so observed that, banks perceive that NPLs in all sectors especially in the SME sector will increase in Q2 and thereafter ease in Q3.


Out of total lending in the formal final cial sector, 58.3 per cent has been towards the institutional sector, whereal 41.7 per cent has been towards the household sector and at June 2020. The growth in credit towards the institutional sector has increased in Q2 of 2020 reporting a growth of 11.6 per cent. This may be due to the increase e in lending to the government and SOEs. Mean while, credit to the household sector has only increased by 2.7 per cent in Q2 of 2020, which is a decline from 4.3 per cent reported in the previous quality.

During the nine months ending September 2020, credit from licensed ba ks to all economic sectors<sup>5</sup> improved considerally compared to end of 2019. However, credit disbursed to economic sectors such a griculture and consumption had decelerated in Q3 2020 compared to the first two quarters of 2020, while credit to industry and services increased slightly. Credit to services sector which encomparses tourism, transportation and

<sup>4</sup> Credit to private sector is credit given by LCBs, LSBs a d LFCs to the private sector a per the Fina cia Survey.

<sup>5</sup> Includes total credit disbursed by licensed balks to economic sectors.





Source: Centra Bank of Sri La ka


Source: Centra Ba k of Sri Lanka

storg e, wholesh e/reta l trd e a d information technology-related service reported a notb le decline stemming from the setba k created by the Easter Sunday attacks towards the end of 2019. In 2020, despite the d verse impa t on this sector from COVID-19 pandemic, credit towards this sector ha slightly improved.


Sector-wise credit growth is more or less affected by sectoral GDP growth of the economy, and during the Q1 2020 the agriculture and industry sectors have contra ted while the services sector have reported a growth. However, in Q2 2020 all sectors indicated a contration with a steeper contration in the industry sector. Thereafter, in Q3 2020, all sectors improved with a growth of 4.3 per cent in the griculture sector, 0.6 per cent in the industry sector ad 2.1 per cent in the services sector.


Even though credit of the ba king sector is recovering compared to 2019, credit quality continues to deteriorate despite the debt moratorium. The increa ing trend of non-performing loans (NPLs) continued for all product categories during the nine months ending September 2020. La k of economic a tivity leal ing to lowering ca h flows for corporates a d individua s due to the Island-wide lockdown during Q2 of 2020 was reflected by increasing NPLs. Even though a debt moratorium ha been gra ted, businesses a d individua s not qualifying for the debt moratorium may have a so fa ed difficulties in honoring debt repayments due to reduction in income levels.

Further, mea ures such a limiting recovery a tion a d lowering pena interest rates were introduced a concessions for borrowers. Such concessions d versely affected the recovery process of loa s of financial institutions increasing their NPL rates. Nevertheless, in Q3 2020, improvement in credit quality wa observed in credit cads a d pawning product categories. On the contray, credit quality continued to decreae on leaing ad hire purchase category during Q3 of 2020. After the lapse of the debt moratorium if higher NPLs are realized that will have a severe impact on financial institution's profitability ad eventually on their cap it believels.



Source: Department of Census and Statistics





Source: Centra Bank of Sri La ka

Source: Centra Ba k of Sri La ka

Further, increasing NPLs in household and the consumption loans was observed during Q3 of 2020. It is apparent that the low Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) and the high unemployment rate in the first ha f of 2020 have affected the repayment cp a ity of individua s a d households resulting in notable NPLs. The unemployment rate of Sri Lanka increa ed to 5.6 per cent in the first had of 2020, compa ed to the unemployment rate of 4.8 per cent in the corresponding period in 2019. Meanwhile, the LFPR declined to 50.6 per cent in the first half of 2020 from 52.6 per cent in the corresponding period of the preceding yea. Further, sha ied employees have experienced shay reduction due to economic downturn a d worsening profitb ility of corporates which a so contributes to the lowering repayment cp a ity.

With a view to minimising the economic impat of the spread of COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant containment measures, the Centrabank eased monetary conditions substantially and continued are commodative monetary policy stance thus far in 2020, supported by muted inflationary pressures and well and chored inflation expectations. Accordingly, the Centrabank has reduced the policy rates, namely, the Standing Deposit Facility Rate (SDFR) and the Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR), by a total of 250 basis points each to a historic low level of 4.50 per cent and 5.50 per cent, respectively, thus far in 2020. The Centrabank kalso reduced the Statutory Reserve Ratio (SRR) by a total of 3.00 percentage points during the year


in two steps, in Ma ch a d June, to 2.00 per cent, thus injecting a la ge an ount of liquidity to the domestic money ma ket. In a dition, indicating the ava lb ility of emergency funding to banking institutions at rea onb le interest rates, the Centra Ba k lowered the Ba k Rate, by 500 ba is points in April 2020, while b lowing it to be determined a tomatically with a ma gin of 300 ba is points

**NPL Ratio of the Household Sector** 


(with IIS)6


Chart

1.31



For the purpose of calculation of NPL ratio is based on the borrowing from banks and LFCs/SLCs sector, NPL is classified when a payment is not made within 9 days from the end of the agreed due date.






b ove the SLFR. Accordingly, the Ba k Rate which wa 15.00 per cent a at April 2020 declined by a total of 650 ba is points to 8.50 per cent by end September 2020. Further, in view of expediting the monetal y policy transmission process and helping maginal borrowers, the Central Bak imposed maximum interest rates on specific lending products, nan ely, credit calds, pawning, pre-alra ged temporally overdrafts alwell alpenal interest rates.

Responding to significat monetary ea ing mea ures, deposit interest rates declined ma kedly during the nine months ending September




Source: Centra Ba k of Sri La ka



Source: Centra Ba k of Sri Lanka

2020, resulting in negative reb returns for some deposit products in a low inflation environment. Although deposit growth of the ba king sector is at a satisfa tory level, rea interest rates have declined to 1.31 per cent at end September 2020. In a environment of negative rea interest rates, there is a possibility that depositors may shift towa ds una thorised deposit ta ing institutions or investing in other avenues such a the stock ma ket a d real estate ma ket. A shift towa ds the stock ma ket a d rea estate ma ket would encourge e growth, a corporates a d the construction sector ga n better a cess to funds, which would stimulate the economy. However, excessive investment in real estate may result in a undue increal e of prices in the reb estate sector if the low interest rates preva I for a longer period of time.

Even though a incline in property prices wa a ticipated due to negative rea interest rates, a per the ava la le data a surge in property prices wa not witnessed. The Colombo La d price index which declined in the first half of 2019 continued to decline reporting a growth of 7.1 per cent in the first had f of 2020, when compared to 13.6 per cent reported in the first half of 2019. All sub sectors in the index, residentia, industria a d commercia la d price indices growth declined during the first ha f of 2020. Mea while, d vertised property prices indicated an overall increase during Q3 2020, which may be attribut le to the regaining of investor confidence. However, Colombo property prices have reported a declining growth and apartment sales prices have contracted in Q3 2020. A possible relucta ce to invest in long-term



Source: Lanka Property Web

ventures may a ise from the uncerta nty created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Such reluctance may have resulted in creating a lower dema d for rea estate investments which in turn led the prices to decline.

Colombo Advertised House Sale Price
 Colombo Advertised Commercial Buildings Sale Price


Sri Lanka overall house sale price growth QoQ (RHS)

Colombo Commercial Buildings Sale Price Growth QoQ (RHS)

Colombo House Sale Price Growth QoQ (RHS)


As expected during a low interest rate regime, a shift in domestic investors' preference towards equity investments wa observed from mid-May 2020 in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE). However, the





Source: Lanka Property Web


Chart Movements of the All Share Price
1.37 Index and the Number of Transactions




Source: Colombo Stock Excha ge

CSE wa under pressure a d experienced volatilities developing from the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, foreign investors continued to withdraw investments from emerging ma kets including Sri La ka due to the uncerta nties created through COVID-19 pandemic. As such the stock market performed disma ly reporting a rp id drop in the All Share Price Index during mid-March to mid-May corresponding to the peak of the COVID-19 pa demic effect in Sri La ka Thereafter, a slight recovery in prices wa observed which continued till October with some fluctuations. It wa observed that, positive a d timely policy mea ures





Source: Centra Ba k of Sri La ka



Source: Centra Bank of Sri La ka


to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic have been **b** le to re-est**b** lish the confidence town ds equity investments. However, with the resurgence of the COVID-19 outbreak, prices have indicated a downturn.


At the sm e time, the externa sector of Sri La ka was also affected severely by the COVID-19 pa demic at the beginning of yea 2020 a d grd ually recovered thereafter. The trd e deficit declined during the nine months ending September 2020 a mercha dise imports sta ted to decline due to disruptions in import related supply chans, economic lockdown, fa ling commodity prices a d Government restrictions on the fa ilitation of motor


vehicle imports a d suspending importation of nonessential consumer goods. Mea while, exports which initially dropped due to low global dema d rebounded with time. On the contrary, the current a count was severely hit by the tourism earnings turning to zero with travel restrictions since March 2020. Nevertheless, worker remittarces had a more fluctuating impart on the current a count during this period. Initially, worker remittarces declined with migrart workers returning to Sri Larkarard thereafter a gradual increare was witnessed supporting the current a count and the domestic foreign excharge market since June 2020.

The fina cib a count of the externa sector faced continuous outflows from the government securities maket a d the CSE due to negative investor sentiments, a d this wa observed in other EMDEs as well. Nevertheless, the financial account improved by the receipt of a US dolla s 500 million syndicated loan in Mach 2020, a SAARCFINANCE Swp of US dollas 400 million a d severa other loas an idst severa repayments. High foreign currency debt service payments faling due in 2021 a d over the medium term will continue to be a major concern in the externa sector.


Further, gross official reserves of Sri La k stood at US dollas 6.7 billion which was equivalent to 4.7 months of imports by end September 2020. The total foreign a sets which consist of both the gross official reserves and the foreign a sets of the banking sector stood at US dollars 9.2 billion as at end September 2020 covering 6.5 months of imports.







Source: Centra Ba k of Sri Lanka




Source: Centra Bank of Sri La ka

As the government expenditure increa ed beyond the moderated government revenue, al fisca ba a ces weakened nota ly during the seven months ending July 2020. Subsequent to the presidentia election, tax concessions gra ted to stimulate economic a tivities resulted in moderated government revenue. Thereafter, in 2020 a myrid of concessions on tax wa gra ted due to the COVID-19 pandemic which aggravated the declining government revenue. Further, a not**b** le increa e in recurrent expenditure wa observed on subsidies a d tra sfers during the seven months ending July 2020. Nonetheless, a new cp ital projects were not implemented during this period, cp ith expenditure contra ted. The overall deficit of the seven months ending July a a per cent of GDP increased to 5.6 per cent, from the deficit of 4.6 per cent recorded in seven months ending July 2019.


The budget deficit for the seven months ending July 2020 was manly fina ced through domestic sources via issuing government securities and loans obtained from licensed banks and the Centra Bank. Fina cing from domestic sources and ounted to Rs. 1,067.0 million during the seven months ending July 2020, companed to Rs. 571.4 million during the corresponding period of 2019. Meanwhile, financing from foreign sources recorded an net repayment of Rs. 194.5 billion, compared to the net financing of Rs. 112.7 billion in the corresponding period of 2019. The repayment of loans and declining non-residents' Treasury bill and bond holdings resulted in this net repayment position.





Source: Centra Ba k of Sri La ka

The Government took mea ures to promptly settle a I maturing obligations, including the ISBs that matured in October 2020, despite d verse speculation a d concerns raised by international rating agencies. Yet, the ability of the foreign reserves to meet short term debt obligations remains a concern a sovereign repayment cp a ity indicated through the short term debt lib ilities to official reserves ratio ha increa ed to 112.6 per cent a at June 2020 compa ed to 107.9 per cent reported at end 2019. The short-term debt to official reserves ratio ha been over 100 per cent from 2015 with a slight dip below




Source: Centra Ba k of Sri La ka

100 per cent in yea 2017. This ratio being **b** ove 100 per cent indicates that either the sovereign repayment cp a ity of Sri La ka or reserves needs a consider b le improvement.

The risk premium<sup>8</sup> ha been in a rising trend from beginning of 2020 a the yield of Sri La ka ISBs increa ed with the declining US Treasury yield. Towards the end of Q1 2020, the yield of Sri La ka ISBs sky rocketed with the negative ma ket sentiments caused by the COVID-19 pandemic a d pea ed in mid-May 2020. However, thereafter with positive policy stimuli the yields can e down till September 2020. At this point, Moody's downgraded Sri Lanka's rating two notches down from B2 to Ca 1 on 28 September 2020, manly citing wide budget deficit, externa sector exposure a d weakening institutions a d governa ce. Further, in November 2020, Fitch Ratings downgraded Sri Lanka's rating to CCC from B. S & P Global Ratings also downgraded Sri Lanka's rating to CCC+ from B- in December 2020. Negative sentiment ca sed by such rating downgral es may have a impa t on increa ing risk premiums exposing the country to high sovereign risks a d vulner**b** ilities to systemic imb**b** a ces.

Despite difficult circumstances, the Sri Lankan economy is expected to rebound in 2021 a evidenced by the fa t recovery of a tivity since the relaxation of the lockdown in May 2020, though a resurgence of COVID-19 cases, as observed in October, could affect this momentum to some extent. The la ge sca e policy support provided by the Central Ba k a d the government is expected to fe ilitate a fast recovery of economic e tivities in the nea term, while growth oriented policies of the Government a e expected to sustain the recovery over the medium term. The lg ged effect of extensive fisch a d moneta y policy stimuli provided thus fa may a so improve the performa ce of the economy in the nea future. The fisch policy strategy for 2021 is expected to a m at strengthening the medium term fisca consolidation path through tax policy reforms, while further rationa ising recurrent expenditure a d prioritising public investment to stimulate the economy a enunciated in the national policy



framework, "Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour". However, externa debt obligations remain large a decrear e of externa demaid on exports, mobility restrictions on tourism and lark of portfolio inflows weigh heavily on foreign currency inflows an idst limited reserve a sets to defend pla sible risks.

The fina cib sector experienced the spillover effects of the risks a d vulnerb ilities fa ed by the globa a d domestic economy during the nine months ending September 2020. The uncertainty of the prevalence of the COVID-19 pandemic questions the extent to which policy stimuli ca be susta ned by Sri La ka As such, the resilience of the fina cib system depends la gely on the ava la ility of va cines for a may countries a possible to overcome this virus fa ilitating the recovery of the globa a d domestic economy. Even when the COVID-19 pandemic is eradicated from the world, the social, economic and financial sector recovery will be at a grd ub pa e due to the severity of den g e ca sed by this pa demic. Therefore, it is importa t to tal off the policy stimuli gra ted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic without creating a shock to the system. Therefore, the empha is should be on the sustanb ility of the policy mea ures to effectively fa ilitate the recovery process.

<sup>8</sup> For a b ysis purposes, the risk premium is cb culated ba ed on the difference between ten year US Treasury yields and the ten year Sri La ka ISB yields.

Box Article 1

# **Key Policy Changes and Regulatory Actions Implemented for the Financial Sector in 2020**

# Financial Institutions Licensed Banks

30 Ja ua y 2020	A Circula wa issued to licensed ba ks providing guidelines for the implementation of a special credit support scheme to provide credit support to eligible Smalad Medium Enterprise (SME) borrowers.
01 Ma ch 2020	A Circular was issued to Licensed Commercial Banks (LCBs) informing to extend the maximum period for the settlement of export credit fa ilities out of export proceeds up to 180 days from the date of shipment.
19 March 2020	Banking Act Directions were issued to LCBs and the National Savings Bank (NSB) informing to suspend fa ilitation of the importation of selected motor vehicles under LCs a d the importation of selected non-essential goods under LCs, documents g is not a cepta ce and d va ce payments. Further, purcha ing of International Sovereign Bonds by LCBs a d NSB was suspended.
24 Ma ch 2020	A Circular was issued to LCBs and Licensed Specialised Banks (LSBs) informing them of the relief mea ures to be provided to businesses a d individuals who were adversely affected by the COVID-19 outbreak in line with the Direction issued by His Excellency the President and the decision taken by the Cabinet of Ministers.
27 Ma ch 2020	A Circula wa issued to LCBs a d LSBs informing them of the eligibility to pa ticipate in a refinancing facility to support the businesses affected by the COVID-19 outbreak, including self-employed businesses a d individuals, commencing from 25 Ma ch 2020. This Circula wa issued to supplement the Circula No. 04 of 2020, dated 24 Ma ch 2020, a d set out the operational guidelines to give effect to the refinal cing faility.
	After a sessing the safety a d soundness of the ba king sector, the Centra Ba k decided to introduce extra rdina y regulatory mea ures to be implemented by licensed ba ks to support businesses a d individuals affected by the outbrea of COVID-19. Accordingly, the extraordinary regulatory measures were informed inter alia permitting Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) and non D-SIBs to draw down their Capital Conservation Buffers, allowing classification of non-performing loas a d recovery of foreign currency loas a d deferring the enha cement of cp ith by licensed ba ks which a e yet to meet the minimum cp ith requirements of end 2020 until end 2022.
17 April 2020	The minimum da ly deposit required to be held by a LCB in the Centra Ba k wareduced to 20 per cent from 90 per cent with effect from the reserve maintenance period commencing on 16 April 2020.
27 April 2020	A Moneta y Law Act Order wa issued informing the maximum rate of interest cha geable by licensed ba ks on pawning d va ces collatera ised by persona gold jewellery, considering the necessity to provide relief for low income ea ners who obtain pawning d va ces to fina ce their short term funding requirements an idst the COVID-19 pandemic.

05 May 2020	Extro rdina y regulatory mea ures were implemented to provide liquidity to licensed banks with a view to negating any potential impact on banks' liquidity positions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, Banking Act Directions were issued to licensed ba ks permitting certa na sets to be considered a liquid a sets, subject to conditions, for the purpose of computation of Statutory Liquid Assets Ratio (SLAR), and reduced the minimum requirement for Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) subject to enhanced supervision and frequent reporting up to 30 June 2021. Further, licensed ba ks were a so a lowed to ava I liquidity in rupees, if required, under the fran ework of emergency loa s a d d va ces to licensed ba ks ba ed on a cepta le collatera a d liquidity foreca ts.
13 May 2020	Banking Act Directions were issued restricting discretionary payments of licensed ba ks such a ca h dividends, profit repatriation, sha e buy-ba k a d increasing management allowances and payments to the Board of Directors to ensure mantaning p propriate levels of liquidity a d prudent mag ement of ca h flows by licensed baks. Further, banks were informed to exercise prudence a d extreme due diligence when incurring cp ital expenditure adtorefranto the extent possible from incurring non-essential expenditure.
15 May 2020	Banking Act Directions were issued on loan to value ratios for credit facilities granted in respect of motor vehicles replacing the previous Banking Act Directions issued on the sm e.
19 June 2020	Banking Act Directions were issued to LCBs and NSB suspending the purchase of Sri Lanka International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) for a period of three months unless such purcha e of ISBs is funded by using new foreign currency inflows.
16 July 2020	* Banking Act Directions were issued permitting banks to consider new credit fa ilities gra ted under the liquidity fa ility scheme to the construction sector against Letters of Acceptance of Payments of Outstanding Bills to Contractors issued by the Government to settle dues to contra tors by 31.12.2020, a liquid a sets for the purpose of computation of SLAR until 31.12.2020, subject to a harcut of 10 per cent. Such fa ilities gra ted for new economic a tivities were permitted to be considered a performing loa s without considering the current classification status of other existing fa ilities of the borrower. These Letter of Acceptance of Payment of Outstanding Bills and the credit guarantee provided under Phase III of the Saubagya COVID-19 Renaissance Facility to be considered a ceptal le credit risk mitigal ts for credit fa ilities gra ted g a nst the san e and to be risk weighted at zero per cent.
	* A Circular was issued to licensed banks, licensed finance companies and specibised leaing companies requiring final cib institutions to extend the existing moratorium period in respect of cp it abouts a ding of leaing failities grated to tourism related vehicles. Final cib institutions may recover interest during the moratorium period in a manner that is not inconvenient to such borrowers and the acrued penb interest in respect of such leaing failities to be waved off. Further, licensed banks were informed of the maximum and ditional interest rate change be leduring the moratorium period and the manner in which such additional interest is to be recovered in relation to leaning failities grated for buses providing public transport services and the Equal Monthly Instalment (EMI) loans.
	* An amendment was issued for licensed banks, with respect to the Banking Act Directions on Capital Requirements under Basel III, to increase the annual turnover threshold for SMEs to Rs. 1 billion.

21 August 2020	A Moneta y Law Act Order wa issued informing the maximum interest rates p plicb le on LKR denominated loa s a d d va ces gra ted by licensed ba ks, repla ing the previous Moneta y Law Act Orders issued in this rega d. Accordingly, maximum interest rates p plicb le for credit ca ds, pre-a ra ged tempora y overdrafts, pawning d va ces, penb interest rates on b l loa s a d d va ces a d enha ced rates on a commodations for exporters were reduced in line with the reduced ma ket interest rates.
26 August 2020	A Circula wa issued to licensed ba ks extending the moratorium scheme gra ted to COVID-19 affected businesses and individuals engaged in the tourism sector.
08 September 2020	Banking Act Directions were issued increasing the limit on acquiring a material interest of issued cp ith carying voting rights of licensed baks. Accordingly, Multilaterh Fina cib Orga isations were permitted to a quire a material interest not exceeding 20 per cent of licensed baks subject to the condition that such material interest quired shall reduce to 15 per cent within 10 yeas from the date of stipulation.
30 September 2020	Banking Act Directions were issued amending the general terms and conditions <b>p</b> plic <b>b</b> le for fin <b>a</b> cib derivative tra sa tions of licensed ba ks to fa ilitate the implementation of Inwa d Investment Swp s.

# **Licensed Finance Companies (LFCs) and Specialised Leasing Companies (SLCs)**

14 Febru <b>a</b> y 2020	A Direction was issued on Classification and Measurement of Credit Facilities, setting out the minimum requirements to LFCs with the d option of Sri La ka Accounting Standards, SLFRS 9: Financial Instruments issued by the Council of Chartered Accounta ts a d prudentia requirement of the Centra Ba k.
17 Febru <b>a</b> y 2020	A Direction was issued on Classification and Measurement of Credit Facilities, setting out the minimum requirements to SLCs with the d option of Sri La ka Accounting Standards, SLFRS 9: Financial Instruments issued by the Council of Chartered Accounta ts a d prudentia requirement of the Centra Ba k.
10 Ma ch 2020	A Circula wa issued to LFCs a d SLCs providing guidelines for the implementation of a special credit support scheme to provide credit support to eligible SME borrowers.
24 Ma ch 2020	A Circula wa issued to LFCs a d SLCs providing relief mea ures for businesses a d individuals affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.
27 Ma ch 2020	A Circula wa issued to LFCs a d SLCs to supplement the Circula dated 24 Ma ch 2020 a d set out the operational guidelines to give effect to a Rs. 50 billion, six month refina cing fa ility to support the businesses including self-employed businesses and individuals affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.
31 Ma ch 2020	Considering the current maket conditions, a m endment wa issued with respect to the existing Direction on liquid assets to be maintained by LFCs that shall be effective for a period of six months from the date of this Direction.
24 April 2020	The existing Loan to Value (LTV) Direction issued to LFCs and SLCs was revised a lowing higher LTV ratios for locally a sembled motor cas, SUVs and vass.  The Direction on maximum interest rates on deposits and debt instruments of LFCs and SLCs was revised with maginally reduced rates.
18 June 2020	An amendment to the Corporate Governance Direction of LFCs was issued permitting a director of <b>a</b> LFC who is <b>b</b> re <b>d</b> y holding office <b>a</b> d re <b>a</b> hes the <b>g</b> e of 70 years to continue in office <b>a</b> a director with the prior <b>p</b> provb of the Moneta y Boa d.

26 June 2020	An amendment to the Corporate Governance Direction of SLCs was issued permitting a director of <b>a</b> SLC who is <b>b</b> red y holding office <b>a</b> d rea hes the <b>g</b> e of 70 years to continue in office <b>a</b> a director with the prior <b>p</b> provb of the Moneta y Boa d.
16 July 2020	* A Direction on Business Expansion and Operations was issued to LFCs revisiting the p provb process, setting out minimum criteria on pla ning to open new business places, vesting responsibilities in Boards of Directors and key mag ement personnel, setting out minimum risk mag ement staded as a d the requirement to staded dise the existing other outlets.
	* A Circular was issued to LFCs and SLCs extending the existing six months moratorium period gra ted in terms of Circula No. 05 of 2020 issued on 27 Ma ch 2020 for a further period of six months in respect of cp ita outsta ding of lea ing fa ilities gra ted to tourism related vehicles.
30 July 2020	The definition of Liquid Assets of LFCs wa an ended under Section 74 of the Fina ce Business Act, No. 42 of 2011, to include Trea ury Bonds issued by the Government of Sri La ka maturing in more tha 12 months, free from a y lien or cha ge a d Sri Lanka Development Bonds and International Sovereign Bonds issued by the Government of Sri La ka free from a y lien or cha ge.
20 August 2020	A Direction on Business Expansion and Operations was issued to SLCs revisiting the <b>p</b> provb process, setting out minimum criteria in pla ning to open new business places, vesting responsibilities in Boards of Directors and key management personnel, setting out minimum risk mag ement staddards and the requirement to standardize the existing other outlets.
28 September 2020	LFCs were requested to follow a new format for publication of fina cib information a d key performa ce indicators in their officib website a d in newspa ers in all three languages. Further, LFCs are also required to publish the independent auditor's report b ong with the a dited fina cib statements a d credit rating reports in the officib website in b I three la gug es.
30 September 2020	* A Circular was issued to LFCs and SLCs on Extending Debt Moratorium for COVID-19 affected businesses and individuals in the tourism industry for a further period of six months from 01 October 2020 to 31 Ma ch 2021. The Circula dated 16 July 2020 wa revoked with the introduction of this Circula.
	* An amendment to the Direction was issued extending the effective date of the Direction on Liquid Assets issued on 31 March 2020, for another period of six months until 31 Ma ch 2021, considering the challenging operating environment due to the prolonged impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### Insurance

19 February 2020	The Consumer Education Strategy (CES) under Technical Assistance of the Capital Market Development Programme (CMDP) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) wa implemented.
25 Februa y 2020	Circular No. 42 was issued on 'Loss Adjuster Registration Rules', published in Extraordinary Gazette No. 2026/27 dated 05 July 2017, requiring all insurers to refra n from obta ning loss a justing services from unlicensed loss a juster.
11 April 2020	Monitor the suspension on payment of the first <b>a</b> d fin <b>b</b> dividend to sh <b>a</b> eholders for the year ended 31 December 2019 as a relief to policyholders and as support needed from the Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (IRCSL) due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

	Other relief measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic:
	* For policies underwritten from 01 March 2020 to 30 June 2020, permit Long Term a d Genera Insura ce Compa ies to consider the premium receiva les outstanding for 90 days for solvency purposes, subject to specific confirmation given by the principa officer of the compa y.
	* Closely monitor 'Monthly Certification/ Reporting of Risk Based Capital Adequacy Requirements (e.g. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Total Available Capital (TAC) and Risk Capital Requirement (RCR) and Determination 01 Compliance for Long Term and General Insurance Businesses' from the month ended 31 March 2020 provided by the principle officer.
	* Oversee whether Long Term and General insurance companies use the Risk Free Interest Rate (RFR) as per the Rules gazetted in 2015 to compute Solvency.
	* Further, the IRCSL will consider negative impacts to the solvency and Determination- 01 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and on extended credit gra ted on payment of premium, on a cale by cale balls.
03 June 2020	Direction No. 19 on 'Compliance with Minimum Net Capital Requirement' was an ended to a dress enforcement a tion that would be the en by the IRCSL when brokering compa ies the extensive periods of time to meet net cap it a requirement.
08 June 2020	Direction No. 17 on Corporate Governance Framework for insurance companies wa an ended considering the views obtained from the Insura ce Association of Sri Lanka (IASL) and a few insurers.
02 July 2020	A Circula wa issued ma dating a l insurers to issue policies in Sinha a Tan il a d English to ensure comprehension of policy terms a d conditions by policyholders.

### Financial Markets Money Market

30 Ja ua y 2020	Standing Deposit Facility Rate (SDFR) and Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR) were reduced by 50 ba is points to 6.50 per cent a d 7.50 per cent, respectively.
17 Ma ch 2020	* SDFR and SLFR were reduced by 25 basis points to 6.25 per cent and 7.25 per cent, respectively.
	* Statutory Reserve Ratio (SRR) applicable on all rupee deposit liabilities of Licensed Commercial Banks (LCBs) was reduced by 1.00 percentage point to 4.00 per cent from 5.00 per cent with effect from the reserve mantenace period commencing on 16 Ma ch 2020.
03 April 2020	SDFR and SLFR were reduced by 25 basis points to 6.00 per cent and 7.00 per cent, respectively, with effect from the close of business on 03 April 2020.
16 April 2020	Ba k Rate wa reduced by 500 ba is points to 10.00 per cent a d b lowed to automatically adjust in line with SLFR, with a margin of +300 basis points.
06 May 2020	SDFR and SLFR were reduced by 50 basis points to 5.50 per cent and 6.50 per cent, respectively, with effect from the close of business on 06 May 2020. Ba k Rate wa automatically reduced to 9.50 per cent from 10.00 per cent.

16 June 2020	SRR p plicb le on a l'rupee deposit lib ilities of LCBs wa reduced by 2.00 percentg e points to 2.00 per cent while till ca h contribution to SRR wa reduced to 1.00 per cent from 2.0 per cent (only 1 per cent over and above the 2 per cent of the currency notes and coins shall be considered as a part of its reserves) with effect from the reserve mantena ce period commencing on 16 June 2020.
09 July 2020	SDFR and SLFR were reduced by 100 basis points to 4.50 per cent and 5.50 per cent, respectively, with effect from the close of business on 09 July 2020. Bank Rate was automatically reduced to 8.50 per cent from 9.50 per cent.

# **Government Securities Market**

01 Ja ua y 2020	Actions were taken to record relevant information (including settlement value, price and interest rate) of the transactions in the Scripless Securities Settlement System (SSSS) to capture more attributes of transactions carried out in the government securities market (secondary market).
29 March 2020	Actions were the en to for ilitate Trea ury bill subscription by the Centra Bak to cover a y shortfala ising at weekly Trea ury bill a ctions.
06 May 2020	* Measures were taken to publish the maximum yield rate for acceptance for all maturities offered at Trea ury bill a d Trea ury bond a ctions until the fina cia ma kets return to norma cy.
	* Activation of the Phase III of Treasury bond auction system was temporarily had ted until normal procedures of the a ction are reintroduced once the market returns to normal cy.

## **Capital Market**

31 Ma ch 2020	With a view to gra ting relief to investors affected by the ma ket downturn ca sed by the COVID-19 pandemic, all registered Margin Providers/Licensed Stockbrokers were directed to pa s on the benefit derived from the decisions a nounced by the Centra Ba k to their clients a d were directed to refra n from cha ging a d recovering interest on credit extended to their clients until 30 June 2020. Further, a l registered Margin Providers/Licensed Stockbrokers were required to act in the best interest of a d in a ma ner equitable le to a l clients in ca rying out functions.
30 April 2020	<ul> <li>The timefrm e for submission of reports by licensed/registered entities was extended due to the COVID-19 pandemic as follows:</li> <li>* The due date for the submission of the Unaudited Financial Statements, the Compliance Officers' Reports and the Unit Trust Returns for the months of Ma ch, April a d May 2020 wa extended by a period of three weeks from the stipulated time frm e.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>* The due date for submission of Audited Financial Statements was extended by a period of two months from the stipulated time frame for fina cib years ending 31 December 2019 and 31 March 2020, respectively.</li> <li>* The submission of Annual and Interim Reports for Unit Trust Funds was</li> </ul>
	extended by a period of two months from the stipulated time fren e.

	<ul> <li>* The licensed/registered entities were advised to diligently monitor their risk profile and resources during the pa demic period to ensure safety a d soundness of the industry.</li> <li>* Notwithstanding the above extensions of the timeframe, the entities were requested to promptly report to the Securities a d Excha ge Commission (SEC) regarding any exceptional matters which adversely affect or is likely to d versely affect the b ility of such entities to meet their obligations in respect of their licensed or registered business or a y matter, which may indicate that the fina cib sta ding or fina cib integrity of such entity or its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or directors or the key management personnel is in question or may rea onb ly be affected.</li> </ul>
	- A deferment of the SEC's annual licensing/registration fees for the year 2020 wa gra ted on the core regulated a tivity of a l licensed/registered entities by a period one year upon a request being md e.
	- The condition to fulfill the mandatory Continuous Professional Development (CPD) requirement to transfer all Investment Advisors from the previous Qualification Framework (QF) to the new QF was extended by six months (until 30 June 2021).
	- All Investment Advisors, who are required to obtain a minimum of two CPD semina credits for the renewa of license of their respective Stockbroker/ Dealer company, where such date of renewal falls within March to September 2020, were gra ted a extension of six months from the date of the due date for renewal in order to meet the aforesaid CPD requirement.
28 May 2020	Amendments were introduced to the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) Rules to fa ilitate the conducting of a l core a tivities digitally.
11 June 2020	<ul> <li>* The Empower Board-Listing rule revision was implemented. The segment of rules that required immediate attention ha been completed. As pat of the continuous improvement process, the others a e under review to a certain whether urgent changes are required, paticularly, to minimise regulatory burden to the listed entities impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.</li> <li>* A regulatory paper was submitted on multi-currency debt listing by local entities.</li> </ul>
15 July 2020	Real Estate Investment Trusts (SL-REITs) were introduced.
	200 10000 (0-1000)

# Financial Infrastructure Payments and Settlements

20 Ja ua y 2020	General Direction No. 1 of 2020 on fees chargeable on the transactions effected through the Common ATM Switch was issued replacing General Direction No. 1 of 2014 to include maximum fees that ca be charged for ATM trase tions carried out using payment cards issued under the National Card Scheme.
14 May 2020	Payment and Settlement Systems Circular No. 13 of 2020 was issued to mandate licensed commercia ba ks incorporated in Sri La ka and operators of mobile phone based e-money systems joining LANKAQR as issuers and acquirers in order to promote LANKAQR for retail payments.
01 June 2020	Guideline No. 01/2020 on minimum complia ce sta dard for payment related mobile p plications wa issued repla ing the Guideline No. 01/2018 in order to update the Guidelines to cover new developments in payment related mobile p plications.

transaction value and fees of Common Electronic Fund Transfer Switch issued to include procedure for determining maximum per tra sa tion		Payment and Settlement Systems Circular No. 16 of 2020 on maximum limits on transaction value and fees of Common Electronic Fund Transfer Switch (CEFTS) was issued to include procedure for determining maximum per traese tion value limits for CEFTS transactions carried out through LankaPay Online Payment Platform.	
17 2020	September	Payment and Settlement Systems Circular No. 18 of 2020 was issued to revise the tra sa tion fees of La ka ettle System a d to extend the cut-off time for a cepting customer tra sa tions.	

## **Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism**

05 Febru <b>a</b> y 2020	Guideline No. 1 of 2020 wa issued on scena io ba ed La kā IN reporting for LFCs, insura ce compa ies a d stock broker compa ies.	
10 June 2020	Guideline No. 2 of 2020 wa issued on Anti-Money La ndering a d Countering the Fina cing of Terrorism Complia ce Obligations for Accounta ts a d Trusts or Company Service Providers.	
15 June 2020	Circula No. 03 of 2020 wa issued to Fina cia Institutions d vising to be vigila t to emerging Money La ndering/Terrorist Fina cing risks.	
22 October 2020	Guideline No. 3 of 2020 wa issued on Non-Fa e-to-Fa e Customer Identification a d Verification Using Electronic Interface Provided by the Department for Registration of Persons	

### **Foreign Exchange Market**

19 March 2020	Direction No. 01 of 2020 was issued to Authorised Dealers (ADs) informing them to limit the release of foreign currency notes up to USD 5,000 or its equivalent in other foreign currency (from the previously permitted foreign currency travel allowance of USD 10,000) to persons resident in Sri Lanka travelling abroad for any purpose including for leisure, business, tra ning, medical treatment etc.		
20 Ma ch 2020	* Direction No. 02 of 2020 was issued to ADs requesting them to suspend the relea e of foreign excha ge, for a period of three months with immediate effect, for the importation of certain non essential consumer goods under Documents Against Payments and Open Account Payment terms in line with the Banking Act Directions issued on curtailing certain imports and foreign currency investments.		
	* Sell-Buy Forex SWAP Auctions were introduced to fulfill the FX liquidity requirement in the domestic foreign excha ge ma ket to ma g e the excessive volatility in the excha ge rate.		
02 April 2020	Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2169/3 was issued to impose certain measures on outwa d remitta ces on Cp ita Tra sa tions for a period of three months with a view to minimising the pressure on the excha ge rate a d possible negative impa t of the economy.		
	* Suspending the general permission granted to make outward remittances for investments oversea through the Outwa d Investment Accounts by persons resident in Sri Lanka excluding the following:		
	<ul> <li>a) investment to be financed out of a foreign currency loan obtained by the investor from a person resident outside Sri La ka under the provisions of Foreign Excha ge Act, or</li> </ul>		
	b) investment to be made to fulfill the regulatory requirement in that country.		

	* Suspending the outward remittances through Business Foreign Currency Accounts (BFCAs) or Personal Foreign Currency Accounts (PFCAs) held by persons in, or resident in, Sri La ka other tha for the remitta ces on current tra sa tions.	
	* Suspending the repatriation of funds under the migration allowance through Capital Transactions Rupee Accounts (CTRAs) by the emigrants who have already cla med migration a lowa ce.	
	* Limiting the eligible migration allowance for the emigrants who are claiming the migration allowance for the first time up to a maximum of USD 30,000.	
	* Limiting the authority of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank to grant special permission for investment on a cale by cale ballis, which exceeds the limits specified in the general permission, only to those satisfying the criterial mentioned in (a) and (b) above.	
03 April 2020	Directions No. 03 of 2020 were issued to ADs informing them to recover any foreign currency loa s gra ted to holders of BFCAs in Sri La ka Rupees, when recovery of such loa s in foreign currency is remote, a a lat resort by converting such loa s to Sri La ka Rupee denominated loa s, where necessary.	
08 April 2020	Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2170/4 was issued to introduce a Special Deposit Account (SDA) for any Sri Lankan individual resident in or outside Sri Lanka including Dual Citizens, Citizens of other States with Sri Lankan origin and any person resident outside Sri La ka including funds, corporate bodies, a sociations a d other well-wishers.	
09 April 2020	Directions No. 04 of 2020 were issued to ADs specifying the criteria of opening and maintaining SDAs and permitted debits and credits.	
16 April 2020	Directions No. 05 of 2020 were issued to ADs informing, loans granted to Sri Lankans employed <b>b</b> rod to be recovered in Sri La ka Rupees, <b>a</b> a la t resort, where necessary, when recovery of such loars in foreign currency is remote.	
01 July 2020	<ul> <li>Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2182/33 was issued to increase the mount of foreign currency that cm be retianed by a person in, or resident in Sri Lanka in his possession up to USD 15,000 from the previously permitted amount of USD 10,000.</li> <li>Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2182/32 was issued to expand the</li> </ul>	
	sources of funding of SDAs, while permitting SDA holders to obtain loans from ADs against SDAs.	
02 July 2020	Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2182/37 was issued, with the expiration of Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2169/3, to impose new measures on outward remitta ces on Cp ita Tra sa tions for a period of six months.	
	* Suspending the general permission granted to make outward remittances for investments overseas through the Outwa d Investment Accounts by persons resident in Sri Lanka excluding the following:	
	<ul> <li>a) investments to be financed out of foreign currency loans obtained by the investor from a person resident outside Sri La ka under the provisions of the Foreign Excha ge Act, No. 12 of 2017,</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>an additional investment to be made to fulfill the regulatory requirement in the investee's country applicable on the investment already made in a compa y or a bra ch office in that country,</li> </ul>	


	c) an additional investment/infusion of funds to be made by eligible resident compa ies in a red y esta lished subsidia ies or bra ch offices in oversea up to a maximum of USD 20,000, for the purpose of working capital requirements of the investee,	
	d) the remittances up to a maximum of USD 20,000, for the purpose of mantena ce of liason, maketing, gency, project, representative or a y other simila offices a really established oversea.	
02 July 2020	* Suspending the outward remittances through BFCAs or PFCAs held by persons resident in Sri La ka other tha for the remitta ces on current tra sa tions up to any amount or capital transactions up to a maximum of USD 20,000.	
	* Limiting the eligible migration allowance for the emigrants who are claiming the migration allowance for the first time, up to a maximum of USD 30,000.	
	* Limiting the repatriation of funds under the migration allowance by the emigra ts who have a red y cla med migration a lowa ce up to a maximum of USD 20,000.	
	* Limiting the authority of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank to grant special permission for investment on a cale by cale balls, which exceeds the limits specified in the general permission, only to those satisfying the criterial mentioned in (a) and (b) above.	
06 July 2020	Directions No. 06 of 2020 were issued to ADs specifying the further criteria of opening and maintaining SDAs and permitted debits, credits and other requirements.	
23 September 2020	Operating Instructions issued to LCBs on the new USD/LKR Buy-Sell currency SWAPs for tenors beyond one yea a d up to two yeas period under the Scheme named "Inward Investments SWAPs" to hedge the foreign exchange risk pertaining to foreign currency inflows that a e chain eled through the Inward Investments Accounts of non-residents. This is to encourage the fresh foreign inflows to the country.	
06 October 2020	Extraordinary Gazette Notification No. 2196/22 was issued permitting renewal and continuation of SDAs, beyond the designated date of maturity with the interest rates offered by the ADs for normal term deposits and to freely convertible and repatriable outside Sri La ka on the maturity of the term deposit.	
07 October 2020	* Directions No. 07 of 2020 were issued to ADs informing them to facilitate maturity proceeds including the interest of SDAs as a permitted credit to PFCA, provided that such SDA holder is eligible to open and maintain a PFCA.	
	* Directions No. 08 of 2020 were issued to ADs informing them to facilitate maturity proceeds including the interest of SDAs as a permitted credit to Inward Investment Account (IIA), provided that such SDA holder is eligible to open and ma nta n a IIA.	
	* Directions No. 09 of 2020 were issued to ADs informing them to continue to maintain SDAs as normal term deposits in the name of SDAs beyond the designated date of maturity of such SDAs, whilst to facilitating transfers of maturity proceeds including the interest of SDAs to IIAs or PFCAs, provided that such SDA holders are eligible to open and maintain such accounts.	

## **Chapter 2**

#### **Financial Markets**

#### 2.1 Overview

Stb ility of the fina cib ma kets, a indicated by the Financial Market Stability Index (FMSI), was at a satisfa tory level, though short term volatilities were observed due to unprecedented challenges in the globa a d domestic environment created through COVID-19 pandemic during the ten months ending in October 2020. With the spread of COVID-19 globaly, the prices of risky a sets plummeted while investors sought for safe haven a sets, in the globa fina cial ma kets. The Sri La ka fina cia ma ket wa no exception, a d behaved in line with other globa ma kets a domestic investors a so sought for more liquid a d less risky a sets. Almost a l of the domestic fina cia ma kets can e under pressure a d exhibited an plified volatility during this short period. However, proa tive a d extro rdina y policy mea ures to en by policy makers and regulators supported stabilization of ma kets to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the outlook remans uncertan a d makets reman volatile with the continuing COVID-19 pandemic related developments.



Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Colombo Stock Excha ge As experienced by other emerging ma kets, the ma or concern with the Sri La ka fina cib markets during 2020 wa the substa tia foreign outflows from domestic cp ith ma kets. The government securities maket, with the lagest shae in the Sri La ka cp ita ma kets, recorded a outflow of US dolla s 531.8 million during the ten months ending October 2020, even though it showed some recovery in September 2020. The Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) also recorded a significant flight of foreign funds a d recorded a outflow of US dolla s 243.6 million on a net ba is during the period under review. Foreign outflows from Sri La ka cp ita ma kets were mostly triggered by country specific circumsta ces which were an plified by the globa pa demic in 2020.

The CSE wa notb ly volatile in mid-Ma ch a d ea ly-May 2020 subsequent to the outbrek of COVID-19 in the country. Nevertheless, markets recovered since mid-May due to domestic investors' preference shifting towa ds equity investments in a low interest rate environment a though foreign outflows continued. The yield curve of government securities d justed downwa d towa ds historically low levels manly due to the a commodative moneta y policy mea ures a opted by the Centra Ba k, strategic issua ce a ra gements, a nouncing of maximum yield rate prior to a ction a per the policy direction of the government to fa ilitate low benchma k interest rates a d prima y ma ket purcha es of Trea ury bills by the Centra Ba k. Mea while, the corporate debt ma ket recorded a slowdown manly due to the limited spa e for corporates to expa d their businesses during the period a d tempora y closure of the CSE. The domestic money maket continuously recorded surplus liquidity, ma nly driven by the policy a tions the en by the Centra Ba k, such a reduction in the Statutory Reserve Requirement (SRR), policy rate reductions, prima y ma ket purcha e of Trea ury bills a d funds disbursed under specia loa schemes. Since mid-Ma ch, the domestic foreign


excha ge ma ket came under pressure driven by lower level of export conversions, lower inwa d remitta ces a d foreign outflows from cp ith ma kets. However, due to the decisive policy mea ures the en, the pressure on the excha ge rate ha continued to ea e since mid-May 2020.

# 2.2 Financial Market Stability Index


The fina cib ma ket stb ility a reflected by the Financial Market Stability Index (FMSI)<sup>9</sup> wa preserved except for short term deterioration observed during Ma ch a d April 2020<sup>10</sup> in a environment of uncerta n ma ket dynan ics due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Volatility of ASPI, Volatility of LKR-USD exchange rate, volatility of money ma ket liquidity a d ma ket intervention were the man rea on for declined stb ility in Ma ch a d April 2020. The estimated va ue of the fina cib ma ket stb ility for April 2020<sup>11</sup> wa the lowest since inception of compiling the index.

However, since May 2020, the maket stb ility improved a d hovered a ound the bae value (100). Improvements in all three market segments contributed to the improvement of especially the equity maket. However, net foreign outflows from the equity maket, one of the major patibindicators of FMSI, remained a a concern throughout the period. Even though majority of emerging makets experienced similar foreign outflows, foreign outflows of CSE were an plified due to country specific issues such a sovereign rating downgrades. Delay in structural reforms such as demutualization, lack of diversified investment opportunities ad lak of a ragement for risk shaing be so weighed in for the foreign outflow.


In October 2020, FMSI remained in a relatively favor be le position. This was mainly due to improvements in partible variables of the bond market, reduced volatility of chil money market rate



<sup>10</sup> Volatility of Market Liquidity also contributed towards the deterioration of market stability in March 2020. However, it was not statistically significant in the model for March 2020.



Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Colombo Stock Excha ge



EX market intervention

including SWAPS

2019 Oct

- - 2010-Base Year

Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Colombo Stock Excha ge

- 2020 Sep

Volatility of LKR

USD exchange rate

2020 Oct

<sup>11</sup> The FMSI was estimated excluding the equity market data for the month of April 2020 since the CSE wa closed during the month. The estimated values are shown with a dashed line.

<sup>12</sup> Thirteen partial variables covering the foreign exchange market, money ma ket, bond ma ket a d equity ma ket a e considered for the compilation of FMSI. Namely: (1) Volatility of call money market rate; (2) Volatility of total money market liquidity; (3) Volatility of secondary market 91 days T-bill rates; (4) Term spread between secondary market 91 days T-bill rates and 5-year T-bond rates; (5) Term spread between 1 to 7 days Treasury bill (secondary market) and AWCMR; (6) Term spread between secondary market 91 days T-bill rates and 3 month London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR); (7) Volatility of LKR-USD exchange rate; (8) FX market intervention including SWAPS; (9) 3 months forward premium; (10) (11) Daily Turnover at CSE; (12) Volatility of Price Earnings Ratio (PER) and (13) Net Foreign Inflows at CSE


<sup>13</sup> Deviation from the center indicates a positive impact to the financial system stability.

and reduced volatility of PE ratio. Nevertheless, partial variables such as volatility of ASPI and net foreign outflows had a negative impa t on FMSI in October 2020. In a dition, volatility of money market liquidity and volatility of the LKR-USD excha ge rate a so remained slightly below the base year's value.


#### 2.3 Equity Market

The Equity Ma ket wa volatile during the ten months ending October 2020 in the ba kground of numerous uncertainties created by the COVID-19 pa demic. The CSE exhibited high sensitivity to adverse news on COVID-19 pandemic and the volatility of the All Share Price Index (ASPI) and S&P SL 20 indices increased significantly during this period. Index-ba ed circuit brea ers were a tivated on severa occa ions due to excessive volatility. It wa noted that, volatility in stock ma kets was common in all globa ma kets especially in emerging markets as the COVID-19 pandemic impa ted equity markets through a combination of unprecedented domestic and external shocks.

Among the stock exchanges of Sri Lanka's regional peers, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore depicted the highest declines in Ma ch 2020. These countries were **b** le to slightly reverse these negative developments by end October 2020. On the contra y, the stock excha ges in China Ta wa a d South Korea significatly improved a d were b le to record a positive growth by the end of October 2020.




Exchanges 15 Excluding the days the ma ket wa closed.



Source: Colombo Stock Exchange

Simila to the poor performa ce of the globa stock ma kets, a investors rushed to more liquid and safe assets with the spread of COVID-19, a sha p deterioration in the performa ce of the Sri La ka equity ma ket wa observed in Ma ch 2020.




<sup>14</sup> The ma ket wa tempora y hated/ closed on several days due to Circuit Breakers applied as a precautionary measure to eradicate distortion in the S&P SL20 Index. Further, The CSE was closed from 20 March 2020 until 11 May 2020 due to the lockdown imposed by the government to prevent the spread of COVID—19.

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


However, from mid-May 2020, the Colombo bourse sta ted to recover from its subdued performa ce and the ASPI recorded a positive year-to-date growth towa ds the latter pa t of November, for the first time in 2020. This recovery wa manly driven by domestic investors' preference shifting towa ds equity investments due to the prevaling low interest rate regime, reviva of the economic a tivities of the country after the complete lockdown wa lifted a d increa ed confidence with the renewed political stability. The CSE has become one of the makets that has recovered fatest from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Asian region with improved maket indices and record high turnover so faduring the year.



Source: Colombo Stock Exchange







Source: Colombo Stock Exchange

Even though the ASPI and S&P SL20 recorded a yea -to-date decline by 6.6 per cent a d 22.3 per cent, respectively, by end October 2020, the indices gained by 29.0 and 30.0 respectively since 15 May 2020. However, the ma ket remained sensitive to COVID-19 pandemic related news and indices plummeted on 13 July 2020 a d 05 October 2020 following maket paic immediately after the identification of new COVID-19 clusters in the country.

Sri Lanka recorded the lowest Price to Earnings Ratio (PER) among its regional peers, as at end 2019. With the positive sentiments that remained at the beginning of 2020, the PER hovered around 11.0 times, which wa the maximum value recorded during the yea. Along with the other



Source: Colombo Stock Exchange



Secondary Market Inflows

Source: Colombo Stock Exchange

CSE net Inflows (RHS)


market indicators, the PER fluctuated throughout the year rear hing its minimum of 7.8 times in mid-May. It remained at 9.7 at end October 2020. The Price to Book Value (PBV) also showed a similar pattern, raging from 0.8 to 1.1 during the period under consideration. With the containment of the first wave of COVID-19 within the country, along with these attractive PER and PBV valuations, domestic investors stated to invest in stocks with a ticipation of gains in the future.

With a favorable PER, a favorable PBV and a low interest rate scena io domestic buyers continued to buy sound stocks ena ling the CSE to record its highest turnover in the lat five yeas. Total turnover in the secondary maket during the ten months ending October 2020 an ounted to Rs. 276.0 billion which surpased the Rs. 171.4 billion of the total turnover recorded in 2019.

However, foreign contribution towa ds the total turnover was subpa compared to the previous yea. Only 17.8 per cent of the total turnover originated from foreign purcha es a g is nst 33.0 per cent reported in the previous yea.

Despite other positive developments, net foreign outflows continue to reman a concern. This yea, the depth of outflows was substantial for many emerging market countries and well as some of the distribution value to the shift in investor sentiment towards safe haven an sets and a result of the uncertainties created by the






Source: Central Depository Systems

COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, lower foreign pa ticipation a d outflows from the CSE have been min or concerns for Sri La ka for yea s.

Continued foreign outflows from the equity maket exerted some pressure on the exchage rate ad reserves. Foreign holdings significatly declined by 15.7 per cent to Rs. 583.2 billion by end October 2020 from Rs. 691.8 billion in December 2019. Accordingly, foreign investors' holdings of total equity declined to 23.9 per cent by end October 2020 compared to 26.1 per cent in December 2019.


The CSE rema ns one of the smallest malkets and ong its peers a though there is huge potential for further expalsion and attracting foreign investments. As at end 2019, the size of the Sri Lankan equity



Note: The size of the sphere is proportional to market capitalization as a percentage of GDP

Sources: World Bank

<sup>16</sup> This va ue includes Rs. 23.6 billion which wa a single day turnover recorded on 9 January 2020, which includes the second highest single transaction in the CSE's history. However, the total turnover for the ten months even without the turnover on 9 January, surpasses the last year's total turnover value



Sources: Department of Census and Statistics
Colombo Stock Excha ge




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

market in terms of market capitalization, average da ly turnover **a** d number of comp**a** ies listed in the m**a** ket, fell behind its peers. Even though a signific**a** t improvement w**a** observed in terms of turnover, market capitalization further contracted to Rs. 2,494.3 billion at end October 2020 compared to Rs. 2,851.3 billion at end 2019 recording a 12.5 per cent decline.

Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP declined over the recent years. Market capitalization a at end October 2020 a a percent g e of estimated GDP remained at 16.7 per cent compared to 19.0 per cent recorded at the end of 2019. Further, the number of listed compa ies ha a so reduced to 285 as at end October 2020 compared to 289 as at end 2019. There was only one Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the CSE during the ten months ending in October 2020 which ra sed Rs. 8.1 billion while there were no IPOs during the corresponding period of 2019.

The la k of diversified investment opportunities ha b so remained a inherent impediment to




Source: World Bank

attra t foreign investment to the stock ma ket over the yeas. Addressing this issue to some extent, numerous products were introduced within the yea, including the lanch of Reb Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) which enables investors to benefit from investments in the real estate sector while opening up new funding avenues for reb estate developers. However, these new products will be so bring new dimensions of risks to the system and may continuously require improvements in the regulatory sphere and propriate upgradie in infracture.

#### 2.4 Treasury Bond Market

The Trea ury bond maket expaded substatially since Mach 2020 with excess demadadthe increaded borrowing witnessed in the primay Treaury bond maket. Increaded domestic investors popetite for investing in risk free government securities, increaded cah flow requirements of the government ad conducive liquidity conditions contributed towads the expansion of the Treaury bond maket.

The outsta ding Trea ury bond va ue an ounted to Rs. 5,337.3 billion at end October 2020, recording a substa til yea -on-yea growth of 14.5 per cent. The total size of the Treasury bond market was 31.2 per cent of GDP as at end 2019 compared to 30.2 per cent of GDP as at end 2018. By end October 2020, the size of the Treasury bond market as a percentage of GDP is estimated to be increased to 35.8. This increa e is the combined effect of both increased market size and a relatively lower GDP estimated with contra tions in domestic economic activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic.




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Enha ced preference from domestic investors wa observed in the prima y ma ket for Trea ury bonds, prima ily to ma e quick ga ns from the low interest rates in money ma kets. At the ea ly pa t of the yea, bids to offer ratio remained at p proximately 3 times indicating a very higher dema d. The prevaling excess liquidity in the baking sector, lower dema d for loas ad vaces due to chalenging business conditions ad shifted investor sentiment towards safer a sets in the uncertain economic environment contributed to the increae in dema d by domestic investors. As a result, the Trea ury bond maket expaded despite low foreign paticipation.

Foreign investors' appetite in Treasury Bonds reduced significatly during the period. The substantially lower interest rates mantaned to support the domestic economy, led the yield-seeking foreign investors to move out of the Sri La kan government securities maket. Except for






Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Secondary Treasury Bond Market
Transactions

Chart


2.19




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

September 2020, notb le foreign outflows from the government securities ma ket were observed. Accordingly, foreign investments a a percentg e of outsta ding Trea ury bills lowered to 0.2 per cent by October 2020, compa ed to the 2.1 per cent which remained at end October 2019. In addition, the outsta ding Treasury bond holdings by foreign pa ties sunk to Rs. 8.6 billion at end October 2020 compared to Rs. 95.9 billion as at end October 2019.

Simila to the previous yea, the seconday maket for Trea ury bonds recorded moderate tralle a tivities. Significat t volatility in terms of the number of transations and tralle volume was observed. The average number of tralles per day declined to 46 during the considered period compared to the average of 51 recorded during the previous year. However, the average traller volume increased to Rs. 7,590.7 million from Rs. 7,346.8 million recorded in the previous year.




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

In the secondary maket, historically low yield rates were observed a ross all maturities during the period. This downwad shift observed in the secondary maket yield curve was manly driven by the a commodative monetary policy stace dopted by the Centrabak, the policy direction of the government to failitate low benchmak interest rates and strategic issuace arrangements carried out by the Public Debt Department of the Centrabak in line with resource availability. Since Mach 2020 the yield curve has shifted downwads and continued to behave in a similal maken refrom





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

July 2020 until end October 2020. However, the downwa d shift of the ma ket yield curve observed for longer-term maturities in June 2020, slightly reversed in October 2020.

The seconda y ma ket yield for Trea ury bonds which exhibits the long-term movement of interest rates continued to decline since the latter pa t of 2018. A significal t decline in yield rates was noticed since Ma ch 2020 with a significal t plunge in July 2020. Accordingly, a higher volatility has been observed in the secondary market yield curve for Trea ury bonds. Exhibiting lower peritte an ong investors for longer-term maturities, the term premium between the two-year and the ten-year Trea ury bond yields which widened during mid-2019, continued throughout the year 2020.

Domestic market liquidity together with monetary policy a tions influenced the Trea ury bond seconda y ma ket yield rates. Sprea s between the two-yea Trea ury bond yield a d Sta ding Deposit Facility Rate (SDFR) have narrowed down significatly since late-June 2020. Further, the two-yea Trea ury bond yield rates went below the Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR) since late-June 2020.

The frequency of Trea ury bond a ctions wa increa ed to two a ctions a month deviating from the estab lished practice of one a ction a month to facilitate the government's cash flow requirements during the period from May to July 2020. In order to improve the traspa ency of the primary issuacce process, the Centrabark stated to a nounce the maximum yield rate for a ceptace for a limaturities offered at Treasury bill and Treasury bond actions to maket paticipats prior to actions from May 2020. This failitated informed decision-making while enhacing symmetry of information an ongaction paticipats.

#### 2.5 Corporate Bond Market


The a tivities of the corporate bond maket, which is a small segment of the cp ith maket in Sri Laka wafurther affected by sluggish economicativities ad temporay closure of the CSE for a period of seven weeks.

The prima y ma ket a tivities remained low during the ten months ending in October 2020 compa ed to the previous yea. Sixteen different types of debentures were issued by eight institutions during this period compa ed to 21 types of debentures issued by 11 institutions during the corresponding

<sup>17</sup> Excludes days without a y trd es

Chart 2.23

#### Listed Debentures Based on Maturity




Source: Colombo Stock Exchange

period of 2019. Accordingly, the total funds mobilized through debentures declined to Rs. 21.9 billion during the period under consideration, compa ed to Rs. 50.6 billion recorded in the corresponding period of the previous yea.

The reduction in a tivities of the prima y ma ket ca be la gely attributed to the lockdown a d sluggish business expa sion during the first ha f of 2020. However, a tivities of the prima y ma ket slowly picked up after the lockdown wa lifted in the third qua ter of 2020. Out of the tota an ount raised through debentures, only Rs. 2.9 billion (13.3 per cent) was raised during the first six months of the year, while Rs. 19.0 billion (86.7 per cent) was raised during the four months between July a d October 2020.




#### **Sector - wise Listed Debentures**



Source: Colombo Stock Exchange

#### Chart 2.25

#### Distribution of Annualized Interest Rates of Fixed Interest Five-year Debentures




Source: Colombo Stock Exchange

When considering the maturity period of debenture issua ce, simila to previous yeas, the debentures with a maturity period of five yeas dominated the maket. No debentures with more than 10 yeas were issued in 2020.

Over the yea s, the baks addiversified finacibinstitutions have been the mp or debt issuers in the debenture maket ad the debenture issuaces from other sectors remaned low. In 2020, blof the debentures were issued by baks addiversified finacibinstitutions. It is evident that the diversified financial institutions' share in debenture issuace hagrown significatly during 2020. The requirements imposed by the Centrabak in 2017 to enhace the minimum cp ital requirement of finacibinstitutions by end 2020 habeen akey contributor in terms of the dominace of baksaddiversified financial institutions in the corporate debt maket.

Chart 2.26

## Secondary Market Transactions of the Corporate Debt Market



Source: Colombo Stock Exchange



Source: Central Depository Systems

Out of 16 debentures issued, three debentures were issued with a floating rate **a** d the rest of the debentures were issued with a fixed rate during the period under review. The annualized fixed interest rates pertia ning to debentures issued during the period under consideration were in the rage of 9.00 -13.30 per cent, compared to the annualized interest rates of 12.30 - 15.60 per cent observed during the ten months ending October 2019. In terms of the debentures with the 5-yea maturity period, it is evident that interest rates have significal tly declined compared to previous yeas, in line with the reduction in market interest rates.

Source: Central Depository Systems

The seconda y ma ket for listed corporate debt wa relatively a tive in 2020 compa ed to the previous yea. The seconda y ma ket turnover for the nine months ending September 2020 increa ed to Rs. 5.4 billion, compa ed to Rs. 4.3 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2019. The foreign pa ticipation in the seconda y ma ket wa at a unsatisfa tory level. Sha e of turnover by foreign nationals further reduced to 0.01 per cent, compa ed to 0.18 per cent recorded in the corresponding period of the previous yea.

The an ount of foreign holdings has significally deteriorated since the latter path of 2018. At end October 2020, the shale of foreign holdings as a percentage of total outstanding maket value was 0.2 per centage of foreign holdings and ounted only to Rs. 0.6 billion.


The corporate debt ma ket in terms of ma ket capitalization has stagnated around the Rs. 250 – 300 billion ra ge a d decelerated over the recent years. The market capitalization of the debentures ma ket a at end September 2020 stood at Rs. 258.0 billion compared to Rs.293.6 billion as at end September 2019. A developed corporate debt ma ket is a necessity for Sri La ka to fa ilitate expa sion in the corporate sector.

#### 2.6 Domestic Money Market


The money maket liquidity endured significat volatility and recorded a liquidity surplus during the ten months ending October 2020. This wam manly driven by the unprecedented monetary policy earing done by the Centra Bark. In addition, a

**Chart 2.29** 

Factors Contributed towards Liquidity on a Cumulative Basis (Jan - end Oct 2020)



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

ra ge of other fa tors such a prima y purcha es of Trea ury bills, foreign excha ge related tra sa tions ca ried out with the a m of reducing pressure on excha ge rate a well a the funds disbursed under special loa schemes introduced by the Centra Ba k for individuas a d corporates affected by the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the elevated surplus liquidity position.

The Centrb Ba k introduced severb moneta y policy relaxation mea ures in 2020.<sup>18</sup> Moneta y policy implementation of the Centrb Ba k during the COVID-19 pandemic was aimed at assuring the availability of all equate liquidity in the domestic money maket and to induce a low interest rate environment, paticularly considering the need for supporting the smooth functioning of the fina cib system and stimulating economic activities during the COVID-19 pandemic period.





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Consequently, ma ket liquidity becan e volatile during the ten months ending in October 2020. Relatively significa t volatility in ma ket liquidity wa observed in March a d June 2020, coinciding with reductions in SRR.


Although the ma ket wa in surplus levels during the period from end Ma ch to June 2020, the Centra Bank conducted open market operations (OMOs) with a view to inducing a downwa d adjustment in the Averg e Weighted Cal Money Ma ket Rate (AWCMR), considering the asymmetric distribution of liquidity an ong the money ma ket pa ticipa ts, a well a to ensure certainty of liquidity in the ma ket. Asymmetric distribution of liquidity an ong the Participating Institutions (PIs) of the money ma ket wa one of the man challenges observed in the money ma ket. Certa n domestic private ba ks a d foreign ba ks continued to mantan a considerb le level of surplus liquidity in the **b** sence of significa t credit dema d a d lending operations, while state ba ks were operating with va ying liquidity positions. With the prevaling excess liquidity position in the domestic money market, PIs continued to deposit excess funds in substantially high amounts under the SDF of the Centra Ba k.

With the continuous surplus liquidity position in the domestic money ma ket, a ctions under OMOs were not conducted during the period from 17 June 2020 to 24 September 2020. Hence,

<sup>18</sup> The Centra Ba k reduced its policy interest rates by 250 ba is points in five stages in January, March, April, May and early July 2020, bringing the SDFR and SLFR to 4.50 per cent and 5.50 per cent, respectively, with a view to support continued reduction in ma ket lending rates. The Centra Ba kaso reduced SRR p plicb le on rupee deposit liabilities of Licensed Commercial Banks (LCBs) by 3.00 percentg e points during the yea in two stg es in Ma ch and June 2020, to 2.00 per cent, by injecting around Rs. 180 billion liquidity to the domestic money market. In addition, since mid-April 2020, with the view to provide more flexibility in liquidity ma g ement of LCBs, the minimum daly reserve requirement to be held by a LCB with the Central Bank was reduced from 90 per cent to 20 per cent of the required reserves on a y given day. Furthermore, to ensure the ava lb ility of emergency funding to banking institutions at reasonable interest rates, the Central Bank reduced the Bank Rate, which is an administratively determined interest rate by the Centra Ba k by 500 ba is points in April 2020 to 8.5 per cent, while allowing it to be determined automatically with a ma gin of 300 ba is points b ove the SLFR.

Chart 2.32

Spread between AWCMR and AWRR



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

the Centra Ba k b sorbed excess liquidity in the domestic money market through the SDF on an overnight ba is. However, a ctions under OMOs commenced on 25 September 2020, an idst the continued surplus liquidity in the domestic money market, recognizing the need for ensuring the ava lability of a equate liquidity manly in view of foreign loa repayments. Accordingly, long-term a d short-term reverse repo a ctions for LCBs a well a long term liquidity support fa ility a ctions for Standalone Primary Dealers (SPDs) were also conducted on a need ba is.


Money ma ket interest rates significa tly declined during the period in response to the moneta y policy relaxing mea ures. The Averg e Weighted Repo Rate (AWRR) also moved along with the trend of AWCMR, reflecting a relatively lower spred between the two rates. By end October 2020, the AWCMR remained at 4.53 per cent. Mea while the AWRR, indicated some uptick in the months of September a d October 2020 manly due to borrowings by a few SPDs, at relatively higher rates in the repo market. However, it rema ned brod ly closer to the AWCMR, which was at 4.59 per cent a at end October 2020.

In 2020, the Centra Ba k took severa mea ures to smoothen the money ma ket a tivities. The Centra Ba k provided long-term liquidity a sista ce to LCBs through long-term reverse repo a ctions with a extended maturity up to three months during four days in ea ly April 2020. Considering the need for providing long-term liquidity a sista ce for SPDs during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Liquidity Support Facility (LSF) was extended for a period of up to 15 days. Since July 2020, the Centra Ba k introduced modifications to the existing sta ding fe ilities by way of reducing me ub intervention and extending cutoff time to PIs to utilize the sta ding fa ilities.


#### 2.7 Treasury Bill Market

The Trea ury bill ma ket, being a short-term riskfree securities maket, wa relatively ative ad liquid during the ten months ending October 2020. Strong dema d wa witnessed throughout the year in the prima y ma ket for Trea ury bills especially in the months of June 2020 a ong with declining yield rates. This trend continued manly due to investors shifting to more risk averse products a a result of the uncertainties created by the COVID-19 pa demic, a d the ba king sector investing heavily in Trea ury bills due to the low dema d for loans a d d va ces. The an ount of Trea ury bills directly purcha ed by the Centra Bak in the primay ma ket during the ten months ending October 2020 an ounts to Rs. 758.56 billion, which includes Rs 239.88 billion issuance for the purposes of provisiona d va ces a d retired the san e on the following business day. Direct purchase of Treasury bills by the Centra Ba k in the prima y ma ket a so supported to mantan a lower yield in the prima y ma ket for Trea ury bills. Nevertheless, in November 2020, a decline in dema d for Trea ury bills wa observed with recent a ctions being not fully a located to ma ket pa ticipa ts within the a nounced maximum yield rates.

The yield rates of the prima y ma ket for Trea ury bills showed a substa tia decline a ross al maturities due to strategic issua ce a ra gements,



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka



2.36

Torcign Toroings of Tedastry Dills

40

30

40

30

40

30

20

10

10

0

English and Foreign Treasury Bill holdings - Outstanding

Foreign Holding as a percentage of total holdings (RHS)


Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

**Foreign Holdings of Treasury Bills** 

Chart

a nouncing of maximum yield rate prior to a ction a per the policy direction of the government to fa ilitate low benchma k interest rates a well a excess liquidity in the maket a a result of the a commodative moneta y policy stace a d prima y maket purchae of Treaury bills by the Centrabank. A similatrend wa observed in the seconday maket yield curve a well. Accordingly, the yield rates for 91 days, 182 days and 364 days Treasury bills declined by 298 bps, 322 bps and 345 bps, respectively during the ten months ending October 2020.

Since Februa y 2020, the outsta ding value of the Trea ury bill maket recorded a noteworthy increale, recording a year-on-year growth of 58.0 per cent from Rs. 893.0 billion by end October 2019 to Rs. 1,410.8 billion by end October 2020.




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Foreign investments in Trea ury bills grd ubly increased during the latter part of 2019 and early 2020 with the renewed political stability. However, with the spread of COVID-19 within the country, the shale of foreign investments in Treal ury bills plummeted to a new record low of 0.1 per cent of total outstal ding volume by October 2020. The outstal ding foreign Treal ury bill holdings an ounted to Rs. 1.7 billion at end October 2020 compared to Rs. 16.6 billion at end October 2019. The substal tially lower rates maintained to support the domestic economy, and developments in global malkets led to foreign funds moving out of the Sri Laikal Treal ury bill malket.


# 2.8 Domestic Foreign Exchange Market

The domestic foreign excha ge ma ket can e under severe pressure subsequent to the outbrek of COVID-19 in mid-March 2020. However, owing to the policy decisions the en by the government a d the Centra Ba k, the pressure exerted on the excha ge rate grd ubly ea ed since May 2020. Consequently, the Sri La ka rupee recorded only a slight depreciation of 1.4 per cent g a nst the US dolla during the ten month period ending in October 2020. However, the recent country rating downgrd e by Fitch Ratings in November 2020 together with the impact of second wave of COVID -19 pandemic, resulted in the exchange rate to be under pressure g an since November ma ing the depreciation of the Sri La ka Rupee g a nst US Dollar to rise up to 2.3% by 11 December 2020.




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

The moving averg e ba ds of excha ge rate clea ly depicts the movements a d the pressure in the domestic foreign excha ge ma ket during the period under consideration. In ea ly 2020, the gap between the moving averg e ba ds na rowed down reflecting the stb ility of the excha ge rate that



<sup>19</sup> Bollinger bands are a method of technical analysis widely used to measure the volatility of exchange rates and asset prices. The Bollinger ba ds in Cha t 2 a e constructed using the sta da d deviation of the exchange rate over the previous 20 days.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

prevailed at the latter part of 2019 which continued till end Februa y 2020 with the post-election political stability in the country. However, the perceived exchange rate stability was not sustained for long, and significant pressure on the exchange rate was observed since mid-March 2020 leading the exchange rate to reanh Rs. 200 in April 2020 due to the lower levels of tourism related inflows, exports conversions and lower remittances and well an increaned repatriations of foreign investments from the government securities and equity mankets, along with negative manket sentiments. With the stat of the depreciation pressure since mid-March 2020 the gap between the three moving average bands increaned.

Nevertheless, the pressure exerted on the exchage rate ha grd ubly ea ed since May 2020, owing to the policy decisions to impose temporary restrictions on non-essentia imports a d selected outward remittances, improved workers' remittances, and modest foreign excha ge interventions by the Centra Ba k a ong with the introduction of Sell -Buy Forex SWAP auctions to the market, and the resumption of domestic economic a tivities. With the ea e of excha ge rate pressure since July, the 90 day average band which remained well above the 180 day moving averg e ba d ha stated to come down reducing the gp between the lines. During the four months between July to October 2020, the Sri La ka rupee g anst US dolla ha hovered a ound the levels of Rs. 184 - Rs. 185.


The constructed Bollinger ba d demonstrates the bove described fundaments. The exchange rate was at the upper Bollinger bad during Mach to April 2020 which grad ubly moved downwards and crossed the 20 day moving average in mid-May 2020 indicating a trend of preciation.

With the stabilization of the exchange rate the Bollinger ba ds na rowed. However, during the period from mid-August to end September 2020 Bollinger ba ds slightly widened a d the excha ge rate remained close to the middle of the Bollinger ba ds. Nevertheless, the Bollinger ba ds na rowed in October 2020 g à n.

Mea while, during the period under review, interest rate cut by Reserve Ba k of India a d less p petite for emerging ma ket currencies led the Sri La ka rupee to p preciate g is nst the India rupee. However, the Sri La ka rupee depreciated g is nst other major currencies such as the Australian Dollar, Sterling Pound, Euro, Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen, mainly due to the increased demand for safe heaven currencies. The Covid-19 impact across internation foreign excha ge ma kets exerted significa t pressures on developing a d emerging country forex ma kets.


Adva ced economies a e likely to continue their a commodative moneta y policy pra ticed during the yea for the foreseeb le future. Although emerging ma kets a e expected to have a positive impa t with the va ious kinds of ea ing mea ures introduced by d va ced economies, where foreign currency inflows a e expected to flow from advanced economies with the view to capitalizing on the interest rate differentia, it has not hap pened as expected. This may have not materialized owing to va ious reasons such a excha ge rate volatility, economic and political uncertainty etc. in emerging economies. Hence, it is unlikely to expect significat to the inflows from the divaced economies, even though interest rate differentials prevailed.

The total trd ing volume in the domestic foreign exchange inter-bank maket during the said



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka






Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

period from November 2019 to end October 2020 recorded a ma gina decrea e of 1.8 per cent from US dollars 19.5 billion in 2019 to US dollars 19.1 billion in 2020. The temporary closure of the domestic foreign excha ge ma ket for a few days in Ma ch 2020, restricted ma ket operating hours during Ma ch to June 2020 a d the reduced level of economic a tivities in the country since Ma ch 2020 due to the spread of COVID-19, contributed to the decrease in the trd ing volumes in the domestic foreign excha ge ma ket. However, the daly averg e volumes in the inter-bak foreign excha ge ma ket have ma ginb ly increa ed by 0.2 per cent to US dolla s 80.4 million during the sa d period from November 2019 to end October 2020, from US dolla s 80.2 million in the corresponding period from November 2018 to October 2019. This wa manly supported by the paticipation of six of the la gest ba ks operating in the domestic foreign excha ge ma ket, which contributed to 66.0 per cent of the tra se tion volume during the period under review.

Despite the significant challenges faced in terms of manta ning the excha ge rate during the first five months of 2020, the Centra Bak wa a net buyer in the domestic foreign excha ge maket during the period from November 2019 to October 2020. Even with the modest sales during the periods of excessive volatility, specifically from Mach to mid-May 2020, the Centra Bak wable to resume purchae of foreign exchage from the maket to build up reserves of the country since May 2020 with the receipt of inflows on account of workers' remittae ces into the domestic foreign exchage maket ad the condensed import demad due to



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

import restrictions. Accordingly, during the twelve month period from November 2019 to October 2020, the Central Ba k b sorbed US dolla s 767.2 million a d supplied US dolla s 380.4 million, resulting in a net purchase of US dollars 386.8 million.

The Centra Bak took several initiatives to mitigate the excessive volatility of the foreign exchage maket a a result of the uncertanties created by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Central Bank intervened in both spot a d forwad makets whenever excessive volatility in the exchage rate wa observed, in order to ensure orderly behavior in the exchage rate. The Central Bak conducted

several Sell–Buy Forex SWAPs auctions to ease the pressure in the domestic ma ket, at the height of the lockdown in Ma ch a d April 2020 to ensure the ava lb ility of d equate liquidity in the domestic foreign excha ge ma ket without depleting the foreign excha ge reserves of the country.

Ma g ing the pressure on the excha ge rates is one of the man challenges being falled by many countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is much more severe for emerging mankets which were a really experiencing significant portfolio outflows from capital markets. If the COVID-19 pandemic continues further, there might be continuous pressure on the exchange rate, due to the volatile export demand and the reduction of ean ings from tourism and other foreign flows.

The Sri La ka fina cib ma kets reman vulner be to globb a domestic maket developments. On a positive note, breakthroughs relating to COVID-19 vacines have boosted optimism in finacib makets worldwide. Continuation of the second wave of COVID-19 remains a challenge for the performace of finacib makets in Sri Laka The speed of the containment of the COVID-19 second wave within the country, improved maroeconomic stability, ad buildup of business confidence will be key to the nea-term stability of the finacib makets.

<sup>20</sup> Excluding the days without a y trd es.

#### Box Article 2

#### **Financial Stress Index for Sri Lanka**

The purpose of this box article is to introduce the Financial Stress Index (FSI), one of the new tools added to the Macroprudential toolkit of the Central Bank during the year 2020.

#### Introduction


The importance of methodologies to a certain the buildup of fina cib stress in the fina cib system a a whole, emerge in the aftermath of a globa fina cial crisis. A period of fina cia stress is defined a an episode where economic g ents a e subject to extreme uncertanty a d va ying expectations of loss in financial markets (Illing and Liu, 2004). However, financial stress is not directly mea ured but believed to be reflected by ma y va ib les related to fina cial ma kets. Therefore, a single measure that summarizes different stress components from all these makets is useful in a sessing vulnerb ilities and predicting future crises that could ema te fom different constituents in the fina cib system. Thus, the FSI ha become a popula tool an ong ma y policy ma ers a d resea chers.

The FSI is a continuum va ib le which combines va ious fina cib ma ket indicators into a composite index, thereby eliminating the dependency on several indicators in measuring financial stress (Park and Mercdo, 2014). In addition, the FSI allows to mea ure the degree a d severity of fina cib stress in a way that spikes in the stress index correspond to the periods of severe fina cib stress, providing timely sna shots of contempora eous stress in order to ga ge the severity of fina cib events

(Illing and Liu, 2014). Further, as a measure of the intensity of a crisis, the FSI provides indications of nea -miss events. Nea -miss events a e periods of heightened fina cib ma ket stress, but do not evolve into a full-blown fina cib crisis. However, the FSI ha its own limitations, pa ticula ly relating to its methodology employed in construction of the index including choice va ib les, method of aggregation, and frequency (Park and Mercdo, 2014).

#### **Methodology of Constructing the FSI**

Compilation of the FSI generally involves four steps: (1) Variable selection; (2) Variable transformation; (3) Aggregating into single index; and (4) Identifying stress episodes. The selection of va ib les a d methodology differ a ross different countries and researchers (Mahmood and Hussain, 2016). In compilation of a FSI for Sri La ka a simila methodology and variables suggested by Park and Mercado (2014) were employed considering data ava la ility, simplicity of the methodology a d the fina cib sector dynamics of Sri La ka The va ib les were selected to reflect vulnerb ilities in the four sectors of the financial system covering (1) Equity Market; (2) Debt Securities Market; (3) Foreign Exchange Market; and (4) Banking Sector a d Money Ma ket.




For the purpose of g gregating the pa tib va ib les for one single index, the Va ia ce-Equa Weighting Method, the most commonly used method in other countries, wa d opted. Accordingly, the pa tib fina cial stress indices for ea h ma ket a e compiled by giving equal weight to each varible within the ma ket. Then, the pa tib financib stress indices are standardized and added together to compile the FSI. Stress periods a e identified ba ed on the sta da d deviation of the historic values of FSI. If the index remains b ove one standad deviation of its historica mea, that paticula period is cla sified a a period with a moderately high level of financia stress. Simila ly, if the index va ue rea hed b ove two sta da d deviation, the period is classified as a period with severe level of fina cia stress.

#### **Behaviour of Monthly FSI**

The FSI constructed on a monthly basis from January 2010 to July 2020 is shown in Figure 2. The monthly FSI has identified five stress episodes since 2010.<sup>43</sup>

One of the main benefits of the FSI is its ability to signal the build-up of future stress periods at a given time due to the availability of high frequency market data. Accordingly, the MSD decided to compile the FSI using daily data to detect building up of risks in the financial system. When compiling the daily FSI, a methodology similar to the monthly FSI was used.<sup>45</sup>

The figure 3 illustrates the daily FSI computed for the recent period since the beginning of 2019. During the considered period, five stress episodes have been identified by the FSI.<sup>46</sup>




Source: The Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo Stock Exchange

- 43 A period with higher stress level that the esplae within 3 months from previously identified stress period, is considered as a one stress episode.
- 44 The FSI was estimated excluding the equity market data for the month of April 2020 since the CSE wa closed during the month. The estimated values are shown with a dashed line.
- 45 There is a slight difference in the two methodologies of computing the daly **a** d monthly FSIs. In terms of the monthly FSI, in order to avoid the impact of extreme values observed in 2011, the volatility of ASPI is calculated using particular month's observations for each
- month. In terms of the da ly FSI, the va ia ce of the whole series is considered, which is the mostly accepted method of computing volatility. Further, it was assumed that there are 21 Market days per month a d 242 Ma ket days per yea. The seven-day moving averg es of ea h indicator were used to smoothen va ib les in order to avoid the impact of high volatility in daily values.
- 46 It is a sumed that a period with higher stress level that takes place within a 3 day from a previously identified stress period is considered as one stress episode. A stress period consisting only one day without any heightened stress levels in next consecutive days is not considered a stressed periods.

#### Stress Periods Identified by the Monthly FSI (Since 2010)

Stress Episodes	Stressed Months	Partial Variables Contributed/Reasons
Stress Episodes		•
1	Oct 2011- July 2012	(1) Rapid Expansion of Credit
(Nov 2011 – Feb 2013)	Oct -Nov 2012	2) Change in Ex. Rate management policies responding to widening trd e deficit a d week
	Feb 2013	globa ma ket a tivities
		(3) Price corrections in stock market due to policies imposed by SEC
2	July 2013	(1) Mainly driven by pressure in the forex market a ising from concerns after withdrawa of moneta y a commodation in USA
		(2) This coincided with volatility in the money ma ket after 200 ba is point reduction in the SRR in July 2013
3-4	Sep 2018 - Nov 2018	Constitutiona Crisis/politica uncerta nty rema ned during the period
(Sep 2018 – Nov 2018)		during the period
4	Apr 2019- July 2019	•
(Apr 2019 – July 2019)		aftermath of Ea ter Sunday atta ks
5	Ma ch -July 2020	Financial Market Volatility during the COVID  pa demic a d high volatility ca sed by the sudden relief mea ures provided



<sup>47</sup> The FSI was estimated excluding the equity market data from 20 Ma ch to 11 May 2020 since the CSE wa closed during the period. The estimated values are shown with a dashed line.

The FSI identifies the stress episode between 8 May 2019 to 11 June 2019 which corresponds to the stress period which occurred in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday attacks. Partial Indicators such as EMPI, Banking Sector Beta, Stock Returns a d Term spred in government securities ma ket contributed to this increa ed stress level. The other four periods correspond to the uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the high volatility ca sed by the sudden relief measures provided due to the pa demic. The second stress period which occurred during 11 Ma ch to 20 Ma ch 2020 wa ma nly driven by the volatility in stock ma ket with the pa ic at the ea ly stg e of the pa demic. After the tempora y closure of the CSE on 20 Ma ch 2020, the FSI rema ned at a stall le level for severa days until 3 April 2020. This third stress episode lasted until 29 April 2020, and was driven by exchange ma ket pressure. The fourth stress period wa identified to be from 11 May to 12 June 2020, driven by the volatility experienced in the stock ma ket after its reopening on 11 May 2020. A short period between 14 to 20 July wa identified a a higher stress period manly due to the reduction of policy rates by the Centra Ba k by 100 basis points on 09 July 2020. However, the stress levels have remained at a low level since the latter pat of July 2020. The Spread between local document of the document of the between AWCMR and AWRR are the main reasons for the reduced stress level.

The computed FSI will be presented in numerous analysis and publications to evaluate the stress in the financial system from year 2020.

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Mahmood, A., and Hussain, S.Z. (2016), "Measure of Financial Market Stress for Pakistan", SBP Research Bulletin, Vol. 12.

Park, C. Y., and Mercado, R.V.M. (2014), "Determinant of Financial Stress in Emerging Market Economies", SBP Research Bulletin, 199-224.

#### Box Article 3

#### **Systemic Risk Survey - 2020**

The Systemic Risk Survey (SRS) captures the views of a wide ra ge of ma ket pa ticipa ts, in order to quantify and track market participants' perceptions on fina cib system stb ility which may signb a y build-up of systemic vulnerb ilities. The SRS b so helps to vb idate the internb a sessments of the Macroprudential Surveillance Department (MSD) of the Centrb Ba k on vulnerb ilities emanating from the financib system a d to fa ilitate the implementation of p propriate policy measures to ma nta n fina cial system stb ility. The eighth round of the survey for second half of 2020 (2020 H2) was conducted during May/June 2020 amidst numerous uncerta nties a d chb lenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### **Confidence on the Financial System**

A significant deterioration of market participants' confidence on stb ility wa observed in 2020 H2 compared to the first half of 2020 (2020 H1), in a environment of maket stress created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Confidence on the financial system which stated to deteriorate significatly from second 2018 H2 reflecting the political uncertainty which prevailed in the country at that time, remained at a low level until 2019 H2, reflecting the uncertainty created by the Easter Sunday attaks. Confidence on the stb ility of the finacib system improved to a greater extent with the chage in the political regime. However, the

(LFCs) and Specialized Leasing Companies (SLCs), insurance compa ies, unit trusts ma  ${\bf g}$  ing compa ies, stock brokering companies, and rating agencies.

<sup>48</sup> The Central Bank introduced the Systemic Risk Survey (SRS) in the first half of 2017, to strengthen its macroprudential surveillance toolkit. The SRS covers perceptions of Risk officers of financial institutions such as licensed banks, Licensed Finance Companies

Chart 1

40

20

0

-20

-40

#### Confidence on the Stability of the Financial System

40

30

20 10

0 -10

-20

# Confidence Over the next 6 months 10 0 -10 -20 -30

2017 H1 2017 H2 2018 H1 2018 H2 2019 H1 2019 H2 2020 H1 2020 H2

Completely confident Not very confident Net Percentage balance (RHS)

# Confidence Over the next 24 months



Note: The net percentage balance is calculated by weighing 0.5 for 'Completely confident', 0 for 'Fairly confident', and -0.5 for 'Not very confident' response

economic lockdown resulted in deterioration of confidence during the 2020 H1. Confidence over the medium term which improved to a significatly higher level in 2020 H1 with the improved politicastability, a so declined in 2020 H2 reflecting the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

## Sources of Risks to the Financial System<sup>49</sup>

In 2020 H2, concerns over global macroeconomic risk increased significantly compared to the previous survey, mainly due to the bleak global economic outlook created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, relative concerns over macroeconomic risks declined in 2020 H2 which was the most prominent risk in 2020 H1 survey. The concerns over financial institutional risks, markets risks, infrastructure risks and general risks remained at a similar level during the 2020 H2 survey.

#### **Top Most Cited Sub-Risks**


The global economic outlook and GDP growth emerged **a** the two top most cited risks in 2020 H2. More th**a** 50 percent of respondents have highlighted the globa ma roeconomic outlook **a** one of the top risk categories. With the est**b** lishment of political st**b** ility after the

## Perceived Probability of a High Impact Event <sup>50</sup>

The perceived prob**b** ility of a high-imp**a** t event in the fin**a** cib system that may **d** versely affect the fin**a** cib system **a** a whole over the short

Chart 2

#### Perception on Major Risk Categories



<sup>49</sup> The respondents were asked to rank the potential risks in the order of their severity on the Sri Lankan financial system stability. For this purpose, a grid of 62 sub risk categories which are classified into six major risk categories namely (1) Global Macroeconomic Risk, (2) Domestic Macroeconomic Risk, (3) Risk related to Financial Infrastructure, (4) Financial Markets Risk, (5) Financial Institution Risk, and (6)General Risk were provided to the respondents.


Presidential election, political risk which remained in the most cited risks during number of recent surveys ha dropped out from the twelve most cited sub-risks.


<sup>50</sup> Respondents were a ked for their opinions on the probb ility of materializing a high impact event in the financial system in the short (6-months ahead) and medium (12-months ahead) term.

term **a** d medium term inclined significatly for 2020 H2 compa ed to 2020 H1. A lower perceived prob**b** ility of a high-impat event was observed in 2020 H1 survey, with the change of the political regime at the beginning of the year.

#### **Conclusion**

Due to the continuous adverse developments experienced by the Sri La ka economy including the politica uncerta nty which remained in the second half of 2018, the Ea ter Sunday atta ks in April 2019 and the economic lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the market participants' confidence in the financial system hald eclined significatly, while the perceived probability of a verse event halinclined. However, confidence over the medium term entered a positive territory in 2020 H1, and remained at a positive level in 2020.





Note: The net percentage balance is calculated by weighing 1 for 'very high', 0.5 for 'high' responses, 0 for 'Medium', -0.5 for 'low' and -1 for 'very low' likelihood.

## **Chapter 3**

#### **Financial Institutions**

#### 3.1 Overview

Financial Institutions (FIs) of the country remained resilient an idst unprecedented shocks to economic activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic globally a d domestically during the nine months ending September 2020. Hed winds of sluggish economic performa ce a d the Ea ter Sunday atta ks ha already affected the performance of FIs in 2019, a reflected by the deterioration in a set gub ity a d profita ility. In such an environment, the spread of COVID-19 in 2020 and associated public heath concerns to contain the outbreak ca sed substa tia disruptions to domestic economic a d business a tivities. Travel restrictions a ross provincia borders a d economic lockdowns led to a significa t decline in revenues of corporates a d household sector of the country. In a environment of limited fisca spa e ava la le to stimulate the economy hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, a debt moratorium wa implemented through the fina cib sector to support borrowers who had lost their income.<sup>21</sup> The performa ce of some FIs ha been a so impa ted by the introduction of import restrictions to curtal non-essential imports a d the sovereign rating downgrd e. Lower dema d for loans a d d va ces forced ba ks to divert their funds to liquid a sets such a Trea ury bills a d Trea ury bonds with lower returns. As a result, yea -on-yea growth in investments of the ba king sector increa ed considera ly. Timely a d **p** propriate regulatory forbea a ces introduced by the Centra Ba k a sured the overal sta ility of the fina cia system without ca sing any ma or ma roprudentia concerns during the nine months ending September 2020. Unprecedented ea ing of moneta y policy wa d opted in response to Covid-19 pandemic to ensure availability of d equate liquidity in inter-ba k ma kets a d a so to support FIs to ma nta n resilience.

The ba king sector, the domina t sector of the fina cia system wa well positioned in cp ita a d liquidity to weather unexpected shocks at the beginning of 2020 though ba king sector experienced increased NPLs and decreasing profitb ility. In response to meet the regulatory minimum cp ith requirement, the ba king sector built their capita level during the lat couple of yeas. Implementation of international best pro tices for creating buffers at the favour b le time a ong with regulatory forbea a ces at turbulent time enb led the ba king sector to mantan a d equate level of liquidity a d cp ith during this period of turmoil. Despite the debt moratorium provided to COVID-19 affected businesses and individuals, increasing NPL has become a concern in credit risk ma g ement of the ba king sector a d the real impa t of the pa demic on a set gub ity is expected to be realized upon cessation of the moratorium. Therefore, the debt moratorium a d other concessions gra ted on repayment of loa s due to the COVID-19 pandemic, understate the deteriorating credit qubity of the ba king sector, which if not **d** equately m**a g** ed, may threaten the solvency **a** d liquidity of the sector.

The nine months ending September 2020 were a challenging period for the Licensed Fina ce Companies (LFCs) and Specialised Leasing Companies (SLCs) sector in terms of higher credit risk, declining profitb ility a d ind equate cp ith levels for a number of compa ies. The LFCs a d SLCs sector wa more vulner b le tha the ba king sector already before the COVID-19 outbreak. The COVID-19 pandemic compounded the existing trends within the LFCs a d SLCs sector a d pointed to the elevated vulner bilities in compa ison to the ba king sector. However, the sector as a whole, ma nta ned cp ith a d liquidity buffers well b ove the regulatory minimum levels. The Centra Ba k announced a Master Plan of consolidation aimed at strengthening the LFC a d SLC sector, by fa ilitating the merger of distressed fina ce compa ies with

<sup>21</sup> Under this debt moratorium borrowers a e b lowed to request banks to defer their capital and interest payments, until the economy picks up a d their income strem s improve. At the san e time, the debt moratorium reduces the expected credit losses of FIs and extends them over time while reducing their revenues.

stronger entities in the medium term, coupled with a prompt corrective a tion fram ework to ensure a LFCs a d SLCs comply with a l the prudential requirements. If ma ro-economic vulnerabilities continue, the resilience of the sector may be han pered creating solvency a d liquidity issues in the LFCs a d SLCs sector.

Mea while, the insura ce sector exhibited mixed performa ces with satisfa tory cp ith and liquidity levels during the period under consideration. Despite calamities faced economically and socially in 2019 and 2020, the insurance sector has sustained while safegua ding policyholders through clam payments and granting relief on payment of insurance ce premiums.

Subdued economic a tivities in the global economy resulting from the spread of the COVID-19 virus and continuation of the paldemic to year 2021 and beyond sans a cure or a varieties will can seemore economic lockdowns and health concerns which are likely to har per the economic growth of the country along with the performance of Fls in 2021. Hence, successful containment of the COVID-19 outbreak, revival of the economy and ensuring man roeconomic standard ility are critical for the standard ility of Fls in 2021.


#### 3.2 Banking Sector

#### **Credit Risk**

The ba king sector exhibited a deterioration in credit quaity during the period of nine months which ended in September 2020 despite the moratorium being in effect a d ma ing the classification of loas under the moratorium frozen for several months. In spite of the sluggish economic a tivities observed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the banking sector recorded a reason be le credit expa sion during the nine months ending September 2020 compa ed to 2019, and year-on-year credit growth picked up from its lowest rate of 5.6 per cent in December 2019 to 13.8 per cent by the end of September 2020. However, the credit growth in 2020 wa ma nly driven by a increa e in loa sadd va ces to the government a d State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

As the fina cial needs of the government a d SOEs a e manly catered to by the lage baks, the loa book of large banks increased significantly by 10.9 per cent during the nine months ending September 2020, while moderation in credit wa observed






Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


with small and medium banks since December 2018 **a** d it wa more pronounced with small banks. Credit portfolio of small banks and medium banks increased by 2.0 per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively, during the nine months that ended in September 2020.<sup>22</sup>

A high concentration of credit to certain sectors of the loa portfolio is a concern in credit risk mag ement of the baking sector. Out of the total loas and delivarious of the baking sector,



<sup>22</sup> For this publication banks have been grouped based on the asset size as at December 31, 2020. Banks with an asset base of more than Rs. 500 billion have been classified as large banks, banks with a set base of between Rs. 200 billion a d Rs. 500 billion have been classified as medium banks, and the rest have been classified a small basks.





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


73.1 per cent of the loa s a e concentrated into six sectors such a consumption, construction, trd e, ma ufa turing, infra tructure a d g riculture at end September 2020. The concentration into these six sectors increa ed from 67.3 per cent in the corresponding period of 2019. Other sectors including the tourism sector concentration wa only 26.9 per cent of the loan portfolio of the banking sector at end September 2020. Concentration on consumption loa s remaned high a though there is a slight decline witnessed compa ed to the end of third quarter of 2019. This may exert an upward pressure on NPLs in an environment of increa ing unemployment a d underemployment a d plummeted business a tivities which affect the debt repayment cp a ity of individua s in the economy.


At present, it p pea sthat there is no potential threat a ising from excessive concentration of lending or a emergence of a credit bubble. However, the concentration of lending to a few sectors or customers could expose the baking sector to a undue credit risk in the events of d verse maket developments a d climate chages. Hence, baks a e expected to closely monitor the potential credit risk of these sectors, given the rising NPL ratios reported in g riculture, maufaturing a d trd e sectors.


The overall NPL ratio of the banking sector reached 5.3 per cent in September 2020. When considering the sector-wise NPL ratios, certain highly concentrated sectors reported NPL ratios above the ba king sector average a at end September 2020. The manufacturing sector reported the highest NPL

ratio of 9.0 per cent followed by agriculture (7.3 per cent), trade (7.3 per cent), tourism (7.1 per cent) construction (6.7 per cent), and consumption (5.2 per cent) at end September 2020. NPLs of these six sectors collectively a counted for 86.6 per cent of total NPLs of the banking sector. NPLs in the ma ufa turing a d tra ing sectors increa ed ma nly due to the overal d verse business conditions that prevailed in the country due to the COVID-19 pa demic a d the resulta t imposition of import restrictions. NPLs in the tourism sector increased a a combined result of the Ea ter Sunday atta ks in 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it may the e longer to recover even after the cessation of the moratorium period a border restrictions a d social dista cing mea ures may affect the revenue of the tourism sector for a considerb le period of time. In this context, ba ks a e expected to strengthen credit risk a sessment a d monitoring mecha isms in order to recognise a y potentia risks in d va ce a d to ta e necessa y prudentia mea ures to mitigate a y d verse impa t on credit qua ity.

When considering the ba king sector a a whole it wa observed that delinquency of loas a d d va ces have depicted a rising trend since end 2017. The d verse business environment that resulted from the political uncertainty which prevailed in 2018, the Ea ter Sunday atta ks in 2019 and the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, has led to a gradual increase in NPLs since end 2017.








Despite the freezing of the classification on loans a d d va ces for individuas a d businesses affected by the COVID-19 pandemic under the debt moratorium, the overall NPL ratio of the ba king sector rea hed 5.3 per cent in September 2020. Although the debt moratorium a d related a counting treatment would help mantan the NPL ratios and reduce provisioning during the moratorium period, the rea impa ton a set quaity is expected to be realized upon cessation of the moratorium. However, with the view of granting relief to the corporates a d individua s affected by the second wave of COVID-19 in the country, the Centra Bank extended the debt moratorium for COVID-19 affected borrowers by another six months sta ting from October 2020.

Despite the rising NPLs, banks could generally evergreen their a sets on the bak of credit


expa sion. However, moderation of credit gra ted by medium a d smal ba ks further deteriorated the a set quaity of the ba king sector limiting the spa e for ever-greening their loa portfolios.


Rupee loans and Foreign Currency (FC) loans (in USD terms) grew at 13.5 per cent and 15.1 per cent, respectively on a yea -on-yea ba is a at end September 2020 compared to 6.9 per cent and 13.0 per cent growth recorded a at end September 2019

Also, NPL ratios of rupee advances and FC advances increa ed from 5.3 per cent a d 2.2 per cent, respectively, in December 2019 to 5.9 per cent a d 2.4 per cent, respectively in September 2020. Further, volume of Rupee NPLs and FC NPLs grew at 24.0 per cent a d 5.7 per cent respectively in September 2020, on a yea -on-yea ba is.









Note: A few extreme values were excluded in the Inter-quartile ranges to avoid the disproportionate influence of the outliers.

The inter-qua tile<sup>23</sup> distribution of NPL ratios of individua ba ks ha widened since September 2018 due to the increa e in the number of observations in the upper qua tile reflecting the deterioration in credit quality of the ba king sector. The media value of the NPL ratio remained same as 2019 at 4.8 per cent.

Despite the debt moratorium which allows to freeze the NPL classification of loans and advances of the corporates **a** d individua s affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, a significant change in the composition of the NPLs was observed at the end of September 2020 compa ed to the corresponding period in 2019.

A large share of NPLs in the banking sector fall into the loss category **a** d represent 50.8 per cent of total NPLs. These are loans that are unlikely to be


Chart Comparison of the Composition of 3.10 **NPLs** Composition - Sep 2019 22.0 50.8 14.9 Composition - Sep 2020 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 Specially Mentioned Doubtfu Substandard Loss

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

recovered in the future **a** d **a** e more likely to be written-off by b**a** ks. This deterioration in credit qub ity will led to the b**a** king sector developing more provisioning requirements. The bottom line of the b**a** king sector will be d versely impa ted by such developments.

The a set quaity of the ba king sector exhibited deterioration with a increa e rescheduled loa s within the ba king sector. Rescheduled loa s a e a counted by the ba ks when borrowers request to extend the credit period a they unb le to ma e repayments within a stipulated time period. Rescheduled loa growth was 28.4 per cent, year-on-year, with a NPL ratio of 29.5 per cent as at end September 2020. The share of rescheduled loa s in tota loa s increa ed from 4.5 per cent at end December 2019 to 5.0 per cent at end September 2020. Given the higher rate of NPLs in rescheduled loans, the potential NPL ratio of the ba king sector will be higher in the nea future, if the performing rescheduled loans a e b so cla sified a non-performing.

The provision coverg e ratio, mea ured a the ratio of loan-loss provisions to gross NPLs, increased during the nine months which ended in September 2020 a the baking sector is required to make more provisions for their loas which fall into loss category during the period under review. The specific provision coverge ratio increase d from 38.2 per cent as at end September 2019 to 45.9 per cent by end September 2020, with the increase in NPLs in the loss category requiring higher provisioning compared to the other categories. In a dition to specific provisions, baks a e required to mantan a general provision of 0.5 per cent gainst loas in



<sup>23</sup> A measurement of variability being equal to difference between upper and lower quartile values in a data set.

the performing a d specib mentioned categories. Accordingly, by end September 2020, the banking sector operated with a total provision coverg e ratio of 55.6 per cent. Hence, the specific provision coverg e ratio and total provision coverg e ratio have significantly increased by 7.7 percentg e points a d 7.5 percentg e points, respectively, from Q3 of 2019 to Q3 of 2020. The increased provision coverg e of the backing sector will provide a cushion to the backing industry to be sorb risks a ising from the deteriorating credit qubity.

The solvency stress test results of the ba king sector reveal ed that the sector is less resilient to possible credit risk shocks that emerged from the COVID-19 pandemic as certain banks are vulnerable to rising NPLs of the loan portfolio. Nevertheless, given the availability of underlying collaterals a da gmented cap it a levels resulting from the duly completed Ba el III cap it a phase in a rangement, the sector is considered to be resilient to credit shocks.


### **Liquidity Risk**

The ba king sector exhibited a higher resilience g is not liquidity risk during the period under review compa ed to the previous period. Unprecedented ea ing of moneta y policy, regulatory forbea a ces a d low dema d for loas a d d va ces fa ilitated the ba king sector to continue with d equate level of liquidity during the nine months that ended in September 2020. Increa ed deposits a a result of na rowed avenues for spending by public due to COVID-19 related health concerns also contributed


towa ds the increa ed liquid a sets of the ba king sector. Regulatory forbea a ces provided by the Centra Ba k for liquidity by expa ding the definition of liquid a sets, in light of the pa demic to ensure continuous supply of credit to the economy, facilitated ba ks to reman compliat with the minimum Statutory Liquid Assets Ratio with the increa ed deposit lib ilities. However, the liquidity level of ba ks needs to be monitored closely a a significat portion of the credit portfolio is under the moratorium.


Rupee deposits continued to be the ma or source of funding for the ba king sector a d rupee deposits increa ed rapidly during the nine months ending September 2020. Rupee deposit growth on a year-on-year basis increared significatly from 7.7 per cent in September 2019 to 19.3 per cent in September 2020 while FC deposit growth reported a slight increare from 14.0 per cent to 14.3 per cent from September 2019 to September 2020. The basing sector continued to experience this growth in deposits despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The credit to deposit ratio declined to 84.8 per cent in September 2020 from 88.2 per cent in December 2019 indicating the easing of credit growth relative to deposits growth.

Share of total borrowings in total funding (includes deposits, borrowings and capital funds) decreased to 12.2 per cent in September 2020 from 13.3 per cent in September 2019. FC borrowings of the ba king sector exceeded rupee borrowings a d represented 58.3 per cent of total borrowings a of end September 2020. Externa borrowings have been the la gest source of FC borrowings of the



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka







Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

ba king sector a d foreign currency borrowings represented 7.8 per cent of tota on baa ce sheet lib ilities of the ba king sector. Although FC borrowings a e a importat source of funding for baks in Sri Laka higher reliace on FC borrowings may a versely affect the profitbility of the sector in a event of high depreciation of the Sri Laka Rupee. Besides, externational funding is less stale in nature a d refinacing could be challenging in a environment of heightened sovereign risk. The recent downgrales in the sovereign rating may tighten the rollover risk of foreign borrowings of the baking sector a d may require higher premiums.

For the ba king sector to fa e the stress situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic, as a regulatory forbea a ce the Centra Ba k lowered the regulatory minimum of the Liquidity Coverg e Ratio (LCR) from 100 per cent to 90 per cent in March 2020. The LCR ratio for rupee currency operations a dal currency operations increa ed from 212.2




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

per cent **a** d 165.4 per cent respectively, in September 2019 to 229.2 per cent and 207.5 per cent respectively in September 2020. It indicates that the **ba** king sector is well positioned to **ha** dle expected liquidity risk in a turmoil situation.

The maturity profile of **a** sets **a** d li**b** ilities of the b**a** king sector slightly downgr**d** ed at the end of September 2020 comp**a** ed to the end of September 2019. Mismatches were observed in all maturity buckets in September 2020. The cumulative maturity g**p a** a percent**g** e of cumulative li**b** ilities of the b**a** king sector for maturity buckets up to six months reported a widened negative g**p** in September 2020 compared to September 2019, indicating the unhea thy maturity profile of **a** sets **a** d li**b** ilities in the short term. However, maturity g**p** s related to **b** l maturity buckets rem**a** ned at m**a g** e**b** le levels.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which mea ures the available an ount of stable funding over a time horizon of one-year relative to the an ount of required stable funding, remained well above the minimum requirement as at end September 2020.


#### **Interest Rate Risk**

The banking sector operates with an assets and liabilities structure that is highly sensitive to changes in interest rates. The maturity profile of interest sensitive assets and liabilities indicated a relatively negative maturity gap of Rs. 257.7 billion up to one month in September 2020 and a relatively lower interest sensitive asset to liability ratio up to 3 months


and up to 6 months compared to the position reported in September 2019. However, the negative maturity gap for interest sensitive assets and liabilities up to 12 months increased in September 2020. This suggests that the banking sector has continued funding its long-term assets through short-term liabilities in the ordinary course of business.


Despite the ceilings imposed on lending rates, the ba king sector ma g ed to ma nta n its Net Interest Margin (NIM) at 3.1 per cent in September 2020.

However, stress test results on interest rate risk indicate that a few ba ks will be vulnerb le in a environment of increa ing interest rates.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka





#### Chart **Decomposition of Change in Profits** 3.23 during the Nine Months that Ended in September 2020 100 95 90 Rs. billion 85 80 75 70 65 60 Тã 2019 Sep interest income Non interest incom interest epense 2020 Profit -Positive Impact on Profit Negative Impact on Profit

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

### **Profitability**


Declining profitability of the banking sector is observed during the period concerned. The ba king sector profits have well ened due to downwa d d justment in NIM ma nly due to policy mea ures the en by the Moneta y Boa d to improve the effica y of moneta y policy tra smission a d the increa e in loa loss provisioning resulting from the deterioration in a set quality of the ba king sector. However, there wa a increa e in noninterest income a d a decrea e in non-interest expenses a d taxes during the nine month period that ended in September 2020 compa ed to the corresponding period of 2019, which contributed positively towa ds profits. The downwa d shifting of the government securities yield curve resulted in the ba king sector recording a higher ca ita ga n on investment in government securities during the nine months that ended in September 2020 compared to the corresponding period in 2019.

Net profits for the nine months period ending in September 2020 increased to Rs. 94.8 billion from Rs. 82.6 billion compa ed to the corresponding period in 2019. Non-interest income mainly contributed by revaluation gains from foreign excha ge income a d income on investment securities.

The growth of NII deteriorated **a** d recorded a negative rate of 3.9 per cent during the nine months ending September 2020 compa ed to 17.2 per cent growth recorded during the nine


months ending September 2019. This was mainly due to the prevaling low interest rate scena io a d the subdued dema d for loas resulting from the sluggish economic a tivities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The NIM of the sector declined to 3.1 per cent of the average a sets for the nine months ending September 2020 reflecting the policy measures the ending september 2020 reflecting the policy measures the ending sevaling the debt moratorium with the payment of interest to depositors could all versely affect the NIM of the backing sector.

Recent downwa d d justments to policy rates a e favourb le to fixed income investments of baks a they rep cp ith gans from the price chages in the



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Note: Growth rates of NII have been computed comparing the perform  ${\bf a}$  ce of the  ${\bf b}$  king sector in the nine months of respective yea s




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

secondary treasury securities' market. Improved performa ce in the stock ma ket during the second qua ter of 2020 ha resulted in a substa tia gan on training securities a well.

The cost to income ratio slightly decrea ed with a slight increa e in the efficiency ratio in September 2020 reflecting the increa e in provisions md e by Rs. 66.0 billion with reductions of operating expenses and taxes by Rs. 10.3 billion and Rs. 30.9 billion, respectively.

Intermediation results from core ba king operations i.e. NII have been eroded due to the weak ening quality of a sets that triggered a higher loa loss provision. The provision change to averg e a set ratio ha increa ed from 0.22 in September 2017 to 0.67 in September 2020. Further, provisions have cost p proximately 21.3 per cent of NII of the banking sector and at end September 2020. The incremental specific provision change for the nine months ending in September 2020 ha increa ed



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Note: Left axis is in per cents that represent the Loan Loss Provision charge to Net Interest Income. Right axis represents the Loan Loss Provision as a fraction of Average Assets

by 35.6 per cent compa ed to the san e period of 2019.


Return on Assets (ROA) of the sector slightly increased from 0.93 per cent to 0.97 per cent year-on-yea a of September 2020. Mea while, Return on Equity (ROE) of the sector increased from 10.5 per cent to 10.9 per cent in September 2020 mainly due to the decrea e in taxes.

### **Capital Adequacy and Leverage**

Despite the challenging macro environment, the ba king sector remained resilient supported by healthy Capital Adequacy Ratios (CAR) which were mantaned well boove the regulatory minimum requirement in order to bosorbay downward verse shocks. The CAR and Tier I cap it borothar ratio encompasing the cap it borothar conservation buffer of the backing



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


sector stood at 16.5 per cent **a** d 13.0 per cent, respectively at the end of September 2020. The aggregate CAR of D-SIBs and non-D-SIBs remained well **b** ove the stipulated regulatory minimum.

All ba ks hd complied with the minimum CAR as prescribed in the Banking Act Direction No. 1 of 2016 on Capita Requirements under Ba el III and the Banking Act Direction No. 10 of 2019 on Framework for Dealing with Domestic Systemically Importa t Ba ks with the extra rdina y policy mea ures on permitting ba ks to draw-down their cap it a conservation buffer by 50-100 ba is points to withsta d the shocks ema ating from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ba ks were provided with a ditional flexibility to support businesses and individuals affected by the outbreak of COVID-19. The extraordinary regulatory measure a lows licensed backs to defer the required enhancement of their minimum capital requirement until 31 December 2022. The original deal line for the requirement and per the Backing Act Direction No. 5 of 2017 was 31 December 2020.

Despite the rapid increase in NPLs, the NPL to Cp ith Fund ratio remained at a healthy level due to increased cp ith base and the cp ith cushions maintained by basks demonstrating the resilience of the basking sector.


Growth in Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) increased in the first quarter of 2020 a d moderated during second a d third qua ters of the yea. Increa ed investments in risk free trea ury securities instead




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

of increa ed lending positively contributed to the reduction of RWA a d to improve the banking sector CAR.

The leverg e ratio, a non-risk ba ed cp ith mea urement that a sesses the d equa y of Tier 1 cp ital to on-bh a ce sheet a d off-bh a ce sheet exposures, reported 6.1 per cent a of September 2020, which is well b ove the regulatory minimum requirement of 3.0 per cent. However, the ratio declined by 0.9 per cent in September 2020 compared to September 2019. The leverage ratio wa ma dated for ba ks operating in Sri La ka with effect from 01 January, 2019.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

#### Chart Loans and Advances of 3.34 LFCs and SLCs Sector 1.300 1,200 1,100 జ్ <sub>1,000</sub> 900 Sep Sep Sep Mar 2020 2018 2019 Y-o-Y growth(RHS) Total Loans

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


#### 3.3 LFCs and SLCs Sector

#### **Credit Risk**


The LFCs and SLCs sector is inherently exposed to higher credit risk compa ed to the ba king sector a the nature of its business model is to dea with high risk customers. Sluggish economic a tivities experienced in the aftermath of the Ea ter Sunday atta ks, resulted in further deteriorating the a set quality of the sector, which wa at a challenging level even before facing the COVID-19 pandemic. The outbreak of COVID-19 further exacerbated the asset quality of the sector. Despite the freezing of classifying part of loans as NPL for businesses and individuals affected by COVID-19 due to the debt moratoriums introduced, the NPL ratio of


the sector continued to increa e during the period under review. Stringing the loa book of the sector by 1.3 per cent yea on yea ba is a at end of September 2020 compa ed to end of September 2019 also fueled to increase the NPL ratio through the denominator effect.

The gross NPL ratio of the sector reached to 12.8 per cent at end September 2020 as against 9.7 per cent at end September 2019 based on classifying loa s after being in a rea s for six months. The sector reached the peak of 14.1 per cent of NPL at the end of the second qua ter of 2020 a a result of the low repayment cp a ity of borrowers a a result of the deteriorated economic a tivities, declining total loans a d d va ces of the sector a d spillover effects of the debt moratorium scheme. However, the net NPL ratio (net of provisions on NPLs) of the










Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

sector wa at 4.0 per cent at the end of September 2020 manly due to high provisioning for loa losses a reflected by the high provision coverg e ratio calculated based on regulatory requirements of the sector.

Further, a significa t number of LFCs have reported NPL ratios higher than the industry average of 12.8 per cent, and some LFCs have reported NPLs over 20 per cent led ing such LFCs to fa e severe credit risk which may affect the stb ility of the sector.

Further, the debt moratorium together with concessions offered for performing **a** d non-performing loans may overstate the credit qub ity



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

of the sector, **a** d the reb impa t of the pa demic on asset quality is expected to be realized upon cessation of the moratorium. Therefore, if the impa t of the debt moratorium is not **d** equately mag ed, it may threaten the solvency ad liquidity of the sector.


Nevertheless, the sector maged to mitigate the negative effects of high credit risk to a certain extent, by maging all equate provisions as reflected in the provision coverage ratio which was 57.9 per cent at the end of September 2020 compaged to 57.7 per cent reported at the end of September 2019. The provisions made by the sector for potential loal losses increased in a solute term from Rs. 67.6 billion at end of September 2019 to 88.1 billion at the end of September 2020.

The loa portfolio of the sector wa highly concentrated on lea ing a d hire purcha e product which a counted for 55.2 per cent of total loa s a d d va ces at the end of September 2020, which is a concern in terms of credit risk mag ement of the sector. However, the growth of lea ing a d hire purcha e product declined from 1.7 per cent at end September 2019 to negative 0.5 per cent at the corresponding period in 2020 manly due to restrictions imposed on importation of motor vehicles.

The Loan to Value (LTV) ratio was imposed on vehicles loa sa a ma roprudentia policy mea ure in 2015 with a view of reducing vehicle imports. The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) also introduced import restrictions for vehicles to ea e pressure on the excha ge rate a d overall baa ce of payment. The policy measures taken by the Centrabaka do GOSL to restrict vehicle imports a ong with the high dependency of the sector on leae a d hire purchabake products, posed challenges to the credit risk magement ad credit expassion of the LFCs ad SLCs sector since 2015.

A potential risk of increasing the NPL ratio of lea ing a d hire purcha e products pertaining to the sector wa manly due to the declining growth in lea ing a d hire purcha e loas a d subdued vehicle maket a tivities.

Product-wise NPLs are also high in almost all products except for the pawning d va ces a dloas against deposits category. The NPL ratio of highly concentrated product, lea ing a d hire purchae increaed by 38.2 per cent from 6.8 per cent at the end of September 2019 to 9.4 per cent at the end of September 2020. The sector as of a ed a high



default risk from micro finance loans. The NPL ratio of micro fina ce loa s continued to increa e from 2017 a d rea hed 30.0 per cent at end September 2020 from 17.3 per cent at end September 2019. However, micro fina ce loa s represent only 3.0 per cent of the tota loa portfolio of the sector.

Stress test results on the credit risk of LFCs sector revela ed that, a a whole this sector will be less resilient to possible shocks originating from the COVID-19 pandemic since certain individual compa ies recorded lower levels of cp ith.

### **Liquidity Risk**

Eased moneta y policy mea ures the en by the Centra Ba k with a view to providing d equate liquidity to the maket a d the introduction of regulatory forbea a ces in Mach 2020, a d paticularly the reduction of minimum liquid a sets requirements supported the LFCs a d SLCs sector as a whole to mantan liquidity levels over the regulatory minimum requirements during the period under review.


The overb lliquid a sets ava lable in the sector at end September 2020 showed a surplus of Rs.87.1 billion a g a nst the stipulated minimum requirement of Rs.52.8 billion. The reduction of requests for loa s due to subdued a tivities of the economy is a so one of the rea on for the increa ed liquidity surplus in the recent period. The surplus increa ed by 113.9 per cent (Rs.46.4 billion) compared to the regulatory surplus available in September 2019


ma nly due to the reduction of minimum liquidity requirements.

The regulatory liquid a sets to externa funds ratio improved to 12.7 per cent at end September 2020 g a nst 11.3 per cent reported in the corresponding period of the previous yea due to the decrea ing externa funds of the sector. Although the available liquid a sets were higher that the regulatory minimum requirement of the LFCs sector a a whole, some individual LFCs have reported a decline in liquidity after the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the reduction of regulatory minimum requirements for mantaning liquid a sets under regulatory forbea a ces.

Even though funding risk wa perceived to be low a excess liquidity wa reported at institutional level a d ma ket level, only a few LFCs have requested for liquidity support from the Sri Lanka Deposit Insurance and Liquidity Support Scheme (SLDILSS) of the Centra Bak baed on the predictions of possible future liquidity shortfals.

Further, LFCs a e ma nly funded through deposits, a stb le funding source which ma ginb ly declined to 49.1 per cent of the total assets of the sector at the end of September 2020 from 49.9 per cent recorded at the end of September 2019. It indicates a deterioration of stb le funding in the sector. Mea while, borrowings of the sector represented 23.4 per cent of the total liabilities at the end of September 2020 a d showed a negative growth of 12.4 per cent compa ed to the negative growth of 12.5 per cent recorded in the corresponding period






of 2019. Negative growth of the deposits and borrowings indicates a risk of future expa sion of the sector.

The credit to deposit and debenture (CDD) ratio of the sector indicates the dependence of LFCs on stb le funding sources like deposits a d debentures, for lending. The CDD ratio of the sector a at end September 2020 wa recorded at 153.0 per cent. As such, it is evident that LFCs a e relying on less stable funding sources such a borrowings at present which may ca se a high liquidity risk to the sector.

#### **Interest Rate Risk**

The ma ket risk of the LFCs a d SLCs sector wa low compa ed to other fina cib risks such a credit and liquidity risks as its trading book's size was not significat for the period under review. The sector



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

continued to experience a minimum exposure to equity risk a total exposure to equity maket wa minima at Rs. 22.1 billion at end September 2020, which wa only 1.6 per cent of the total as sets of the sector. In response to the reduction in the deposit interest rates, it is expected that the lending rates would as so reduce with the new loads and devances granted. Accordingly, interest rate risk of the sector decelerates with the prevailing negative mismatch in the maturity profile of the interest-bealing as sets and liabilities.

During the nine months that ended in September 2020, negative mismatches in interest sensitive **a** sets **a** d li**b** ilities were observed for all maturity buckets of the LFCs **a** d SLCs sector except for the less tha 1-month maturity bucket, exposing the sector to a high interest rate risk.

### **Profitability**


The profitb ility of the LFCs a d SLCs sector declined many due to high loa loss provisioning a d the drop in NIM during the period under review. The profits of the sector during the first six months of the financib year declined to Rs. 2.2 billion from Rs. 4.8 billion recorded during the corresponding period of 2019.

ROA a d ROE of the sector were reported at 1.1 per cent a d 2.1 per cent respectively during the period under review which declined from 1.7 per cent a d 5.0 per cent respectively compa ed to September 2019. This may affect the internal cp ital generation of the sector. Further, attracting new investors to the sector under the prevailing low ROE scena io will be challenging.

The efficiency ratio declined to 57.0 per cent at end September 2020 compa ed to 60.4 per cent in the corresponding period of 2019, while the cost to income ratio slightly increased to 93.3 per cent from 91.2 per cent during the same period indicating the higher interest expenses of the sector. Cost to income ha increa ed during the first four months of fina cia yea manly due to the increa e of expenses other tha employee related expenses a d increa ed provisioning.

### **Capital Adequacy**

Adequate capital levels act as a cushion to the sector to absorb unexpected risks arising in the future. Capital funds of the sector as a whole improved during the period under review due




Profitability of the LFCs and


Chart

to the initial requirement of enhancement of regulatory capital requirements to Rs. 2.0 billion by January 2021 and Rs.2.5 billion by January 2022 as a policy measure. This regulatory capital requirement was deferred further by one year due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the total regulatory capital levels of the sector as a whole improved by Rs. 32.0 billion to Rs. 212.2 billion by end September 2020 compared to Rs. 180.2 billion recorded in the corresponding period of 2019 due to the initial requirement to enhance the regulatory capital up to Rs. 2.0 billion and the cancellation of the license of a distressed finance company with a negative capital. However, there are LFCs which have not complied with the minimum core capital requirement.

The core cp ith ratio a d toth risk weighted cp ith d equally ratio of the sector increal ed to 13.6 per cent a d 14.8 per cent, respectively, by end September 2020 from the reported level of 11.2 per cent and 12.5 per cent at end September 2019. However, there are a few LFCs which do not comply with the stipulated minimum cp ith diequacy requirements. Risk weighted as sets of the sector have recorded a negative growth from Ma ch 2020 corresponding to the drop in credit. The negative growth of risk weighted as sets of the sector has a so contributed to the satisfactory overboth cp ith diequally ratios of the sector.


At end September 2020, four LFCs were identified as Domestic Systemically Important LFCs (D-SILFC)






\*The LFCs which have recorded negative Total Capital Ratios were omitted in the grp h to improve visibility

which have recorded toth cp ith d equa y ratios well b ove the required level. Ma y other LFCs have recorded cp ith d equa y ratios at the required level a d a number of LFCs have recorded cp ith d equa y ratios below the required level. Out of these non-complia t LFCs, a few LFCs which have a well fina cib position have recorded negative cp ith d equa y ratios. The Centra Bakhataen numerous regulatory mea ures to d dress non-compliance to the Capital Adequacy Directions. Accordingly, in order to d dress the well nesses a d risks in the LFCs a d SLCs sector, the Centra Bakha proposed a medium term Mater pla including a consolidation plan and a Prompt





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka


Corrective Action Fran ework to ensure a strong a d resilient LFCs sector with a LFCs complying a d reporting cp ith well b ove the minimum prudential requirements with diversified business models which ca effectively contribute to the economic needs of the country.

Despite the rapid increase in NPLs, the net NPLs to Capital Fund ratio remained improved demonstrating the d eque y of cp ith when considering the LFCs sector a a whole.

### Reputation risk

The issues relating to the existing distressed/ highrisk LFCs in the sector with a negative cp ith/insufficient cp ith buffer to b sorb shocks, customer compliants, and public reactions on regulatory actions the eng is not such LFCs and SLCs sector and whole. It impacted the deposit mobilisation and profit bility of the sector.

The credit ratings of institutions are an indicator which influence the assessment of the credit risk faced by such institutions. Even though obtaining a credit rating has been made mandatory by the Central Bank, out of 41 LFCs only 37 LFCs have obtained credit ratings as at end September 2020. Out of the LFCs which have obtained a rating, 14 LFCs were rated below the investment grade of BBB- whereas, 23 LFCs were rated as above investment grade. As such, a considerable number of LFCs may face difficulty in raising funds at a competitive rate to carry out their business operations.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Note: 1. Credit ratings were obtained from both the Fitch ratings **a** d the ICRA.

2. Two LFCs whose licences were suspended a so included in the b ove chat.

#### **Risk of Governance**

It ha been repeatedly observed that one of the rea ons for the falures of LFCs is lak of good governace, where ownership addecision maing a econcentrated with the man shaeholder or few shaeholders linked to the man shaeholder. Strong corporate governace processes ad practices failitate the conduct of the finace business in a responsible ada countable man er to promote safety ad soundness of individual LFCs, thereby led ing to the stability of the sector. Accordingly, the Central Back is in the process of an ending the Corporate Governance Direction to improve the practices of the sector.

Thus, it is **p** pa ent that compa ies in the LFCs a d SLCs sector a e exposed to a number of risks: default risk, concentration risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, reputation risk a d risk of improper governa ce. Hence, stringent regulations a d necessay an endments to the existing legb fran ework such a an ending the Fina ce Business Act and strengthening the resolution a d enforcement fran ework, a d proper implementation of the Master Plan are required to safegua d the stb ility of the sector in the long run.


### 3.4 Insurance Sector

The insurance sector recorded mixed results during the period under consideration while exhibiting stability. The sector expansion in terms of total assets growth was 13.0 per cent at end June 2020 which is a slight decline from the growth in assets of 14.9 per cent reported during the corresponding period of 2019. The growth of the Gross Written Premium (GWP) was negative 2.8 per cent at end June 2020 which is a significant decrease from the 14.1 per cent growth reported at end June 2019. The GWP of the long-term insurance sector increased by 3.8 per cent while the GWP of the general insurance sector declined by 7.7 per cent at end June 2020. When considering sub-sectors of the general insurance sector, Health and Marine insurance both recorded a negative growth in the GWP of 10.6 per cent as at end June 2020. Further, the GWP of the motor insurance and fire insurance sub-sectors reported a decline of 3.8 per cent and 1.0 per cent respectively, during the period under consideration.


The insura ce sector profits have increa ed during the period under consideration. The total profit of the sector increa ed by 32.7 per cent by end June 2020.

The profits of the long-term insura ce sector which contributed to 61.2 per cent of the insura ce sector profits, continued to decline during this period, reporting a decline of 20.6 per cent at end June 2020. Mea while, the genera insura ce sector profits increa ed significa tly by 116.6 per cent during this period with a decline in claims in the second qua ter of the yea.

The Return on Assets (ROA) of both the long term **a** d general insura ce sector increa ed to 3.2 per cent **a** d 7.7 per cent respectively, for the period which ended in June 2020 from 2.6 per cent and 5.8 percent of the same at the end of June 2019.




Source: Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka



Source: Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka

While, Return on Equity (ROE) of long term and general insura ce sector as so increased to 14.6 per cent a d 16.2 per cent respectively, for the period which ended in June 2020 from 11.7 per cent a d 12.0 per cent from the previous yea.

There wa a drop of 28.2 per cent in the volume of clams md e by the general insurace sector during this period, whereathe clams md e by the long-term insurace sector also dropped maginally by 0.7 per cent. The reduction of clams observed in the second quarter of 2020 may be attributable to the reduction of incidents covered by insurace acresult of the economic lockdown admobility restrictions imposed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Also, institutions provided




Source: Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka


some concessions on the payment of premium to support their customers during the period of pa demic. Mea while, the investment income of the sector ma gina ly decrea ed by 0.5 per cent at end June 2020.

The insura ce sector may fa e va ious risks such a ma ket risk, liquidity risk, a d operationa risk a d fa e d verse shocks like natura ca an ities a d economic downturns. Therefore, a equate levels of cp ita a d liquidity a e importa t to withsta d possible shocks to the sector.


The cp ith levels of both the long-term insura ce sector a d the general insura ce sector have been in a increa ing trend a d the tota cp ith



Source: Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka



Source: Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka



Source: Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka

d equa y ratio ha been well b ove the minimum requirement of 120 per cent.<sup>24</sup> As such, so fa the insura ce sector ha been b le to withsta d the shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ava lb ility of liquidity is a so vita for the business continuity of a insura ce service provider. It is observed that the liquidity ratios of both genera a d long-term insura ce sub-sectors a e at a increa ing trend a though they slightly decrea ed in the first quarter of 2020.

<sup>24</sup> CAR of the insura ce sector calculated based on the Risk Based Capital (RBC) Framework implemented in Sri Lanka with effect from 1st Jasua y 2016. The RBC methodology measures the amount of available capital relative to the risks inherent in liabilities and the adequacy of capital to absorb unforeseen losses


## **Chapter 4**

### Household Sector and Corporate Sector<sup>25</sup>


### 4.1 Overview

Private sector leverage which is measured by the ratio of private sector credit to nominal GDP, wa heavily impa ted by the pa demic-induced economic contra tion which outweighed the slow growth in credit to the private sector. The private sector credit to GDP gap<sup>26</sup> which wa negative since April 2019 continued to be negative until August 2020 except Ma ch a d April 2020. However, the ratio turned positive g is n in September 2020.

As indicated in the credit condition surveys conducted by the Centra Ba k, a higher dema d for credit was observed in 2020Q1 which turned negative in 2020Q2. On the contrary, the willingness of ba ks to lend which decrea ed at the outset of first wave of the pa demic turned positive in the second qua ter of 2020.



25 Household and corporate sector analysis is confined to the formal financial sector which constitutes credit disbursed by licensed banks, licensed finance companies and specialized leasing compa ies.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

The ratio of Credit to Government & Public Corporations to GDP, an indicator of state sector leverg e, ha continued to rise phenomenally since the pa demic, resulting in a substatib positive credit gp in September 2020. The strong credit dema d from the state sector ea ed the contrationary pressure on domestic credit growth during the nine months ending September 2020.

The moderation of credit is evident in the household sector which has been affected by the pa demic. The institutional sector<sup>27</sup> which encompa ses the corporate sector, government a d state-owned enterprises reported a credit growth la gely due to the increase in credit to government. Nevertheless, delinquency levels of household a d institutional sectors have been rising, resulting in increased non-performing loan ratios (with interest in suspense—IIS) in these sectors.

As the impa t of the pa demic heightens, the nonfina cia corporate sector reported further disma performance in Q1 and Q2 of 2020 as reflected through the decline in sa es, eroding profit ma gins a d decrea ing profits. A few vulnera ilities have surfa ed in the non-fina cia corporate


<sup>26</sup> Credit to GDP gap is the difference between credit to GDP ratio from its long-term trend.

<sup>27</sup> Institutional sector is comprised of non-financial corporates, government **a** d state-owned enterprises.

sector pa ticula ly with impared debt servicing cp b ilities, decrea ed solvency levels a d increa ed gea ing ratios. Moneta y policy ea ing since early 2019 and tax stimulus unveiled in late 2019 had an ease on corporate sector performance prior to the pa demic, which unfolded in Sri La ka in late Ma ch 2020. The corporate sector performance in Q3 of 2020 is expected to improve a the economic lockdown wa ea ed to a la ge extent in Q3. However, as the second wave of the pa demic sweeps a ross the Western province, the corporate sector performance may be affected in Q4 of 2020. Effective pandemic mag ement enb ling the economy to return to its growth path is a critical fa tor in terms of boosting investor confidence a d reviving the household a d corporate sector performa ce in 2021, while mitigating risks to the fina cia sector.

## 4.2 Household Sector Credit and Vulnerabilities


Household sector credit, which a counts for 41.7 per cent of the total formal final cial sector lending<sup>28</sup>, has been growing at a slower pace during 2019. It reported further moderation by end 2020Q2. The semi-al nual credit growth of the household sector moderated to 0.7 per cent in June 2020 from 2.1 per cent in June 2019. The slowdown in economic al tivities, rising unemployment ald the economic lockdown may have contributed to the deceleration in credit to the household sector. The




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

ba king sector wa the man source of household borrowings with a contribution of **p** proximately two thirds of total credit to the household sector from the formal final city sector.

Despite the debt moratorium offered to the tourism sector and COVID-19 affected households, the sha e of non-a rea s loa s<sup>29</sup> declined in June 2020 to 60.5 per cent from 61.3 per cent by end 2019. Meanwhile, loans in arrears demonstrated a increa e in its sha e from 38.7 per cent by end 2019 to 39.5 per cent by end June 2020. Credit



<sup>28</sup> Formb Fina cib sector lending includes lending by licensed ba ks, licensed finance companies and specialised leasing companies.




29 Facilities with zero days in arrears



Chart

4.7


### NPL Ratio (with IIS)- Household Sector



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Chart 4.8 Composition of NPLs as at June 2020

– By Number of Days in Arrears



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

quality of the household sector ca be seen to be deteriorating, signaling a pla sible build-up of imba a ces in the sector.

The NPL ratio of the household sector (with IIS) ha been rising since 2018 signifying a worsening of credit quality. The NPL ratio of the household sector rose to 20.2 per cent by the end of 2020Q2 compared to 12.5 per cent in 2019Q2 despite the moratorium gra ting relief mea ures for those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The possibility of NPL levels rising significantly by the end of the moratorium period is high.


Despite the banking sector being the main source of household sector debt, the non-performing

loans (NPLs) were largely stemming from the non-bank financial institutions (NBFI)<sup>30</sup> sector. The NBFI sector a counts for 64.3 per cent of total non-performing d va ces of the household sector a at end June 2020.


Out of the total loa s of the formal fina cial sector which were classified a non-performing by end

Chart 4.9

Household Sector NPL Ratio by Province



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka



**Composition of NPL of Household** 

Sector as at June 2020


30 Non-Bank Financial Institutions encompasses Licensed Finance Compa ies a d Specia ised Lea ing Compa ies.

2020Q2, 60.1 per cent were in buckets of 90-180 days in a rea s a d 180-360 days in a rears. Further downgrd e of the loa s in these buckets in future may ca se stress to the fina cib system with provisioning requirements by fina cib institutions increasing significantly. A significant portion (31.3 per cent) of NPLs were in arrears for more than 540 days.


The North Centra, Centra a d Western provinces reported the highest household sector NPL ratios of 22.0 per cent, 21.2 percent a d 20.7 per cent by end 2020Q2, respectively. Western province accounted for 50.8 per cent of the loa s a d d va ces gra ted to household sector a d recorded 20.7 per cent of NPLs.

### 4.3 Credit to Institutional Sector<sup>31</sup>

The institutional sector a counted for 58.3per cent of total formal final cial sector lending<sup>32</sup> a at end June 2020. During the first half of 2020, credit to institutional sector grew by 4.5 per cent a opposed to a contraction of 1.5 per cent in the first half of 2019. Further, on a y-o-y basis, credit to the institutional sector grew by 11.6 per cent in June 2020 compared to 5.2 per cent in December 2019. The institutional sector debt grew at a higher rate than the household sector debt during the last two years ending June 2020, and the sector is predominal ty served by the banking sector with a share of 97.3 per cent in the total institutional debt.




31 The institutional sector encompasses the corporate sector, government and public corporations.




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Loa s in a rea s a counted for 17.1 per cent of toth d va ces of the institution b sector a at June 2020 while the share of loans with zero days in arrears marked 82.9 per cent. Asset quality of the institutional sector measured through NPL ratio (with IIS) has been deteriorating since June 2018. Despite the moratorium in place and the sizeable portion of the institutional loa s represented by a commodations to government a d SOEs, the institutional sector total NPL ratio increased to 8.0 per cent in June 2020 from 6.4 per cent by end 2019 Q2. A majority of institutional loans which are classified as NPL are in arrears for more than 540 days.

The economic fallout from the pa demic, its implications on the livelihood of households a d disruptions to businesses a e unprecedented. A



<sup>32</sup> Formb Fina cib sector lending includes borrowing from licensed banks, licensed finance companies and specialized leasing compa ies.



prolonged economic recovery may heighten the defa It risk resulting in a increa ed probb ility of defa It in credit to the household a d institutiona sectors. These developments may **d** versely affect the ba king sector a d the NBFI sector a it would erode profitb ility a d hinder interna cp ita generation. If the depleting a set gub ity persists, it could erode the existing cp ith levels of some fina cia institutions. Consequently, meeting minimum cp ith requirements for ba ks a d NBFIs would be more challenging. Nevertheless, proa tive policy mea ures, moneta y stimulus, regulatory forbea a ce, debt moratorium, implementation of refina cing schemes a d directed lending to identified economic sectors a e expected to ea e the effects of the shocks triggered by the pa demic.

## 4.4 Non-Financial Corporate Sector Risk<sup>33</sup> Assessment


Corporates a economic a tors influence the ma roeconomy a d the financia system through their cohesive behavior. Meanwhile, they a e a so exposed to cha ges in the ma roeconomy a d the fina cia system. Analysis of the non-fina cia corporate sector enales policy ma ers to foresee pla sible systemic vulnera ilities, a d thereby a t a ea ly wa ning indicator. Resilience of the corporate sector in Sri La ka ha been a sessed using 220 non-fina cia compa ies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE).

During the first three quarters of 2019, the corporate sector wa affected by the continued low economic growth scena io, political instability


a d heightened security concerns during the period. With the restoration of politica sta ility in late 2019, easing of security concerns, fiscal stimulus offered a dea ing of moneta y policy, the economic growth wa expected to bounce ba k to its potentia which could have eventually improved the performa ce of the corporate sector. However, before the corporate sector could rea the benefits of the envisg ed economic resurgence, hed winds of the COVID -19 pandemic befell, affecting the livelihoods of households a d threatening the going concerns of corporates. The country wa under economic lockdown during the first wave of the pa demic, a d the Western province, which contributes more than 50 per cent of GDP wa under lockdown for a period of time fa ed mobility restrictions during the second wave of the pa demic.

### 4.4.1 Performance of Listed Nonfinancial Corporates – First Half of 2020

Non-fina cib corporates reported wear fina cib performa ce in the first half of 2020, on a y-o-y ba is, a reflected through negative sales growth a d profits. Lockdown imposed with the view of flattening the spread of COVID-19 in the country and slow recovery in the business a tivities subsequent to lifting the lockdown manly contributed towards the revenue contraction. The number of compacies reporting a decline in revenue increased to 149 in the first half of 2020 from 102 and 80 in the first halves of 2019 and 2018, respectively. The dismal




<sup>33</sup> Corporate sector risk a sessment wa conducted using nonfinancial corporates listed in Colombo Stock Exchange.




performa ce of the corporate sector wa a so revea ed in the Business Outlook Survey<sup>34</sup> in Q2 of 2020 with a worsened Business Sentiment Index (BSI).

Profits of listed corporates further declined in the first had for 2020 on a y-o-y ba is compared to the first half of 2019. Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) declined by 22.6 per cent in 2020H2 compared to 2019H2. Net profit dwindled by 38.1 per cent on a y-o-y ba is. The beverge, food a d toba co sector, hotel & travel sector, diversified



34 The Business Outlook Survey cp tures short-term ma ket developments using a sm ple of la ge-scb e enterprises.





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

holdings, **a** d l**a** d **a** d property sector l**a** gely contributed to the decline in profits.

The number of loss-ma ing corporates increa ed to 83 in first half of 2020 from 68 a d 54 in first halves of 2019 and 2018. With the decline in profits, net profit margin a d EBIT ma gin which a e expressed a a relative sha e of shes, decrea ed to 7.7 per cent a d 17.0 per cent, respectively, in H1 of 2020 compa ed to 10.6 per cent a d 18.8 per cent, respectively in H1 of 2019. A greater decline in corporate profits relative to shes, eroded the profit ma gins of the corporate sector. Further, net fina ce cost to shes increa ed during the first half of 2020 a revenue contra ted during the period.


Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) declined to 6.2 per cent **a** d 4.8 per cent, respectively





Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

in H1 of 2020 compa ed to 8.4 per cent a d 8.0 per cent, respectively, in H1 of 2019. Meanwhile, both media ROA a d ROE have deteriorated indicating that the diminishing profitb ility in corporate sector is brod -ba ed.




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Median - Return on Assets

Return on Assets


### Chart Return on Equity of Corporates 4.21



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

ratio of less tha 1 increa ed to 74 in H1 of 2020 from 58 in H1 of 2019. The corporate debt to equity ratio<sup>36</sup>, which reflects the funding structure of companies, has increased from 0.37 in H1 of 2019 to 0.42 in H1 of 2020 a corporate debt grew at a higher pa e. However, the number of compa ies with a debt to equity ratio b ove 1 decrea ed by 2 counts to 48 in Q2 of 2020 from 50 in Q2 of 2019.


As the pa demic continues, non-fina cib corporate sector performa ce is expected to be affected significatly, which in turn could deversely reflect on the fina cib statements of fina cib institutes with a time lg. However, it is p pa ent that the debt moratorium, concessionay interest rates a decommodative monetay policy mea ures



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

<sup>35</sup> For the purposes of this study the solvency ratio was computed considering net profit as the numerator and average debt as the denominator.

<sup>36</sup> The debt to equity ratio has been computed taking total debt of corporates a the numerator a d total equity a the denominator. The ratio measures corporate debt relative to corporate equity as at a given ba a ce sheet date.



would provide consider be le ease to the fina cib statements of corporates a well. Nevertheless, the speed of convergence to norm be cy a do the an plitude of the economic shock resulting from the pademic are yet to be measured. Subdued developments in the corporate sector may eventually be transmitted to the fina cib sector, eroding its perform are while hindering internation in the corporate sector may eventually be transmitted to the fina cib sector, eroding its perform are while hindering internation in the generation. Economic and business revivals hinges langely upon the effectiveness and sustain bility of the fight go and the pademic and proactive measures the ento a leviate socioeconomic consequences.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Financial System Infrastructure**

### 5.1 Overview

The fina cib infra tructure of the country, one of the critical components of fina cib stb ility, functioned without a y ma or disruptions an idst the challenges that emerged from the spread of COVID-19, thus enabling the preservation of fina cib system stb ility. Significat increase in digital trassations in the country during the periods of lockdown imposed due to the spread of COVID-19 also demonstrated the growing importace of efficient and reliable finacib system infratructure. The Centrassa k focused manly on the national payment and settlement system and all opted several measures to strengthen the finacible system infratructure of the country during the nine months ending September 2020.

systemica ly import**a** t payment settlement systems (SIPS) operated without any disruptions a d with a high degree of system availability despite the COVID-19 pandemic, as the Central Bank activated its Business Continuity Plan (BCP). Necessary guidelines for the development of effective BCPs and the establishment of disaster recovery sites were issued to Participating Institutions (PIs) of the national payment and settlement systems by the Centra Ba k, considering the risks a sociated with possible disruption to operations of these systems a d their ba k up sites. With the view to promoting the usg e of secure a d efficient digital payment mecha isms by the general public, working towards establishing a digital economy, strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework and minimizing risks a sociated with such payment mecha isms, the year 2020 was declared as "The Year of Digital Tra sa tions". In the ba kdrop of technologica d va ces in the critical payment a d settlement system infra tructure, the increa ed system a d cyber security threats emerging in the recent pa t were a ma or a ea of concern for fina cia system st**b** ility. Therefore, a number of mea ures were the en to improve the system security a d cyber security to ma e these critical systems more

resilient. In this regard, the National Payments Council of Sri La ka focused on strengthening the mecha isms of monitoring a d preventing fra d in line with international security sta da ds, enha cing awa eness of cyber threats a d cyber security best practices, while coordinating between PIs and the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which was established by the National Center for Cyber Security.


With the view of mantaning fina cia system stb ility by improving public confidence in the country's financial system, appropriate regulatory mea ures a d a tions were the en by the Centra Ba k within the existing legb a d institutionb fran ework, a dressing the emerging risks, including the risks arising from the COVID-19 pa demic. Regulatory mea ures a da tions ma nly ta geted the fina cib system infra tructure related to the payment a d settlement systems, foreign excha ge controls a d a ti-money la ndering & countering the fina cing of terrorism. In a dition, the Centra Ba k continued to strengthen its lega a dinstitution from ework by introducing reforms to a sist the mantena ce of fina cia system stb ility of the country. Steps a e being the en to introduce reforms focused on a wide spectrum of financia services covering Licensed Ba ks (LBs), Licensed Finance Companies (LFCs) and Specialised Leasing Companies (SLCs), exchange control, payment a d settlement systems a d stock & securities. Initiating a tion to introducing a new Ba king Act to improve the regulation a d supervision of the ba king sector, strengthening the regulatory fran ework p plicb le to Sri La ka Deposit Insurance and Liquidity Support Scheme (SLDILSS) and commencing the establishment of a resolution fran ework for LBs a d LFCs a e an ong the key steps the en by the Central Ba k during the reference period. Further, drafting the Credit Regulatory Authority Act to repla e the existing Microfina ce Act No. 6 of 2016 to further strengthen the regulation a d supervision

of microfina ce businesses a d to introduce a mecha ism to regulate a d supervise local lending businesses is another noteworthy development in the legal infra tructure of the fina cib sector.

## **5.2 Payment and Settlement Systems**

The payment a d settlement systems operated efficiently a d effectively a d fa ilitated the smooth functioning of the fina cia flows to support economic a tivities of the country during the period under review. The continuous operations of the payment a d settlement fa ilities to institutions a d individua s were ensured by the robust infra tructure systems, while fa ilitating timely settlement of tra sa tions to maintan fina cia system stability, despite the disruptions to economic a d business a tivities due to the COVID-19 lockdowns imposed. As the event of a falure in the payment a d settlement systems could give rise to systemic risk, regulators continued to orga ise and conduct effective oversight mecha isms simila to the prudentia supervision a d regulation of fina cib ma kets a d fina cib institutions. The Centra Bak aso continued its regulatory a d supervisory a tivities on the payment and settlement systems under its purview to minimize these risks. In addition, promotional a tivities were ca ried out to encourge the general public to use digital payment methods for their transa tions which were a so promoted a a mea s of reducing the spread of COVID-19.


The Centra Ba k, a the operator of the La kaSettle System, mantaned continuous operations of the system during the period under review.



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

The La ka ettle System which is a systemically importa t payment system in Sri La ka comprises two well-integrated systems i.e. the Reb Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System and the LankaSecure System. The RTGS system, the Scripless Securities Settlement System (SSSS) and Cheque Imaging Truncation Systems (CITS) are the three main SIPS in the country. The RTGS a d SSSS fa ilitate rea-time settlement of high vb ue a d time critica payments, while the CITS fa ilitates a la ge volume of retal va ue interba k a d person to person payments. In its cp a ity a the Nationa Switch, La k@ lea Pvt. Ltd (LCPL) facilitates clearing and settlement of a la ge number of retal payment instruments a d payment cha nels operated by both ba ks and non-ba ks, ma nly telecommunication compa ies.

Reflecting the restrictions on travel **a** d health concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic **a** d limitation of economic **a** tivities in the country during these exception **b** circumsta ces, tra sa tions performed through cheques declined






Chart 5.4


### **Total Volume and Value of Transactions Carried Out** through Credit cards



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Chart 5.6

### ATM Cash Withdrawals and **Payments Effected through Debit Cards and Credit Cards in Value Terms**



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

considerb ly while usg e of internet ba king a a mea s of ma ing payments a d fund tra sfers increa ed during this period. The Cheque Clea ing System operated by LCPL cleared a total volume of 25 million cheques registering a decrea e of 28.1 per cent when compa ed to the corresponding period of the previous yea, while the g gregate và ue of cheques clea ed à so recording a decrea e of 25.4 per cent. It wa further noted that the volume of cheque returns during the second quarter of 2020 increased to 15.9 per cent of total volume of cheques from 4.9 percent recorded in first qua ter of 2020 reflecting the disruptions to the household sector **a** d corporate sector income due to the pandemic.

The Sri Lanka Inter Bank Payment System (SLIPS) provides a 24\*7 online payment facility to execute

low-va ue bulk fund tra sfers both in the nature of credit transfers and direct debit transfers. During Chart **ATM Cash Withdrawals and Payments** 5.5 **Effected through Debit Cards and Credit Cards in Volume Terms** 24.000 22,000 90,000 20,000 80.000 18.000 Card 70.000 16,000 60,000 14 000

Volume of ATM Transactions (RHS)

Volume of Credit Card Transactions

Volume of Debit Card Transactions

Volume of Debit Card & Credit-

12.000

10,000

8,000

4.000

2,000

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

50,000

40,000

30,000


20 000

10.000

the period under review, the g gregate volume of SLIPS transactions grew by 0.7 per cent to 27 million whilst the g gregate value grew by 4.6 per cent to Rs. 1,628 billion, in compa ison to the corresponding period in the previous yea. In d dition, the use of credit/debit ca ds showed a declining trend during the period under review. Although d option of on-line a d digital payment methods increased during the COVID-19 outbreak, the slowdown in household sector consumption is reflected by the decline in value a d volume of credit ca d spending during the second qua ter of the 2020.

Common ATM Switch (CAS), which facilitates domestic ATM tra sa tions originating from a y ATM in the CAS network, recorded a increase in volume a d va ue of tra sa tions. Tota volume a d va ue of CAS tra sa tions ca ried out during the nine months ending September 2020 were 36.3 million and Rs.368.9 billion, respectively. Common Electronic Fund Transfer Switch (CEFTS) provides a common infra tructure to clea payments effected through multiple payment cha nels such a ATMs, Internet Ba king, Mobile Ba king, kiosks a d overthe-counter.

Total volume and value of CEFTS trains a tions were 18.8 million a d Rs. 1,636.8 billion, respectively, during the period from Ja uary 2020 to September 2020. JustPay, which is a Mobile Application (app) ba ed payment solution for low va ue payments, fa ilitated payments up to the value of Rs. 10,000. In April 2020, maximum per tra sa tion va ue of JustPay was increased to Rs. 25,000 to meet the dema d a ising for low va ue payments through digita methods due to the economic lockdown. During the nine months ending September 2020,



the total volume and value of JustPay transactions which were carried out through CEFTS were 2.6 million a d Rs. 8.8 billion, respectively. The LankaPay Online Payment Platform (LPOPP), which is a payment mecha ism ba ed on CEFTS, wa implemented in 2017 to fa ilitate online rea time payments to government a d other institutions. As at end September 2020, three government institutions, commenced providing rea time payment facilities through LPOPP. CEFTS and other reta I payment mecha isms ba ed on CEFTS a d operations were conducted smoothly during the period under review, providing safe, secure a d efficient payment options for the general public.

The National Quick Response (QR) Code specification branded as "LANKAQR" was issued to provide a low-cost, customer convenient payment option and ensure interoperability of different payment mechanisms and instruments. Accordingly, several financial institutions offered LANKAQR based payment products to their customers. Promotional campaigns on LANKAQR were carried out island-wide to enroll merchants and to increase customer awareness.

Smooth reb-time settlement of high value and time-critical interbank payments of the country was fallitated by the RTGS system. In order to ensure that the operation of the RTGS system was not adversely affected by liquidity issues of the PIs, the Central Bank as the operator of the system, continued to provide the interest free Intra-Day Liquidity Facility (ILF). During the period under review, PIs utilized an average ILF value of Rs. 62.5. billion per business day and a total of 298,786 RTGS transal tions were settled through the RTGS system with an average of 1,679 transactions per day.

Considering the risks a sociated with possible disruption to operations of the PIs of the LankaSettle

System, the Central Bank issued the BCP Guidelines in 2016, instructing PIs to develop proper BCPs a d disa ter recovery sites to ensure continuity of business operations. Accordingly, the Central Bank continued to monitor the BCPs and disaster recovery arrangements of PIs of the LankaSettle System during the period under review. The BCP of the Central Bank was a tivated during the COVID-19 pandemic in order to ensure continued operations of the LankaSettle System and other related systems and to ensure timely settlement of transactions carried out through the retail payment systems operated by LCPL.

The Centra Ba k continued to promote digital payments while strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework to minimize risks a sociated with such payment mecha isms. Onsite supervision a d off-site surveilla ce were conducted by the Payments and Settlements Department of the Central Bank on Service Providers of Payment Cards and Mobile Payment Systems to ensure smooth operations of these systems while **d** hering to regulatory requirements. Ba ed on the findings, the Centra Ba k d opted severa mea ures to mitigate risks a d to stream line the operations of mobile phone ba ed e-money systems. Accordingly, in order to minimize the risks a ising from multiple e-money a counts being ma nta ned by a individua customer, the number of e-money a counts which ca be held by a individual was limited to one. The Payment and Settlement Systems Circular No. 08 of 2019 was issued to mobile phone based e-money system operators to specify the number of e-Money a counts, individua stored va ue limits, day limits a d tra sa tion limits p plicb le for customer e-money a counts.

Using mobile **p** plications to fa ilitate va ious services increa ed during the recent pat a d severa fina cia institutions introduced payment products ba ed on mobile a plication technology. Although new technologically d va ced payment mecha isms were introduced using mobile **p** plications, regulatory intervention becm e necessa y to safegua d customer funds a d information. Accordingly, the Centra Ba k issued Guidelines on Minimum Complia ce Sta da d for Payment Related Mobile Applications in 2018 to set minimum security sta da ds to mitigate the risks of using Mobile Applications to perform fina cib tra sa tions. However, in order to be on pa with the rp idly evolving technology a d to fa t trak the d option of Fintech developments in the country,

this set of Guidelines wa reviewed in 2020 in order to update it to cover new developments in payment related mobile **p** plications. Accordingly, Guideline No.01/2020 on minimum complia ce sta da ds for payment related mobile **p** plications wa issued repla ing Guideline No. 01/2018.

The National Payments Council (NPC), which is the industry consultative a d monitoring committee on payment systems, considering the impa t the security of digital payment mecha isms would have on the fina cib system, included a tion items to strengthen payment system security a d to increa e public awa eness in its Rod Mp for 2020-2022. Accordingly, estb lishing dedicated fra d monitoring a d prevention units, d hering to international security standards such a the Europay Master Visa (EMV) and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCIDSS), the requirement of fina cia institutions joining the CERT a d increa ing awa eness on cyber security best pre tices were included a items in the Rod Mp .

The Central Ba k issued licenses to 2 institutions to operate in the payment ca d industry, during the nine months ending September 2020. Accordingly, one licensed specialized bank (LSB) and one LFC were gra ted p prova to issue debit ca ds a licensed Service Providers of Payment Cards. In d dition, p prova wa gra ted to a LFC to function a a fina cib a quirer of payment ca ds.

## **5.3 Strengthening the Legal** Framework to Maintain Stability

Adva ced legb infra tructure plays a pivotb role in the operations of the fina cib sector by empowering a d governing regulators to enb le effective regulation a d supervision of fina cia ma kets a d fina cib institutions to mantan a efficient a d stb le fina cial system. In order to strengthen the lega fran ework related to the fina cia sector of Sri La ka the Centra Ba k is in the process of introducing a new Ba king Act for the regulation a d supervision of the ba king sector. The new Act will repla e the existing Banking Act, No. 30 of 1988, one of the key statutes d ministered by the Centra Ba k. The new Ba king Act contains provisions on d ditional criteria for licensing of ba king institutions a d regulation a d supervision of fina cial holding compa ies. The proposed Act will a so enb le consolidated supervision a d enha ce corporate governa ce

within ba king institutions. While it a ms to recognize systemically important banks to improve regulatory a d supervisory oversight, provisions a e introduced for ea ly intervention by the Centra Ba ka da wide ra ge of ba k resolution mea ures a e a so incorporated. Other a ea of significa ce include consumer protection within the banking sector, legaly ma dated deposit insura ce a d cross border corporation with other regulators. As a mea ure to strengthen the regulatory fran ework, the Centra Ba k will be empowered to chage d ministrative penalties a d initiate civil a tions for non-complia ces etc. These developments a e expected to resolve the legb a d regulatory issues fe ed by the fina cib system a d d dressing the la una in the present law which a e not in line with the developments in the regulatory supervisory fran ework. Technica Assista ce from the World Ba k ha been obtained to develop the initial draft of this Act a d further discussions a e underway to ma e further developments thereto. In a dition, the p prova of the Moneta y Boa d ha a so been obtained to introduce an endments to the Fina ce Business Act, No. 42 of 2011, the man statute p plicb le for the regulation a d supervision of the LFCs which a so a ms to a dress the la una in the existing law a d to further strengthen the regulatory from ework p plicb le to that sector. Such an endments will include those a ming at strengthening the regulatory a d supervisory powers of the Monetary Board and the Director of the Department of the Supervision of Non-Bank Fina cia Institutions. The provisions on directors of non-bank financial institution's disqualification criteria a d fit a d proper a sessments will be developed in line with internationa sta da ds. Within the a ra gements of the Cp ita Ma kets Development Project, significant changes will be introduced to laws pertaining to cp ita ma kets. It is expected to introduce legislation on netting a d clea ing with a view to developing the lega fran ework to a competitive level.

Further, the Centra Ba kha the ensteps to introduce an endments to the Registered Stock and Securities Ordinance, No. 7 of 1937, the Local Treasury Bills Ordinance No. 8 of 1923, which will inter alia fee ilitate introducing provisions with respect to the paper pointment of nominees for the treasury bills and bonds, strengthening the provisions relating to offences under such statutes and introducing and ministrative changes etc. Moreover, initiatives have a really been the ento introduce an endments to the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, No. 28 of 2005. Amendments suggested to the Foreign

Excha ge Act, No.12 of 2017 have a so been referred to the Cb inet of Ministers for its p provb with a view to strengthen a d enha ce the regulatory a d supervisory fram ework of the Centra Bank in respect of foreign excha ge operations in Sri La ka In a dition to that, the Centra Ba k is involved in drafting a New Credit Regulatory Authority Act for Sri La ka which wa p proved by the Cb inet of Ministers in 2019. This proposed Act will replace the present Microfina ce Act, No. 06 of 2016 a d a ms at further strengthening the regulation a d supervision of the microfina ce business in Sri La ka The draft Act will introduce a new regulatory framework p plicb le for persons who engg e in the business of money lending in Sri La ka a d provide for new legal requirements relating to consumer protection a well.


### 5.4 Resolution & Enforcement and Deposit Insurance Scheme

The Sri Lanka Deposit Insurance and Liquidity Support Scheme (SLDILSS) continued to expand during the period under review while providing compensation payments to license ca celled/ suspended finance compa ies, thereby upholding the public trust in the fina cib system.<sup>37</sup> Currently, SLDILSS comprises of 73 member institutions (MIs).38 Funds of SLDILSS have been invested in Government Securities a d in liquidity support loa s given to MIs. The maximum coverg e of SLDILSS is currently Rs. 600,000 per depositor per institution.


The Centra Bank continued with the compensation payments for the depositors under SLDILSS for three failed LFCs, nan ely Centra Investment a d Finance PLC (CIFL), The Standard Credit and Finance Ltd. (TSCFL) and TKS Finance Company Ltd. (TKSFL)

during the period under review. Further, mea ures were a so ta en to commence compensation payments to the depositors of three other license ca celled/suspended fina ce compa ies, nan ely The Finance Company PLC (TFC), ETI Finance Ltd. (ETI) and Swarnamahal Financial Services PLC (SFS) through a Agent Ba k in order to expedite the compensation payment process a d a licensed commercia bank wa p pointed a the "Agent Bank" for this purpose. Accordingly, Rs.19.7 billion ha been pad a compensations to g grieved depositors of license ca celled/suspended fina cib institutions a at 30 September 2020.

Furthermore, the Centra Bakha developed operation by procedures pertaining to enforcement functions in order to strem line enforcement a tion g a nst regulatory non-complia ces. In this regad, a Enforcement Committee wa est**b** lished in coll**b** oration with the Attorney General's Department to expedite legal action against prohibited schemes and unauthorized fina ce businesses. Severa investigations were conducted into unauthorized finance businesses a d prohibited schemes under the releva t provisions of the Fina ce Business Act, No. 42 of 2011 and the Banking Act, No. 30 of 1988. Awa eness program mes were a so conducted with a view to improving fina cia litera y a d educating the general public on the ill-effects of unauthorized fina ce businesses a d prohibited schemes. Awa eness program mes rega ding fra dulent schemes will a so be conducted to geting school children a d law enforcement a thorities with a view to enha cing their knowledge b out the importa ce of combating these fina cia scan s.



<sup>38</sup> It is also expected to conduct on-site supervision of MIs of SLDILSS to ensure the mantena ce of data a es a d other systems that are imperative for ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme. RED is currently not conducting on-site examinations. However, it is expected to conduct next yea onwa ds together with the two regulators BSD and SNBFID.



A comprehensive Resolution Fram ework for the LBs a dLFCs under the existing lega fram ework is being developed with the technica a sista ce of the US Trea ury. In the proposed resolution fram ework, the Resolution & Enforcement Department will function a the Resolution Authority of the Centra Bakina cordace with the policy fram ework that will be promulgated under the proposed Baking Act. Accordingly, it is envisated to SLDILSS in terms of the proposed Baking Act a dinternationab best practices.

# 5.5 Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism

Money la ndering a d fina cing of terrorism pose a significa t threat to fina cib system stb ility a d economic development by diverting resources away from economically a d socially productive uses. The COVID-19 pandemic has especially generated a ra ge of fina cia flows through fisca stimulus, internationa a d a d other socia a sista ce program mes providing new opportunities for crimina s a d terrorists to la nder illicit proceeds. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)39 highlighted that threats of money la ndering have increased due to the COVID-19 pandemic with the increased popula ity of remote work through online systems, restrictions on in-person ba king, urgent purcha es of medica equipment to meet the overwhelming dema d a d increa e in globa online sales. Having recognized the emerging threats, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Centra Ba k continued to perform its core functions an id may challenges, during the year 2020. However, the de-listing of Sri La ka by the FATF a d Europea Commission from their lists of High Risk countries that have strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT in 2019 and 2020 respectively will have a positive economic a d fina cia impa t on Sri La ka since the stb ility of the fina cib system depends heavily on perceived reputation of its integrity.40

FIU issued severa circula s a d guidelines focusing on identification of Politically Exposed Persons, AML/CFT complia ce obligations for Accounta ts

39 The FATF is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and Trusts or Company Service Providers, scenario ba ed La kā IN reporting for LFCs, Insura ce Compa ies a d Stock Brokers, etc. a d to all the Fina cia Institutions a vising them to increa e vigila ce/due diligence a d to ta e p propriate mea ures to protect the fina cia system from possible money la ndering/ terrorist fina cing risks arising during the global COVID-19 pandemic.

Conducting awa eness investigating an ong officers on money laundering (ML) investigations, coordination with continuous investigators, prosecutors **a** d fin**a** cia institutions, briefing fina cib institutions on their responsibilities in ensuring institutional complia ce a d supporting Law Enforcement Agencies' (LEA) efforts in combating ML related to illicit drug trd e, etc. were a so ca ried out during this period.

The FIU is in the process of introducing an endments to three man legislative ena tments (the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act, No. 25 of 2005, the Prevention of Money La ndering Act, No. 5 of 2006 a d the Financial Transactions Reporting Act, No. 6 of 2006) that support the AML/CFT fren ework of Sri La ka The p provb of the Cb inet of Ministers ha been sought for the an endments, which a e manly a med at rectifying the deficiencies identified at the Mutub Evb uation ca ried out in 2014/15 by the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, with a view to enhancing the country's compliance with the cha ges to the FATF recommendations a d deficiencies identified in the implementation of these legislations over the period.

## 5.6 Surveillance on Foreign Exchange Transactions

Severa mea ures were introduced by way of Regulations, Orders and Directions issued under the provisions of the Foreign Excha ge Act, No.

<sup>40</sup> The de-listing of Sri Lanka by the European Commission from its List of High Risk Third Countries that have strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes published on 7 May 2020 is one such a hievement. Sri La ka wa listed a a High Risk Third Country by the EU in February 2018, subsequent to Sri Lanka being identified by the FATF as a jurisdiction with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies in its Compliance Document a.k.a "the Grey List" in October 2017. Upon the listing, a time bound Action Plan to address the strategic deficiencies identified was assigned to Sri Lanka. Since the listing by the FATF, the FIU together with other sta eholders, took a series of effective and tangible steps to implement the FATF Action Plan well within the given time frame, and accordingly, the FATF de-listed Sri La ka from the Grey List at its plena y held during 13-18 October 2019 in Paris. Subsequent to the de-listing by the FATF, the EU de-listed Sri La ka from its list of High Risk Third Countries.

12 of 2017 (FEA), in order to ease the pressure on the excha ge rate a d to improve the foreign reserve position of the country during the period concerned.

Accordingly, in order to attra t foreign excha ge inflows to the country from both residents a d nonresidents, Special Deposit Accounts (SDAs) with an d ditiona interest payment by the Government were introduced during ea ly April 2020. Further, the Order issued under Section 22 of the FEA which suspended outwa d remitta ces in respect of certain cp ital tra sa tions is vaid only for a six months period (i.e. to be lapsed by 01 January 2021). However, suspensions under this Order, if not extended, may ca se unfavor b le effects on the excha ge rate stb ility with possible subsequent outwa d cp ital tra se tions. However, if the economic conditions wa ra t continuation of these restrictions, then there will be concern to revisit the existing general permission gra ted under the FEA for residents to mk e outwa d investments a d cla ms on migration a lowa ce by emigra ts.

Moreover, considering the difficulties fa ed by foreign currency borrowers with the reduced level of ca h flows/ea nings in foreign excha ge due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Authorized Dealers (ADs) were permitted to recover existing foreign currency loa s gra ted to foreign excha ge earners and to Sri Lankans working abroad (other than emigrants), in Sri Lanka Rupees, as a last resort.

In line with severb other mea ures introduced by the Centra Ba k to ea e the pressure on the excha ge rate a d to prevent fina cia ma ket pa ic due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Directions were issued to ADs under FEA limiting release of foreign excha ge in respect of certa n current tra sa tions. As a further mea ure to preserve the foreign currency reserve position of the country, a Order wa issued under Section 22 of the FEA, restricting outwa d remittances of certain cp ith tra se tions for a three months period. However, considering the possible negative impat to the Sri La ka economy due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this Order wa subsequently extended for a period of six months. In order to attra t inwa d remittances/ inflows to the country a d thereby to support national effort to mage the challenges faled due to the COVID-19 outbreak, regulations were issued introducing SDAs to be opened with fresh inwa d remitta ces until 02 October 2020 41. Later, sources of funding in foreign exchange for SDAs

were expa ded with a view to encourg ing more inward remittances/deposits to SDAs. Moreover, regulations were issued, permitting ADs to renew and continue SDAs beyond the designated date of maturity under the terms for normal deposits a d to tra sfer maturity proceeds into Inwa d Investment Accounts (IIAs) or Personal Foreign Currency Accounts (PFCAs).

Instructions a e being issued on a ca e by ca e ba is to ADs, in respect of foreign currency loans granted to holders of Business Foreign Currency Accounts (BFCAs) and to Sri Lankans working abroad who maintain PFCAs (other than emigrants), to allow borrowers to repay such loa s in Sri La ka Rupees only for a short period (i.e. for 03 to 06 months of loans installments), thereby avoiding the lump sum conversions of la ge sca e/long term foreign currency loa s into Sri La ka Rupee loa s.

During October 2020, regulations were issued permitting the renewal and continuation of SDAs, beyond the designated date of maturity with interest rates offered by ADs for normal term deposits and to be freely convertible **a** d repatri**b** le outside Sri L**a** ka on the maturity of such term deposits. Further, maturity proceeds including the interest of SDAs were permitted to be credited to PFCAs and IIAs, provided SDA holders are eligible to open and mantan such a counts, a so encourging retention of such deposits within the country.

### 5.7 Financial Inclusion


inclusion is identified Fina cia 8 key determina t of household sector income, thereby influencing the fina cib stb ility a d economic growth pa ticula ly in developing countries. Having identified the importace of finacial inclusion, the Centra Ba k ha ta en efforts to improve the level of fina cib inclusion of the country during the pa t few decd es. The ba king density<sup>42</sup> of the country, one of the key prima y indicators of fina cib inclusion grd ubly increa ed with the outrea h of ba k bra ches, pa ticula ly during the post-conflict era With a intention of further improving fina cib inclusion of the country, the Centra Ba k developed

<sup>41</sup> Proposals have also been forwarded to the Hon. Minister of Fina ce seeking permission to extend the period for which new SDAs can be opened. All these measures are expected to lessen the emerging risk of remitting out of maturity proceeds of such SDAs.

<sup>42</sup> Banking density is defined as the number of bank branchers per 100.000 population.

## Chart 5.9

## Changes in Banking Density of Sri Lanka




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS), with a sista ce from the Internationa Fina ce Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Groupand it is expected to be officially la nched during the fourth qua ter of 2020. The key objective of the NFIS is to identify a d promote a more effective a d efficient process to improve fina cial inclusion a ross the country. This strategy focuses mainly on four (04) policy pillars: (I) Digital Finance and Payments, (II) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Finance, (III) Consumer Protection and (IV) Financial Literacy & Cp a ity Building. A time bound a tion pla of the NFIS, developed in collb oration with the other state eholders and the expertise of the IFC, would help to mea ure a d monitor the progress in a hieving the fina cib inclusion objectives of the NFIS.

Fina cib inclusion does not comprise only of providing affordb le a cess of fina cib products a d services, but a so effective usg e of the sm e by the public a well. Therefore, improving fina cib litera y has been a concern a d a policy priority a broad -ba ed a cess to formb fina cib services promotes inclusive growth a d fina cib stb ility. In this light, with a view to enha cing fina cib litera y of the public, the Centrb Ba k

### Chart 5.10

## Banking Density (LCBs and LSBs only) by Province as at End 2019



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

continued to conduct awa eness a d cp a ity building program s for identified segments of the society where litera y levels a e relatively lower, to educate them on debing with formb fina cib institutions a d affordb le fina cib a d the disd va tg es a d risks a sociated with informal financial services, unauthorized deposit ta inginstitutions, pyran id schemes, etc. The focus groups of these program s have been youth, women a d gra s root level entrepreneurs. A lower level of fina cia litera y in the household sector is likely to have serious ran ifications on the household a d SME sector indebtedness by driving lowincome fan ilies to originate a substa tia volume of risky cla ms. Hence, enha cing the litera y level of the household sector is importa t to d dress household indebtedness.

### Box Article 4

## Strengthening the Macroprudential Framework of Sri Lanka

Ma roprudential policies a e à med at safegua ding the stb ility of the fina cib system a a whole to limit the systemic risk of widespred disruptions to the provision of fina cib services that would have serious negative consequences for the economy at la ge. In a upwa d pha e of the financib cycle, ma roprudential policies à m to reduce the systemic risk of exubera t ma ket trends a d build-up the loss b sorption cp a ity of the fina cib sector. During a downward phase of the financial cycle ma roprudential policies a e relaxed to fa ilitate b sorption of losses a d to support the provision of credit when systemic risks emerge.

The general objectives, scope, tools and the interactions of macroprudential policy with other policies were discussed in a previous Box Article titled 'Macroprudential Policy for Economic Stability' published in the Annual Report 2011. The Central Bank continued to strengthen its macroprudential framework covering macrofinancial linkages, institutions, financial markets and financial infrastructure while introducing and employing new tools to monitor the buildup of risk in the financial system. In 2019, macroprudential framework was extended to assess the risk emanating from household sector and corporate sector of the country. However, the macroprudential policy framework in Sri Lanka is still evolving. This article builds upon the previous Box Article on macroprudential policy and discusses the current status of the development of a macroprudential framework for Sri Lanka and the way forward.

The ma roprudentia ma date in Sri La ka is a signed to the Moneta y Boa d of the Centra Bank by the Monetary Law Act, No. 58 of 1949 via mantaning the fina cia system stability as a core objective of the Centra Bak. The Centra Bak estabilished the Fina cia System Stability Department in 2007 to introduce a 'macro perspective' to the microprudential supervision functions of the Central Bank. The Department was later renamed as the 'Maroprudential Surveillance Department' (MSD) to be in line with the structure of the fina cial sector departments of other selected Asia central baks. Since its

inception, the Department has been shaping the me roprudential policy la dscp e in Sri La ka a d several efforts a e underway to extend the scope a d depth of me roprudential policy.

## The Current Status of Macroprudential Surveillance in Sri Lanka

Ma roprudentia surveilla ce is ca ried out using data reported by regulated fina cia institutions and data collected by MSD from other sources. The current surveilla ce fran ework a a yses risks ema ating from globa a d domestic ma roeconomic developments, fina cia ma ket a tivities a d the fina cia institutions sector using such data In a dition, a sessment of household a d non-household sector debt dynan ics a d corporate sector risk profiles a sist to eva uate the impa t of ma ro level developments on fina cia system sta ility.

Stress testing **a** d network **a** b ysis play a major role within the current ma roprudentia fran ework while monitoring of fina cib stb ility indicators a d surveys provide informative inputs to the policy ma ing process. Stress testing is employed to ga ge the impa t of credit risk, interest rate risk a d foreign excha ge risk on the Cp ith Adequa y Ratio (CAR) of individual banks as well as the sector a a whole under va ious ma ro-stress scena ios. Network a bysis complements stress testing by analyzing inter-bank lending exposures. The Central Ba k a so constructs severa indicators to a sess fina cia sector soundness. The Ba king Sector a d LFC Sector Soundness Indices, the Fina cia Ma ket Stb ility Indicator, the Ma roeconomic Soundness Index a d the Fina cib Stress Index a e used to identify stra ns from different sources when ga ging the sta ility of the fina cia system. In d dition to such a bytich tools, the Centra Ba k conducts the Systemic Risk Survey to a sess the ma ket perceptions rega ding risk in the fina cib sector. Further, committees such a the Fina cia System Stb ility Committee, Fina cib System Stb ility Consultative Committee a d the Fina cib Sector Oversight Council a so provide key inputs to the policy formulation process.

The ma or output ava labele to the public on finacial system stability of the country from the Central Bak is the Finacial System Stability Review. This report reviews the state of finacial system stability during the year, the foreseen risks in the finacial system lad dscape, measures to mitigate such risks, ad presents a outlook for finacial system stability in the future.

## **Significant Macroprudential Policy Measures Taken by the Central Bank**

Since the scope of ma roprudential policy is the final cial system and a whole, policy tools which fall under its purview that get the sources of systemic risk. Such tools are introduced to the final cial sector for three main reasions, namely, to all dress the build up of risks, to build resilience of the final cial system, and to all dress structural dimensions. In all dition to these general objectives, each central back may have context specific objectives when introducing these tools.

The man ma roprudential policy tools employed by the Central Bank include cap it a conservation buffers, limits on leverge e ratios, forward looking loal loss provisioning requirements, cap is on credit growth and load to value ratios.

The Centrb Ba k b so developed a fran ework for dealing with Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) by introducing Higher Loss Absorbency requirements (HLA) as a capital surcharge on D-SIBs. This was implemented in line with the guidelines issued by the Ba el Committee on Banking Supervision from 2019.

### **Way Forward**

The Centra Ba k ha obta ned technica a sista ce from the Internationa Moneta y Fund to expa d the bred th a d depth of ma roprudentia surveillance fran ework in Sri La ka Under this technica a sista ce progran, it is envisa ed that improvements would be mel e to data collection a d a bysis, the depth of the stress testing functionality via dynamic stress tests, improving

risk surveilla ce by enha cing the forwa d looking element, ch ibration of policy instruments a d improving the governa ce structure of ma roprudentih policy ma ing.

The overa ching objective of fina cia stb ility is supported within a brod er ra ge of fina cib sector policies implemented by the Centra Ba k. The proposed new Ba king Act would a so support the me roprudential policy frem ework by a lowing a differentiated regulatory fram ework to fa ilitate proportionality, strengthened corporate governa ce a d consolidated supervision for ba king groups, resolution, imposing penaties, ring-fencing of ba ks to mitigate contg ion risk, strengthening provisions for mergers, a quisitions and consolidation, subsidiarization of large foreign ba ks, a d introducing fina cib holding compa y structure for ba ks. It is envisioned that the regulatory a d supervisory fran ework perta ning to licensed ba ks will be further strengthened in future in line with the Basel Core Principles on Effective Ba king Supervision a d other internationa best pra tices. Further, with the view of improving systemic resilience to shocks, the Licensed Fina ce Compa ies a d Specialised Lea ing Compa ies sector will be encourged a d incentivized to undergo business consolidation to meet improved regulatory sta da ds.

The Centra Bak is a so moving towards a comprehensive resolutions procedure through the estab lishment of the Resolutions and Enforcement Department within the Central Bank, which is in the process of developing a resolutions from ework for the Licensed Baking Sector and the Licensed Finance Companies and Specialized Leasing Company sector.

### References

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### **Appendix 1: Financial Soundness Indicators - All Banks**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 Sep (a)
Capital Adequacy					
1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR)	15.6	16.4	16.2	16.5	16.5
1.2 Tier 1 Capital / Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)	12.6	13.4	13.1	13.0	13.0
1.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Capital Funds	9.6	9.3	14.5	19.5	21.1
1.4 Debt to Capital Funds	239.8	185.4	171.1	148.6	140.4
1.5 Equity Capital & Reserves to Total Assets Ratio	7.8	8.4	8.7	9.0	8.7
2. Asset Quality					
2.1 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (w/o Interest in Suspense)	2.6	2.5	3.4	4.7	5.3
2.2 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (with Interest in Suspense)	4.1	3.8	4.7	6.3	7.0
2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans	1.2	1.3	1.9	2.8	2.9
2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.5	2.9
2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total)	71.8	69.9	57.4	52.3	55.6
2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific)	52.1	49.6	43.1	42.4	45.9
2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9
2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets	61.2	62.5	65.2	64.9	63.7
2.9 Investments to Total Assets	25.1	24.8	22.7	24.2	26.9
2.10 Total Income to Total Assets	9.5	10.6	10.7	10.7	7.0
2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	2.2
2.12 Operating Income to Total Assets	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.5	2.9
3. Earnings & Profitability					
3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax	17.3	17.6	13.2	10.3	10.9
3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.3
3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax	1.4	1.4	1.1	0.9	1.0
3.4 Interest Income to Total Income	88.0	88.9	88.2	90.2	89.2
3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income	35.4	31.2	31.6	32.0	31.6
3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income	12.0	11.1	11.8	9.8	10.8
3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income	22.9	18.7	20.2	19.7	19.2
3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses	44.9	46.5	44.1	44.6	46.3
3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income	10.3	8.7	8.9	8.8	8.9
3.10 Provisions to Total Income	2.3	2.6	4.0	5.3	7.3
3.11 Total Cost to Total Income	75.6	76.3	76.8	77.8	76.8
3.12 Efficiency Ratio	49.2	45.7	50.0	52.7	53.0
3.13 Interest Margin	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.1
4. Liquidity					
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets	27.3	28.8	25.7	28.9	34.8
4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio	29.9	31.3	27.6	31.0	38.8
5. Assets / Funding Structure					
5.1 Deposits	69.6	71.9	72.0	73.2	75.2
5.2 Borrowings	18.8	15.6	15.0	13.4	12.2
5.3 Capital to External Funds	8.8	9.6	10.0	10.4	9.9
5.4 Credit to Deposits	88.0	86.9	90.6	88.7	84.8
5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings	69.3	71.4	75.0	74.9	72.9
5.6 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings & Capital	63.7	65.1	68.2	67.8	66.4

(a) Provisional

### **Appendix 2: Financial Soundness Indicators - LCBs**

2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans 2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total) 2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific) 2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific) 2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets 2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets 2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets 2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets 2.9 Investments to Total Assets 2.9 Investments to Total Assets 2.10 Total Income to Total Assets 2.11 Note Interest Income to Total Assets 2.11 Note Interest Income to Total Assets 3.4 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.6 3.0 3. Earnings & Profitability 3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax 3.1 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax 4.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax 4.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 3.5 Not Interest Income to Total Income 4.6 8.6 8.7 8.8 0.8 8.7 8.9 8.1 3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income 4.7 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses 4.4 1 4.5 4.2 7.4 4.1 4.5 4.5 7.8 8.0 3.10 Provisions to Total Income 4.6 7.5 2.7 7.5 8.0 3.11 Total Cost to Total Income 4.8 7.9 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.7 4.9 4.5 7.8 8.0 4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets 4.2 4.2 Liquid Assets to Total Assets 4.4 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 4.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1	Appendix 2. I maneial Soundhess maleators - Lebs						
Capital Adequacy		2016	2017	2018	2019		
1. Capital Adequacy 1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR) 1.2 Tier 1 Capital / Risk Weighted Assets (Ter 1 RWCAR) 1.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Capital Funds 1.4 Debt to Capital Funds 1.5 Capital Risk Weighted Assets (Ter 1 RWCAR) 1.5 Capital Funds 1.5 Capi							
1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR)   15.6   16.4   16.2   16.6   16.7   1.2 Tier 1 Capital / Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)   12.5   13.4   13.0   13.0   13.1   1.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Capital Funds   7.6   7.5   13.2   18.3   19.3   1.4 Debt to Capital Funds   223.7   169.2   167.0   147.5   142.6   1.5 Capital to Assets Ratio   8.2   8.9   9.1   9.5   9.1   2. Asset Quality   2.1 Capital Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (Wio Interest in Suspense)   2.1 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (Wio Interest in Suspense)   2.2 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (will Interest in Suspense)   2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans (will Interest in Suspense)   2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans (will Interest in Suspense)   2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans (will Interest in Suspense)   2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans   1.0   1.0   1.8   2.6   2.7   2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans   1.0   1.0   1.8   2.6   2.7   2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific)   58.5   55.4   45.9   43.8   48.2   2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets   1.1   2   1.2   1.3   1.7   2.0   2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets   1.2   1.2   1.3   1.7   2.0   2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets   1.2   1.2   1.3   1.7   2.0   2.9 Investments to Total Assets   1.2   1.2   1.3   1.7   2.0   2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets   1.1   1.1   1.1   1.1   1.0   1.0   2.9 Investments to Total Assets   1.2   1.2   1.3   1.7   2.0   2.1 Total Income to Total Assets   4.6   4.6   4.8   4.6   4.8   4.6   3.1 Earnings & Profitability   1.1	4. Canital Adamian					(a)	
1.2 Tier 1 Capital / Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)   12.5   13.4   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.1   13.0   13.0   13.1   13.1   13.0   13.1		15.6	16.4	16.0	16.6	16.7	
1.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Capital Funds							
1.4 Debt to Capital Funds							
1.5 Capital to Assets Ratio	·	-					
2. Asset Quality 2.1 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (w/o Interest in Suspense) 2.2 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (with Interest in Suspense) 2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.6 2.7 2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total) 2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific) 2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific) 2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets 2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets 2.8 Total Loans (Gross Loans 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.8 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.8 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.1 1.7 2.0 2.0 3.1 1.7 2.0 2.0 3.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 1.0 6.0 6.3 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.0 5.0 1.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1							
2.1 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (wio Interest in Suspense)	1.5 Capital to Assets Ratio	8.2	8.9	9.1	9.5	9.1	
2.1 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (wio Interest in Suspense)	2. Accot Quality						
In Suspense    2 2 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (with Interest in Suspense)   2 3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans   1.0		2.4	2.3	2 2	16	5.1	
In Suspense	in Suspense)		-				
2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans	, ,	3.9	3.7	4.6	6.2	6.9	
2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total)  2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific)  5.8.5  5.5.4  4.5.9  4.3.8  4.8.2  2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.7  2.0  2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets  2.9 Investments to Total Assets  2.9 Investments to Total Assets  2.9 Investments to Total Assets  2.10 Total Income to Total Assets  2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.5  2.2  2.10 Porating Income to Total Assets  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.2  2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets  3.4  3.6  3.7  3. Earnings & Profitability  3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax  3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax  3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax  3.4 Interest Income to Total Income  3.5  3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income  3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income  3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income  3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses to Total Income  3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income  3.0 Staff Expenses to Total Income  3.10 Provisions to Total Income  3.11 Total Cost to Total Income  74.6  75.2  75.1  76.6  75.3  71.2  77.7  78.1  76.3  76.3  77.7  78.1  76.3  77.7  78.1  76.3  77.7  78.1  76.3  77.7  78.1  76.3  77.7  78.1  76.3	2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans	1.0	1.0	1.8	2.6	2.7	
2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific)	2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.5	3.0	
2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets 2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets 2.9 Investments to Total Assets 2.9 Investments to Total Assets 2.10 Total Income to Total Assets 2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.2 2.12 Operating Income to Total Assets 3.14 Between the Total Assets 3.15 Tetal Interest Income to Total Assets 3.16 Tetal Interest Income to Total Assets 3.17 Net Interest Income to Total Assets 3.18 Tetum on Equity (ROE) – After Tax 3.18 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax 3.18 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax 3.18 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax 3.18 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax 3.18 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax 4.14 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 3.4 Interest Income to Total Income 86.7 88.0 87.0 89.1 88.0 3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income 35.9 32.0 32.3 32.5 32.0 3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income 35.9 32.0 32.3 32.5 32.0 3.8 Staff Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income 33.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses 44.1 45.4 42.7 43.1 45.0 3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income 10.5 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.7 3.10 Provisions to Total Income 2.6 2.9 4.4 5.7 8.0 3.11 Total Cost to Total Income 2.6 2.9 4.4 5.7 8.0 3.11 Total Cost to Total Income 48.9 45.2 48.5 51.8 52.1 3.13 Interest Margin 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.1 4. Liquidity 4. Liquid Assets to Total Assets 24.9 26.7 24.5 27.1 32.4 4. 2 Liquid Assets Ratio 5. Assets / Funding Structure 5.1 Deposits 69.5 72.0 71.4 72.0 73.8 5.2 Borrowings 18.4 15.0 15.1 14.0 13.0 5.3 Capital to External Funds 9.4 10.2 10.5 11.1 10.5 5.4 Credit to Deposits 91.9 90.1 94.2 93.4 89.8 5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings 72.6 74.6 77.7 78.1 76.3	2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total)	80.3	77.8	61.1	54.0	58.4	
2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets 2.9 Investments to Total Assets 2.9 Investments to Total Assets 2.10 Total Income to Total Assets 2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.2 2.12 Operating Income to Total Assets 3.12 Operating Income to Total Assets 3.13 A 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.2 3.5 Earnings & Profitability 3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax 3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax 3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax 3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax 3.4 Interest Income to Total Income 3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income 3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income 3.7 Non-Interest Income to Total Income 3.8 Non-Interest Income to Total Income 3.9 Staff Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income 3.9 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses 4.4.1 45.4 42.7 43.1 45.0 3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income 4.5 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses 4.4.1 45.4 42.7 43.1 45.0 3.10 Provisions to Total Income 4.5 Total Income 4.6 Total Income 4.7 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.7 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.1 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.1 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.1 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.2 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.3 Staff Expenses to Total Income 4.4 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.5 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.6 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.7 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.8 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.9 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.1 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.2 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.3 Staff Expenses to Total Income 5.4 Credit to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.5 Credit to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.5 Credit to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.5 Credit to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.6 Staff to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.7 Staff Total Total Cost to Total Total Expenses 5.6 Staff to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.6 Staff to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.6 Staff to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.7 Staff to Deposits 8 Borrowings 5.7 Staff to Deposits 8 Borrowings	2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific)	58.5	55.4	45.9	43.8	48.2	
2.9 Investments to Total Assets	2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.7	2.0	
2.10 Total Income to Total Assets   9.4   10.5   10.5   10.6   6.9	2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets	63.8	64.9	67.3	67.3	66.3	
2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets	2.9 Investments to Total Assets	22.1	22.3	20.5	21.9	24.7	
2.12 Operating Income to Total Assets	2.10 Total Income to Total Assets	9.4	10.5	10.5	10.6	6.9	
3. Earnings & Profitability  3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax  3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax  2.0 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.4  3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax  1.4 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0  3.4 Interest Income to Total Income  86.7 88.0 87.0 89.1 88.0  3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income  35.9 32.0 32.3 32.5 32.0  3.6 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income  3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income  3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses  44.1 45.4 42.7 43.1 45.0  3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income  10.5 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.7  3.10 Provisions to Total Income  2.6 2.9 4.4 5.7 8.0  3.11 Total Cost to Total Income  74.6 75.2 75.1 76.6 75.3  3.12 Efficiency Ratio  4. Liquidity  4. Liquidity  4. Liquid Assets to Total Assets  4.2 Liquid Assets to Total Assets  5.4 Serts / Funding Structure  5.1 Deposits  5.2 Borrowings  18.4 15.0 15.1 14.0 13.0  5.3 Capital to External Funds  9.4 10.2 10.5 11.1 10.5  5.4 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings  72.6 74.6 77.7 78.1 76.3	2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	2.2	
3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) - After Tax	2.12 Operating Income to Total Assets	4.6	4.6	4.8	4.6	3.0	
3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) - After Tax							
3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax   2.0   2.1   1.9   1.5   1.4	3. Earnings & Profitability						
3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax       1.4       1.5       1.2       1.0       1.0         3.4 Interest Income to Total Income       86.7       88.0       87.0       89.1       88.0         3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income       35.9       32.0       32.3       32.5       32.0         3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income       13.3       12.0       13.0       10.9       12.0         3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income       23.7       19.2       20.4       20.0       19.3         3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses       44.1       45.4       42.7       43.1       45.0         3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income       10.5       8.7       8.7       8.6       8.7         3.10 Provisions to Total Income       2.6       2.9       4.4       5.7       8.0         3.11 Total Cost to Total Income       74.6       75.2       75.1       76.6       75.3         3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1	3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax	17.2	17.4	13.7	10.6	10.9	
3.4 Interest Income to Total Income       86.7       88.0       87.0       89.1       88.0         3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income       35.9       32.0       32.3       32.5       32.0         3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income       13.3       12.0       13.0       10.9       12.0         3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income       23.7       19.2       20.4       20.0       19.3         3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses       44.1       45.4       42.7       43.1       45.0         3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income       10.5       8.7       8.7       8.6       8.7         3.10 Provisions to Total Income       2.6       2.9       4.4       5.7       8.0         3.11 Total Cost to Total Income       74.6       75.2       75.1       76.6       75.3         3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0<	3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.4	
3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income       35.9       32.0       32.3       32.5       32.0         3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income       13.3       12.0       13.0       10.9       12.0         3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income       23.7       19.2       20.4       20.0       19.3         3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses       44.1       45.4       42.7       43.1       45.0         3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income       10.5       8.7       8.7       8.6       8.7         3.10 Provisions to Total Income       2.6       2.9       4.4       5.7       8.0         3.11 Total Cost to Total Income       74.6       75.2       75.1       76.6       75.3         3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.	3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.0	
3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income   13.3   12.0   13.0   10.9   12.0   3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income   23.7   19.2   20.4   20.0   19.3   3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses   44.1   45.4   42.7   43.1   45.0   3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income   10.5   8.7   8.7   8.6   8.7   3.10 Provisions to Total Income   2.6   2.9   4.4   5.7   8.0   3.11 Total Cost to Total Income   74.6   75.2   75.1   76.6   75.3   3.12 Efficiency Ratio   48.9   45.2   48.5   51.8   52.1   3.13 Interest Margin   3.6   3.5   3.7   3.6   3.1   4. Liquidity   4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets   24.9   26.7   24.5   27.1   32.4   4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio   25.4   27.2   25.0   27.8   35.0   5. Assets / Funding Structure   5.1 Deposits   69.5   72.0   71.4   72.0   73.8   5.2 Borrowings   18.4   15.0   15.1   14.0   13.0   5.3 Capital to External Funds   9.4   10.2   10.5   11.1   10.5   5.4 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings   72.6   74.6   77.7   78.1   76.3   76.3   76.3   77.5   78.1   76.3   78.5	3.4 Interest Income to Total Income	86.7	88.0	87.0	89.1	88.0	
3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income       23.7       19.2       20.4       20.0       19.3         3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses       44.1       45.4       42.7       43.1       45.0         3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income       10.5       8.7       8.7       8.6       8.7         3.10 Provisions to Total Income       2.6       2.9       4.4       5.7       8.0         3.11 Total Cost to Total Income       74.6       75.2       75.1       76.6       75.3         3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5	3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income	35.9	32.0	32.3	32.5	32.0	
3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses       44.1       45.4       42.7       43.1       45.0         3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income       10.5       8.7       8.7       8.6       8.7         3.10 Provisions to Total Income       2.6       2.9       4.4       5.7       8.0         3.11 Total Cost to Total Income       74.6       75.2       75.1       76.6       75.3         3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposi	3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income	13.3	12.0	13.0	10.9	12.0	
3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income   10.5   8.7   8.7   8.6   8.7   3.10 Provisions to Total Income   2.6   2.9   4.4   5.7   8.0	3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income	23.7	19.2	20.4	20.0	19.3	
3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income   10.5   8.7   8.7   8.6   8.7   3.10 Provisions to Total Income   2.6   2.9   4.4   5.7   8.0	3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses	44.1	45.4	42.7	43.1	45.0	
3.10 Provisions to Total Income       2.6       2.9       4.4       5.7       8.0         3.11 Total Cost to Total Income       74.6       75.2       75.1       76.6       75.3         3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income	10.5	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.7	
3.12 Efficiency Ratio       48.9       45.2       48.5       51.8       52.1         3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	3.10 Provisions to Total Income	2.6	2.9	4.4	5.7	8.0	
3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	3.11 Total Cost to Total Income	74.6	75.2	75.1	76.6	75.3	
3.13 Interest Margin       3.6       3.5       3.7       3.6       3.1         4. Liquidity       4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	3.12 Efficiency Ratio	48.9	45.2	48.5	51.8	52.1	
4. Liquidity  4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets  24.9 26.7 24.5 27.1 32.4  4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio  25.4 27.2 25.0 27.8 35.0  5. Assets / Funding Structure  5.1 Deposits  69.5 72.0 71.4 72.0 73.8  5.2 Borrowings  18.4 15.0 15.1 14.0 13.0  5.3 Capital to External Funds  9.4 10.2 10.5 11.1 10.5  5.4 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings  72.6 74.6 77.7 78.1 76.3							
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3							
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets       24.9       26.7       24.5       27.1       32.4         4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	4. Liquidity						
4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio       25.4       27.2       25.0       27.8       35.0         5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3		24.9	26.7	24.5	27.1	32.4	
5. Assets / Funding Structure       5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	`					35.0	
5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3							
5.1 Deposits       69.5       72.0       71.4       72.0       73.8         5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	5. Assets / Funding Structure						
5.2 Borrowings       18.4       15.0       15.1       14.0       13.0         5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	,	69.5	72.0	71.4	72.0	73.8	
5.3 Capital to External Funds       9.4       10.2       10.5       11.1       10.5         5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3		18.4			14.0	13.0	
5.4 Credit to Deposits       91.9       90.1       94.2       93.4       89.8         5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings       72.6       74.6       77.7       78.1       76.3	Š		-			10.5	
5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings 72.6 74.6 77.7 78.1 76.3							
	5.6 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings & Capital	66.4	67.7	70.4	70.4	69.0	

(a) Revised Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

### **Appendix 3: Financial Soundness Indicators - LSBs**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	"2020 Sep (a)"
1. Capital Adequacy					
1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR)	15.3	16.3	17.1	15.6	14.4
1.2 Tier 1 Capital / Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)	13.5	13.4	15.0	12.3	11.5
1.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Capital Funds	31.1	29.3	28.7	33.0	42.6
1.4 Debt to Capital Funds	409.6	360.1	214.7	162.6	113.9
1.5 Capital to Assets Ratio	5.1	5.4	6.3	5.6	5.3
2. Asset Quality					
2.1 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (w/o Interest in Suspense)	4.5	4.3	4.8	5.5	7.0
2.2 Gross Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Gross Loans (with Interest in Suspense)	5.2	4.9	5.4	7.2	8.3
2.3 Net Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.9	5.1
2.4 Provision Made against Gross Loans	1.3	1.3	1.5	2.1	2.4
2.5 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total)	29.6	31.1	32.9	38.6	34.7
2.6 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific)	20.6	21.4	24.3	31.3	28.9
2.7 Provision Made against Total Assets	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.1
2.8 Total Loans (Gross) to Total Assets	44.3	46.8	50.1	48.1	45.6
2.9 Investments to Total Assets	44.5	41.6	38.2	40.0	42.3
2.10 Total Income to Total Assets	10.4	11.4	11.8	11.3	7.6
2.11 Net Interest Income to Total Assets	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.3	2.2
2.12 Operating Income to Total Assets	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	2.4
3. Earnings & Profitability					
3.1 Return on Equity (ROE) – After Tax	18.3	19.2	7.7	6.8	11.4
3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) – Before Tax	1.5	1.5	8.0	0.8	1.0
3.3 Return on Assets (ROA) – After Tax	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.4	0.6
3.4 Interest Income to Total Income	95.7	94.2	96.1	97.1	96.8
3.5 Net Interest Income to Total Income	32.4	26.5	27.1	29.0	28.9
3.6 Non-Interest Income to Total Income	4.3	5.8	3.9	2.9	3.2
3.7 Non-Interest Expenses (Operating Expenses) to Total Income	18.4	15.6	18.9	17.5	18.1
3.8 Staff Expenses to Non-Interest Expenses	51.1	54.3	54.2	55.4	55.4
3.9 Personnel Expenses to Total Income	9.4	8.5	10.2	9.7	10.0
3.10 Provisions to Total Income	0.3	0.9	1.6	2.9	2.4
3.11 Total Cost to Total Income	81.7	83.3	87.8	85.6	86.0
3.12 Efficiency Ratio	51.5	49.3	63.8	60.1	60.6
3.13 Interest Margin	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.1
4. Liquidity					
4. Liquid Assets to Total Assets	42.9	42.6	35.1	41.5	51.7
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets					
4.2 Liquid Assets Ratio	61.4	61.6	47.7	53.1	63.0
5. Assets / Funding Structure					
5.1 Deposits	70.3	71.3	76.3	80.9	84.5
5.2 Borrowings	20.9	19.4	13.5	9.0	6.1
5.3 Capital to External Funds	5.6	5.9	7.0	6.2	5.9
5.4 Credit to Deposits	63.0	65.6	65.7	59.5	54.0
5.5 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings	48.6	51.6	55.8	53.5	50.4
5.6 Credit to Deposits & Borrowings & Capital	46.0	48.7	52.1	50.4	47.6

(a) Provisional Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

# **Appendix 4: Financial Soundness Indicators LFCs and SLCs Sector**

	2016 Mar	2017 Mar	2018 Mar	2019 Mar	2020 Mar (a)	2020 Sep (b)
1. Capital Adequacy						
1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR)	11.3	11.8	11.7	10.6	12.5	14.8
1.2 Tier 1 Capital/Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)	10.7	11.3	11.2	9.3	11.2	13.6
1.3 Capital Funds to Total Assets	11.2	11.3	11.0	11.7	15.2	15.6
1.4 Borrowings to Equity (times)	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.4	1.6	1.5
1.5 Non Performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital	8.2	7.5	10.3	14.7	19.8	20.0
2. Asset Quality						
2.1 Gross Non Performing Advances to Total Advances	5.1	4.9	5.8	7.7	11.4	12.8
2.2 Provision made against Total Advances	3.3	3.2	3.6	4.6	6.0	7.4
2.3 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific Provisions to NPA)	63.0	63.1	60.8	56.5	53.4	55.7
2.4 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total Provisions to NPA)	64.9	65.1	62.7	58.8	54.7	58.0
3. Earnings and Profitability						
3.1 Return on Assets (Annualized)	3.5	3.7	3.0	2.8	1.9	1.1
3.2 Return on Equity (Annualized)	17.0	20.0	14.5	12.0	6.6	2.0
3.3 Operating Profit Before Provision to Total Assets	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.3	1.9
3.4 Interest Income to Interest Expenses	215.9	189.9	177.1	183.9	184.0	188.1
3.5 Net Interest Income to Profit After Tax	404.6	333.0	405.8	553.6	731.8	2605.8
3.6 Operating Cost to Net Interest Income	77.8	76.3	75.9	76.7	78.0	72.6
3.7 Net Interest Income to Average Assets	8.6	7.8	7.1	8.0	7.6	6.8
3.8 Net Interest Income to Interest Income	53.7	47.4	43.5	45.6	45.7	46.8
3.9 Non-Interest Expenses to Total Cost	44.9	39.0	33.8	35.3	34.4	32.3
3.10 Efficiency Ratio	65.4	61.6	64.5	68.9	76.2	81.9
3.11 Cost to Income Ratio	80.8	80.4	84.3	86.3	90.3	93.3
4. Liquidity						
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets	8.0	7.6	8.5	8.7	8.3	9.2
4.2 Liquid Assets to Deposits and Borrowings	10.4	9.9	11.0	11.2	11.0	12.7
4.3 Net Loans to Total Borrowings	223.1	227.2	260.9	256.5	295.8	311.1
5. Assets/Funding Structure						
5.1 Borrowings to Total Assets	33.3	33.7	29.0	28.9	27.3	25.2
5.2 Investment to Total Assets	10.9	9.9	9.0	8.7	9.3	10.6

(a) Revised Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

(b) Provisional

# **Appendix 5: Financial Soundness Indicators Licensed Finance Companies Sector**

	2016 Mar	2017 Mar	2018 Mar	2019 Mar	2020 Mar (a)	2020 Sep (b)
1. Capital Adequacy						
1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR)	9.9	10.3	11.0	10.1	12.0	14.2
1.2 Tier 1 Capital/Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)	9.4	10.0	10.4	8.8	10.6	13.0
1.3 Capital Funds to Total Assets	10.0	10.2	10.4	11.1	14.6	14.9
1.4 Borrowings to Equity (times)	2.9	2.9	2.5	2.4	1.6	1.5
1.5 Investment Properties to Capital Funds	9.4	8.7	12.2	12.6	11.4	12.7
1.6 Non Performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital	9.6	8.8	10.9	15.4	20.8	20.5
2. Asset Quality						
2.1 Gross Non Performing Advances to Total Advances	5.4	5.2	5.9	7.8	11.6	12.9
2.2 Provision made against Total Advances	3.5	3.4	3.7	4.6	6.0	7.5
2.3 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific Provisions to NPA)	62.4	62.8	61.0	56.9	53.4	56.1
2.4 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total Provisions to NPA)	64.3	64.8	62.8	58.8	54.5	57.9
Earnings and Profitability						
3.1 Return on Assets (Annualized)	3.1	3.4	2.9	2.6	1.7	1.0
3.2 Return on Equity (Annualized)	15.7	20.4	15.6	12.0	6.2	1.9
3.3 Operating Profit Before Provision to Total Assets	3.4	3.8	3.9	4.2	4.1	1.8
3.4 Interest Income to Interest Expenses	207.2	184.3	173.5	181.5	180.9	185.0
3.5 Net Interest Income to Profit After Tax	452.3	339.4	419.6	568.2	771.4	2925.1
3.6 Operating Cost to Net Interest Income	82.8	79.2	78.2	78.2	79.9	74.1
3.7 Net Interest Income to Average Assets	8.0	7.3	7.2	7.8	7.4	6.6
3.8 Net Interest Income to Interest Income	51.7	45.8	42.4	44.9	44.7	45.9
3.9 Non-Interest Expenses to Total Cost	44.6	38.4	33.5	35.1	34.1	32.1
3.10 Efficiency Ratio	68.4	62.8	66.1	70.0	77.7	82.9
3.11 Cost to Income Ratio	82.9	81.4	85.3	86.9	91.1	93.8
4. Liquidity						
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets	7.7	7.4	8.5	8.8	8.3	9.3
4.2 Liquid Assets to Deposits and Borrowings	9.9	9.5	11.0	11.2	11.0	12.7
4.3 Net Loans to Total Borrowings	238.1	247.0	269.5	264.8	303.9	319.0
5. Assets/Funding Structure						
5.1 Borrowings to Total Assets	30.9	30.8	28.0	27.9	26.4	24.5
5.2 Investment to Total Assets	11.5	10.3	9.3	8.9	9.6	10.8

(a) Revised

(b) Provisional

# **Appendix 6: Financial Soundness Indicators Specialised Leasing Companies Sector**

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020
	Mar	Mar	Mar	Mar	Mar (a)	Sep (b)
1. Capital Adequacy						
1.1 Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets (RWCAR)	33.5	33.4	45.0	23.5	27.7	33.2
1.2 Tier 1 Capital/Risk Weighted Assets (Tier 1 RWCAR)	32.1	31.2	44.7	22.9	27.0	32.4
1.3 Capital Funds to Total Assets	26.0	23.9	29.1	29.8	36.5	39.7
1.4 Borrowings to Equity (times)	2.4	2.8	2.1	2.0	1.4	1.2
1.5 Non Performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital	0.8	1.2	3.3	5.6	5.9	12.2
2. Asset Quality						
2.1 Gross Non Performing Advances to Total Advances	1.7	1.5	2.6	4.4	5.4	9.9
2.2 Provision made against Total Advances	1.4	1.2	1.4	2.5	3.5	6.0
2.3 Provision Coverage Ratio (Specific Provisions to NPA)	84.8	74.6	48.2	36.3	51.3	36.0
2.4 Provision Coverage Ratio (Total Provisions to NPA)	84.8	78.3	55.9	55.9	68.3	61.7
3. Earnings and Profitability						
3.1 Return on Assets (Annualized)	9.1	6.7	3.6	6.9	7.1	4.1
3.2 Return on Equity (Annualized)	24.2	18.0	9.0	11.9	11.3	4.3
3.3 Operating Profit Before Provision to Total Assets	9.1	6.8	10.0	8.4	11.1	4.3
3.4 Interest Income to Interest Expenses	343.4	258.5	334.7	272.9	318.8	361.8
3.5 Net Interest Income to Profit After Tax	240.0	296.7	277.1	380.4	399.0	878.4
3.6 Operating Cost to Net Interest Income	45.8	57.3	43.3	50.4	46.9	46.0
3.7 Net Interest Income to Average Assets	15.0	13.1	5.6	13.3	16.2	14.1
3.8 Net Interest Income to Interest Income	70.9	61.3	70.1	63.4	68.6	72.4
3.9 Non-Interest Expenses to Total Cost	48.7	45.7	46.5	42.1	41.6	40.4
3.10 Efficiency Ratio	43.1	52.8	40.4	49.1	49.8	59.8
3.11 Cost to Income Ratio	60.9	71.0	59.3	69.6	70.5	78.6
4. Liquidity						
4.1 Liquid Assets to Total Assets	11.2	10.5	8.1	7.8	6.7	4.2
4.2 Liquid Assets to Deposits and Borrowings	17.7	15.8	13.4	12.9	12.7	8.8
4.3 Net Loans to Total Borrowings	133.2	123.7	139.4	138.1	161.2	170.8
T.O NOT ESUMS TO TOTAL BOTTOWINGS	100.2	120.7	100.4	100.1	101.2	170.0
5. Assets/Funding Structure						
5.1 Borrowings to Total Assets	63.1	66.5	60.3	60.4	55.2	51.7
5.2 Investment to Total Assets	3.8	5.5	1.2	1.3	0.8	0.7

(a) Revised

(b) Provisional